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I. Introduction
The story is familiar to most Californians. Balkanization has ex-
acerbated what are properly regarded as regional-as opposed to
statewide or local-problems: crime, urban sprawl, socio-economic
disparities, inefficient and uncoordinated transportation systems,
housing shortages, insufficient open space and recreational facilities,
inadequate water supply, and poor air quality.'
1. See, e.g., Douglas R. Porter, Tough Choices: Regional Governance for San Fran-
cisco, URB. LAND 36-39 (Mar., 1992); CAL. CH. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS'N, ACION
AGENDA FOR THE 1990s: A NEw APPROACH TO GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND REGIONAL
PLANNrING (mimeograph, Sacramento, 1991); Douglas R. Porter, Regional Governance of
Metropolitan Form: The Missing Link in Relating Land Use and Transportation, in TRANsP.
RscH. BD., TRANSPORTATION, URBAN FORM, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Special Report
231, at 63-80 (1991); Kenneth A. Brunetti, Note, It's Time to Create a Bay Area Regional
Government, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1103, 1116-23 (1991); David R. McEwen, Land-Use Con-
trol, Externalities, and the Municipal Affairs Doctrine: A Border Conflict, 8 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REv. 432,433 n.7 (1975); GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS,
METROPOLITAN CALIFORNIA 3, 18-19 (Ernest A. Engelbert ed., 1961); CAL. COMM'N ON
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Most Californians live in vast metropolitan areas. In the San
Francisco Bay Area, more than six million people live in 7,000 square
miles, divided into nine counties, covered by a patchwork of nearly
100 cities, and crisscrossed by more than 650 special districts.2 Even
with a dominant central city, and a large county, greater Los Angeles
is equally complicated, more populous, much larger, and even more
daunting.3
In planning circles, there is consensus that the "region" is the
most relevant level for effective land use planning in California.4 Nev-
ertheless, in the overwhelming majority of cases, California's system
of local government fails to match the regional model. Each of Cali-
fornia's four types of local government-county, city, consolidated
city-and-county, and special district-has subject matter jurisdiction
exclusive of the others.' In fact, political and fiscal pressures en-
courage California local governments to compete, rather than cooper-
ate with one another.
This is not a new phenomenon. During the Gold Rush, boosters
of rival communities within the same region, like the cities of San
Francisco and Benicia, competed to attract commerce and put their
rivals under.6 Well before California's post-World War II population
explosion, city planners, elected officials, and political scientists began
COUNTY HOME RuLE, CouNTrY GovERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL REPORT OF THE
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CoUNTY HoME RULE 165 (1930).
2. See Brunetti, supra note 1.
3. Los Angeles County covers 4,060 square miles. See CALIFORNIA CITIES, TowNs &
CouNTIEs: BASIC DATA PROFILES FOR ALL MuNIciPALITIES AND COUNTIES 496 (Edith R.
Hornor ed., 1997). In 1996, it was home to an estimated 9.4 million people, of whom 3.6
million lived in the City of Los Angeles, 4.8 million in another 80 cities, and 1 million in
unincorporated areas. See id., at 235 (city), 495 (county). Within Los Angeles County
there are also approximately 700 independent agencies, including 100 school districts. See
WINSTON W. CRoucH, ET AL., CALIFORNIA GovERNvmNT AND POLITIcs, at 249 (6th ed.
1977).
4. C.f. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 498 n.20 (1971) ("Younger /")
("Indeed, it has been generally recognized that land use planning and environmental con-
trol often present problems of regional, statewide, national, or even world-wide concern.")
(citations omitted). For a recent, scientific survey of California planning directors' opin-
ions on regional government generally, and regional planning functions specifically, see
Mark Baldassare, et al., Possible Planning Roles for Regional Government: A Survey of
City Planning Directors in California, 62 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 17, 17 (1996) ("There are at
least ten economic regions in the state."), citing RICHARD SYBERT & ANTHONY QuINN,
THE REGIONS OF CALIFORNIA (Sacramento: Cal. Governor's Ofc. of Plan. & Rsch., 1992).
5. The territorial jurisdiction of special districts often overlaps with that of counties
and cities.
6. See, e.g., PAUL WALLACE GATES, LAND AND LAW IN CALIFORNIA: ESSAYS ON
LAND PoLIcIEs 109-12 (1992) (describing San Francisco-Benicia rivalry).
to call for a reform in California's system of local government.7 Some
improvements have come, whether through annexations, recodifica-
tion of state laws, or amendments of the State Constitution.8 Overall,
these have been too little, too late.
As California's land use problems continue to intensify and be-
come more complex, commentators continue to clamor for local gov-
ernment reform.9 In all these efforts, some form of regional
government has remained the Holy Grail.' ° Like the search for
Christ's chalice, the quest for regional government has been uncertain
and interminable. Sadly, both the Grail and regional government
bodies may be largely mythical."
Despite valiant efforts," the recent push for regional government
has stalled, just as it has in the past. It is hard to believe that more
urban sprawl and other catastrophes 3 will inspire the California elec-
torate to embrace regionalism when they have not done so to date.
7. See, e.g., Brunetti, supra note 1, at 1108 (recounting past efforts to create regional
government in the Bay Area), citing JOHN C. BOLLENS, THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT
IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION 65-94 (1948).
8. See, e.g., Revision to California Constitution, Article XI, Approved by the Voters,
June 2, 1970. Of course, one might credibly argue that the rewriting of Article XI merely
strengthened Home Rule, especially for cities, thereby making it even harder to address
regional problems. See infra part II.B.
9. See, e.g., Brunetti, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENLAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND CoMPETI-
TION IN SILICON VALLEY AND Rour 128 (1994); Brunetti, supra note 1, at 1106 (1991);
CROUCH, ET AL., supra note 3, at 268-69; STANLEY ScoTr & JOHN C. BOLLENS, GoVERN-
mr: REGIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 2 (1969);
STANLEY SCOTT & JOHN C. BOLLENS, GOVERNING A METROPOLITAN REGION: THE SAN
FRANCIsCo BAY AREA (1968); Ira Heyman, Symposium: The San Francisco Bay Area-
Regional Problems and Solutions, 55 CAL. L. REv. 695, 698 (1967); GOVERNOR'S COMMIS-
SION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, METROPOLITAN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1;
Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Mun. & County Gov't, Concepts in Metropolitan Gov-
ernment, 6 ASSEM. Iwr. Rrs. 1957-1959 No. 9, 1, 7; BOLLENS, supra note 7; Planning Act
of July 1, 1937, Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 665, at 1817 (directing State Planning Board to divide
State into regional planning districts, each with a regional planning commission appointed
by Governor from nominees selected by boards of county supervisors); CAL. COMM'N ON
CotnY Holm RULE, supra note 1, at 165-73.
11. There is some reality to regionalism. A few regional bodies in California have
planning authority, like the California Coastal Commission, see CAL. PuB. RES. CODE
§§ 30300-30355 (West 1996), the Bay Conservation and Development Commission
("B.C.D.C."), see CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 66600-66682 (West 1997), and the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency ("T.R.P.A."). See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 67000-67132 (West 1997).
12. In the Bay Area, a recent failure was Bay Area 2020, set up at the end of 1989. See
Brunetti, supra note 1, at 1104.
13. Of course, not every planner agrees that sprawl is bad. See, e.g., Genevieve Giu-
liano, The Weakening Transportation-Land Use Connection, 6 ACCESS 3 (1995); Peter
Gordon & Harry Richardson, Gasoline Consumption and Cities: A Reply, 56 J. AM. PLAN.
Ass'N 342.45 (1989).
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Some damage, like the destruction of prime agricultural land, is irre-
versible. It will be cold comfort for planners to say, "We told you so,"
once the San Joaquin Valley has become an undifferentiated megalop-
olis, stretching from Sacramento to Fresno.
Therefore, it is unwise to expend precious political, psychic, and
financial capital in lobbying state officials to undercut their own power
by authorizing a new layer of regional government, or in suggesting to
city officials that they surrender their identities by merging into their
larger neighbors.14 Rather, those concerned by the status quo might
try something new, and, yes, less ambitious. We must be mindful of
planning titan Daniel H. Burnham's famous admonition, "Make no
little plans." However, the plan to correct regional problems remains
unchanged. It is the implementing strategy that must be reconsidered.
This article examines California's most basic form of local gov-
ernment, the county. Its central premise is that California counties
are not merely second-rate localities, but are suited to address re-
gional planning problems. Counties are and have always been an es-
sential part of California's constitutional makeup. While cities and
special districts come and go, counties remain. Furthermore, although
not as powerful politically as their counterparts in cities, county offi-
cials already exist. That means that counties are relatively unthreaten-
ing to the State and other localities. Moreover, counties have their
own sources of power. They have a tax base and their own identifi-
able constituency.
The discussion below has a simple format. First, I trace the polit-
ical realities of California counties as a form of local government (Sec-
tion II). Next, I establish the legal parameters that constrain
California county government (Section III), and, in the process, tackle
counterintuitive rules of law, like the immunity of city-owned prop-
erty in unincorporated areas from county land use controls. Finally, I
attempt to synthesize lessons from California politics and law to sug-
gest a coherent strategy for reform, namely the creation of "county-
wide affairs," or the adoption of the "urban county" plan (Section
IV).
The discoveries in this article are not shocking. California coun-
ties are, in fact, poor relations to their municipal brethren. They are
not currently vested with adequate power to perform regional plan-
14. These aspects of the regionalization movement are discussed throughout Brunetti,
supra note 1, at 1103, and Frank P. Sherwood, Some Major Problems of Metropolitan Ar-
eas, in GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON METROPOLiTAN AREA PROBLEMS, METROPOLITAN
CALIFORNiA, supra note 1.
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ning. However, both these shortcomings are easily cured through
statutory reform, more easily I would argue, than the creation of new
regional governments has proved.
H. A Brief History of California County Government
No regional planning strategy can succeed without reference to
political realities. As one of California's best-known planners, Wil-
liam Fulton, has put it, "[Pllanning is inseparable from politics."' 5
This section, provides a typology of local governments in California,
explaining the evolution of county and other local government forms
under the state's two constitutional regimes. Additionally, it briefly
recounts the counties' relative decline in importance since World War
II.
A. Typology of California Local Government
The California Constitution describes how counties, cities, and
consolidated cities-and-counties come into being, and distributes to
them certain powers. While special districts are the most common
form of local government, the State Constitution almost fails to men-
tion them. History shows that within the local government family,
counties are the poorest of the four relations.
i. Counties
At present, the California Constitution requires that the State be
subdivided into counties, and that the Legislature provide for "county
powers."' 6 California's 58 counties are local, political arms of the
State. 7 As such, every county must perform functions assigned to it
by the State. 8 However, the State Constitution also guarantees that a
county may make and enforce within its boundaries all ordinances and
15. See WILLIAM FULTON, GUIDE TO CALwORNIA PLANNING 8 (1991).
16. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 1; Cleland v. Sup. Ct. of Mendocino County, 52 Cal.
App. 2d 530, 535 (1942) (citing Welsh v. Bramlet, 98 Cal. 219, 224 (1893) (Legislature must
provide for counties)), review denied, Aug. 3, 1942; 16 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 79, 81 (1950)
(same); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 ("The provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.").
17. See County of Manin v. Sup. Ct. of Main County, 53 Cal. 2d 633, 638 (1960); Los
Angeles County v. Orange County, 97 Cal. 329, 331 (1893).
18. See Kahn v. Sutro, 114 Cal. 316, 319 (1896), overruled in part on other grounds by
Rand v. Collins, 214 Cal. 168, 175 (1931).
SPRING 19991
628 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:621
regulations not in conflict with general laws. 19 Finally, the Legislature
grants certain, specific authority to counties by statute.20
The county concept predates California statehood.2' Under an
1837 law, Mexican California was divided into three prefectures: Baja
California, and two others in Alta California that split roughly at San
Luis Obispo.22 In 1845, the Mexican governor subdivided the prefec-
tures of Alta California into partidos centered around the communi-
ties of San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, Monterey and Yerba
Buena (San Francisco).' In 1849, delegates to the California Consti-
tutional Convention, which also predated statehood, represented ten
"districts" that roughly correspond to present-day counties.24
When the State Legislature first met in 1850, one of its earliest
acts was to divide the state into 27 counties,' and to provide for the
19. See CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 7; Candid Entertainers, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High
Sch. Dist, 39 Cal. 3d 878, 885 (1985); Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 184 (1956).
20. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23003 (West 1988) ("A county... has the powers speci-
fied in this title and such others necessarily implied from those expressed."); County of
Modoc v. Spencer, 103 Cal. 498, 501 (1894) (county powers are purely statutory). But see
CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7 (county may make and enforce within its boundaries all ordi-
nances and regulations not in conflict with general laws).
21. See People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 31 (1871).
22. See CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HoME RULE, supra note 1, at 18; J. Ross BROVNE,
Ti CONSTITUTONAL CONVENIMON OF 1849, Appendix, at xxix-xxxi (San Francisco, James
T. White & Co. 1878) (translated text of 1837 Mexican law). Unlike the Mexican districts,
California's modern counties typically have lacked chief executives. See CAL. COMM'N ON
CoUNTY HoMvr RULE, supra note 1, at 25.
23. See CAL. COMM'N ON CouNTY HoME RuLE, supra note 1, at 19.
24. See id.; OwEN C. Coy, CALiFORNIA CouNTY BoUNDARIES 1 (rev. ed. 1979). The
ten districts were: San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Monterey, San
Josi, Sonoma, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Sacramento. See BROWNE, supra note 22.
These same districts were used to apportion the two houses of the new State Legislature
until the Legislature could pass laws creating counties. See CAL. CONST. OF 1849, Sched.,
§ 14 (repealed 1879).
25. See "AN ACT subdividing the State into Counties and establishing the Seats of
Justice therein," Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 15, at 58-63 (Feb. 18, 1850); CAL. COMM'N ON
CoUNTY HoME RULE, supra note 1, at 19. The original twenty-seven were: San Diego, see
Cal. Stats. 1850 at 58; Los Angeles, see id., at 59; Santa Barbara, see id., at 155-56; San
Francisco, see id., at 59-60, 156; Santa Clara, see id., at 60, 156; Contra Costa, see id., at 60,
156; Marin, see id., at 60; Sonoma, see id., Solano, see id., at 61; Yola, see id. (became Yolo,
see id., at 162); Napa, see id., at 61; Mendocino, see id. (attached to Sonoma for judicial
purposes until 1859, see id.); Sacramento, see id.; El Dorado, see id., at 61-62; Sutter, see id.,
at 62; Yuba, see id., Butte, see id.; Colusi, see id. (Spelled Colusa from 1859 onward, see
Coy, supra note 24, at 4 n.5); Shasta, see Cal. Stats. 1850, at 62; Trinity, see id.; Calaveras,
see id., at 63; San Joaquin, see id.; Tuolumne, see id.; and Mariposa, see id. The Legislature
acted on the basis of reports prepared by a committee chaired by General Mariano
Guadalupe Vallejo, who also did most of the work. See Coy, supra note 24, at 1-2, citing
Cal. Sen. J., 1st. Sess. (1849), at 72, app. F at 420-21. Contrary to the Vallejo committee's
advice, the Legislature made many mining districts into separate counties. See id., at 4.
first county elections.26 Between 1850 and the adoption of a new
State Constitution in 1879, 26 more counties were carved out of the
original set, one of which later dissolved.27 Only six more counties
have been added under the current Constitution, and none since
1907.2
ii. Cities
In 1850, after creating counties, the California Legislature acted
to allow the incorporation of cities.29 Today's State Constitution com-
mands the Legislature to prescribe a uniform procedure for city for-
mation and provide for city powers.30  However, the State
Constitution does not mandate the creation of cities, as it does of
counties.3' Instead, county residents must themselves petition for in-
26. See "AN ACT to provide for holding the First County Election," Cal. Stats. 1850,
ch. 24, at 81-83 (Mar. 2, 1850).
27. See CAL. CoMnv'N ON Coun'ry Hovm RuLE, supra note 1, at 19-21. The twenty-six
newcomers were: Klamath (from Trinity, 1851), see Cal. Stats. 1851, at 180, (dissolved into
Humboldt and Siskiyou, 1874), see Cal. Stats. 1873-74, at 755; Nevada (from Yuba, 1851),
see Cal. Stats. 1851, at 177; Placer (from Yuba and Sutter, 1851), see Cal. Stats. 1851, at 176;
Siskiyou (from Shasta and Klamath, 1852), see Cal. Stats. 1852, at 233; Sierra (from Yuba,
1852), see Cal. Stats. 1852, at 230; Tulare (from Mariposa, 1852), see Cal. Stats. 1852, at 240;
Alameda (from Contra Costa, 1853), see Cal. Stats. 1853, at 56; San Bernardino (from Los
Angeles, 1853), see Cal. Stats. 1853, at 119; Humboldt (from Trinity, 1853), see Cal. Stats.
1853, at 161; Plumas (from Butte, 1854), Cal. Stats. 1854, at 129; Amador (from Calaveras,
1854), see Cal. Stats. 1854, at 157; Stanislaus (from Tuolumne, 1854), see Cal. Stats. 1854, at
40; Merced (from Mariposa, 1855), Cal. Stats. 1855, at 125; Buena Vista (from Tulare, 1855,
organized as Kern, 1865-66), see Cal. Stats. 1865-66, at 796; San Mateo (from San Francisco,
1856), see Cal. Stats. 1856, at 176; Fresno (from Mariposa, 1856), see Cal. Stats. 1856, at 183;
Tehama (from Shasta, Colusi and Butte, 1856), see Cal. Stats. 1856, at 222; Del Norte (from
Klamath, 1857), see Cal. Stats. 1857, at 35; Mono (from Calaveras and Fresno, 1861), see
Cal. Stats. 1861, at 235; Lake (from Napa, 1861), see Cal. Stats. 1861, at 560; Alpine (from
El Dorado, Amador, Calaveras, Tholumne and Mono, 1864), see Cal. Stats. 1863-64, at 178;
Lassen (from Plumas and Shasta, 1864), see Cal. Stats. 1863-64, at 453; Coso (from Tulare
and Mono, 1864, organized as Inyo, 1866), see Cal. Stats. 1865-66, at 355); Ventura (from
Santa Barbara, 1872), see Cal. Stats. 1871-72, at 484; San Benito (from Monterey, 1874), see
Cal. Stats. 1873-74, at 95; and Modoc (from Siskiyou, 1874), see Cal. Stats. 1873-74, at 124.
28. The final six counties were: Orange (from Los Angeles, 1889), see Cal. Stats. 1889,
at 123; Glenn (from Colusa, 1891), see Cal. Stats. 1891, at 98; Riverside (from San Diego
and San Bernardino, 1893), see Cal. Stats. 1893, at 159; Kings (from Tulare, 1893), see Cal.
Stats. 1893, at 176; Madera (from Fresno, 1893), see Cal. Stats. 1893, at 188; and Imperial
(from San Diego, 1907), see Cal. Stats. 1907, at 275.
29. See "AN ACT subdividing the State into Counties and establishing the Seats of
Justice therein," Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 15, at 58-63 (Feb. 18, 1850); "AN ACT to provide for
holding the First County Election," Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 24, at 81-83 (Mar. 2, 1850); "AN
ACT to provide for the Incorporation of Cities," Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 30, at 87-91 (Mar. 11,
1850).
30. See CAL. CONsr. art. XI, § 2(a).
31. Nevertheless, California law has long recognized cities' valuable role in society.
See, e.g., Lynch, 51 Cal. at 29 ("municipalities are invaluable to a great and free people").
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corporation as a city.3 2 California's over 450 cities are "municipal cor-
porations," formed for the purposes of local government, and, unlike
counties, they are not subdivisions of the State.3 The Legislature has
authorized cities to exercise powers that are often identical to those of
counties.34 The result is that counties are left to exercise their powers
only in unincorporated portions of their territories.
Municipal governments also predated California statehood.
However, Mexican California was predominantly rural, and dense set-
tlements were few and small. The Mexican census of 1842 counted
only 196 San Franciscans, and in June, 1847, a year after the American
conquest-but before the Gold Rush-there were still only 459.35
As American courts soon learned, Mexican local government was
also complicated. Continuing with San Francisco as an example, the
American city there grew out of several earlier communities.3 6 For-
eigners, especially Yankee merchants, concentrated in a hamlet that
grew up around a cove directly across from Yerba Buena Island.37
The older Spanish-Mexican settlement comprised three separate poli-
ties. The Spanish had founded two of these in 1776: a military base,
the Presidio, which lay on the southern side of the Golden Gate, to
the east of Punta de Lobos, and a religious center, Mission San Fran-
cisco de Asis, commonly known as Mission Dolores, which was situ-
ated inland toward the bay.38 The Presidio spawned a pueblo,39 which
32. See County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 636 (1900); Kahn, 114 Cal. at
319; Williams v. McClellan, 119 Cal. App. 2d 138, 142-43 (1953), review denied, Sept. 4,
1953.
33. See City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue, 66 Cal. 2d 217,230-31 (1967) (unanimous);
accord Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 438, 467 (1958); Coburn, 130 Cal. at 636-
37; People ex rel. Graves v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489,498 (1889) (unanimous); see also Butler
v. Compton Junior Coll. Dist., 77 Cal. App. 2d 719,728 (1947) (counties are not municipal
corporations like cities), review denied, Mar. 20, 1947; Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.
App. 2d 605, 611-12 (1942) (same).
34. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65300 (legislative body of each county and city
must adopt a general plan); 65850 (legislative body of any county or city may adopt zoning
ordinances), 66411 (regulation of subdivisions is vested in legislative bodies of cities, coun-
ties and cities-and-counties) (West 1997).
35. See BERNARD Mosas, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MUNICIPAL GovERNTmNr IN SAN
FRANcIscO 17 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1889). I do not mean to suggest that
San Francisco was California's largest settlement at the time. Until the Gold Rush, Monte-
rey, the former capital of Alta California, was probably larger.
36. See generally Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530 (1860), overruled on other grounds by
Risdon Iron & Loco. Works v. Citizens' Traction Co. of San Diego, 122 Cal. 94, 97 (1898).
37. The hamlet was also called Yerba Buena. The cove was later filled creating the
modern city's Financial District.
38. See Mosas, supra note 35, at 5-6.
39. See id., at 6-7. Literally, pueblo means "people," but here it has the sense of the
English word "town." See Trenough v. San Francisco, 100 U.S. 251, 252 (1880).
the Mexican Government granted a separate civil government in
1834.40
iii. Chartered Counties, Chartered Cities, and Chartered Cities-and-
Counties
A few counties and many cities in California operate under a
"charter."'" The provisions of a charter become the law of the state
and have the force and effect of legislative enactment.42 In other
words, the charter is something more than a local ordinance and less
than the State Constitution itself.43 However, as discussed below, the
degree of autonomy gained by adopting a charter depends on whether
the polity is a county or a city.4'
Finally, a county and a city may consolidate into a chartered "city
and county," which is essentially the same as a chartered city.4" San
40. See Palmer v. United States, 65 U.S. 125, 127 (1861); MosEs, supra note 35, at 17-
18. When Mission Dolores was secularized, the Pueblo succeeded to its property. See De
Haro v. United States, 72 U.S. 599, 623 (1866). As for the Presidio, it passed from the
Mexican Army directly to the U.S. Army in 1846, see United States v. Bateman, 34 F. 86,
87 (1888), and then to the National Park Service exactly 150 years later. Thus, although
the Presidio is San Francisco's oldest European settlement, the city has never controlled it.
C.f Bateman, supra, at 90 (holding that Presidio not within exclusive jurisdiction of United
States because U.S. controls it merely as a proprietor).
41. California is one of only a few states that allows its counties to become chartered.
See Victor S. De Santis & Tari Renner, Governing the County: Authority, Structure, and
Elections, in CouT GOVERNmEmS IN AN ERA OF CHANGE xii (David R. Berman ed.,
1993). Even when permitted to charter, counties rarely do so. In 1988, only 117 out of
1,307 eligible counties nationwide had done so. See id., citing TANIs J. SALANr, COUrrY
HoNm RULE: PERSPECTIVES FOR DECISION-MAKING IN ARIZONA (1988).
42. See Adams v. Wolff, 84 Cal. App. 2d 435, 440 (1948), review denied, May 17, 1948;
see also Stem v. Council of City of Berkeley, 25 Cal. App. 685, 688 (1914) (adoption of
charter by the State gives charter effect of state law); C. J. Kubach Co. v. McGuire, 199 Cal.
215, 217 (1926) (charter is not only organic law of city, but also law of state within constitu-
tional limitations); Platt v. City and County of San Francisco, 158 Cal. 74, 84-85 (1910)
(municipal charter is municipality's constitution enumerating and giving to it all the powers
it possesses).
43. Originally, the State Legislature had to approve such charters. See CAL. CONsr.
art. XI, §§ 71/2 (county charters) (repealed June 2, 1970), 8 (city charters, and city and
county charters) (repealed June 2, 1970); see also Brooks v. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173, 175-77
(1889) (Governor's signature not required). However, it did so without fail. See ARvo
VAN ALsTYNE, BACKGROUND STUDY RELATING TO ARTICLE XI: LOCAL GOV'T 230-32
(1967) (describing legislative approval as an empty sham), citing Harrison v. Roberts, 145
Cal. 173, 178 (1904) ("practically only a formal matter"). Today, charters become effective
when filed with the Secretary of State. See CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 3(a).
44. By adopting a charter, a county does not become a municipal corporation. See
McClellan, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 142.
45. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6(b); Kahn, 114 Cal. at 319,322 ("Geographically, [San
Francisco] is one of the legal subdivisions of the state .... Politically, it is regarded in [the
State Constitution] as a municipal corporation."); see also Martin v. Bd. of Election
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Francisco became the first consolidated city and county in 1856.46
However, except for a brief experiment by Sacramento between 1858
and 1863, 47 no other California locality has followed suit.
iv. Special Districts
The last type of local government in California is the special dis-
trict, which the State Constitution appears not to have recognized for-
mally before the adoption of Proposition 13 in 1978.48
Special districts can perform "proprietary," as well as "govern-
mental" functions.49 In other words, the State often establishes spe-
cial districts to provide services to the public, like fire protection, or
water and sewerage, which are then financed by public bonds, taxes,
and/or user fees." Certain types of special districts, like drainage and
sewer districts, are governed directly by county boards of supervi-
sors.51 Others are independent.
Although some had existed earlier in California, special districts
did not catch on until the Legislature passed the Wright Act of 1887 to
establish a system of irrigation districts.52 The next year, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court rejected a claim that such districts were private
Comm'ers, 126 Cal. 404, 412 (1899) (provisions of constitution applying to counties do not
apply to City and County of San Francisco). But see Keyes v. San Francisco, 177 Cal. 313,
323-24 (1918) (consolidated city and county partakes of the nature and has the powers and
exercises the functions of both municipal corporation and subdivision of the State).
46. The Legislature passed a special act in 1856 to split off the City of San Francisco
from present-day San Mateo County, and create the consolidated "City and County of San
Francisco." See John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: III, 32 CAL. L. REv.
341, 342 (1944) ("PEPPiN III"), citing Consolidation Act (a.k.a. "Hawes Act"), Cal. Stats.
1856, at 145.
47. See id., citing Cal. Stats. 1858, at 67 and Cal. Stats. 1863, at 413-441.
48. Even since then, the only references to special districts in the Constitution are in
connection with the tax limitation provisions. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4; art. XIIIB,
§ 8.
49. This archaic distinction is based upon the idea that government's activities can be
separated into those performed for the general welfare of the public, such as activities
under the police power ("governmental"), and those performed for the peculiar benefit
and advantage of particular citizens or groups and therefore more resembling the activities
of private persons ("proprietary"). See generally Guidi v. State of California, 41 Cal. 2d
623 (1953), and cases there cited. In practice, this distinction has been of no predictive use,
and can only be made on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Barrett v. City of San Jose, 161
Cal. App. 2d 41, 42 (1958). Litigating this issue ensured employment to generations of
California lawyers, until judicial abrogation of governmental tort immunity made it largely
irrelevant. See Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213 (1961).
50. See generally CAL. COMM'N ON CouNrY HoME RULE, supra note 1.
51. See CAL. COMM'N ON CoUNTY HomE RULE, supra note 1, at 37, citing Cal. Stats.
1923, at 196 ff (drainage districts) and Cal. Stats. 1927, at 1088 (sewer districts); Dairy Belle
Farms v. Brock, 97 Cal. App. 2d 146 (1950).
52. Act of Mar. 7, 1887, Cal. Stats. 1887, at 29.
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corporations unconstitutionally allowed to levy taxes.5 3 The court rea-
soned that irrigation districts were "quasi public corporations" be-
cause they were organized not for private gain but to address one of
California's great public concerns.5 4 Later, the court held that a spe-
cial district's "quasi" status comes from exercising fewer powers than
cities do.5"
B. California's Constitutional Regimes
When the Americans assumed control of Alta California in 1846,
they had varying preconceptions about local government from their
years back East. In New England, counties were essentially unimpor-
tant, serving judicial functions, if any, while towns and cities domi-
nated. In direct contrast, counties were all important in the Southern
states. 6 Meanwhile, in the Middle Atlantic States, both counties and
cities served as seats of local government. The largest number of
American-born delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1849
had arrived in California from this last region. 7 Therefore, it was not
purely coincidence that the State Constitution established a system of
local government in a middle ground between the New England and
Southern models.
However, the Americans did not simply transplant in California
their legal forms from back East." Mexican California had had its
own forms of local government, 9 including town councils, called
ayuntamientos, and municipal offices, like the alcalde, who acted in
53. See Irrigation District v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360 (1888).
54. See id. at 369-70. The court used this same reasoning in Marin Mun. Water Dist. v.
Chenu, 188 Cal. 734, 737-38 (1922) (unanimous) (refusing to construe the word "business"
broadly to include public corporations of the State).
55. See In re Orosi Pub. Util. Dist., 196 Cal. 43, 56, 59 (1925) (unanimous) (public
utility district is "quasi-municipal corporation"); In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 321-23
(1891); see also People v. Van Nuys Light. Dist., 173 Cal. 792, 798 (1916) (district's public
purpose makes it "public corporation"); Low v. Mayor and Common Council of Marys-
ville, 5 Cal. 214, 216 (1855) (distinguishing between "public" and "municipal").
56. See generally Howard Lee McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local
Self-Government: II, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 303-10 (1916).
57. See PETER THOMAS COMMy, THE CONSTIrrIONAL BEGINNINGS OF CALIFORNIA
20 (1959).
58. It was not for lack of trying. Three years after the American occupation of Cali-
fornia had begun, the Military Governor, General Bennett Riley, voided San Franciscans'
radical restructuring of their city government, and ordered them to revert to Mexican
pueblo law. See MosEs, supra note 35, at 44-46.
59. See Fowler v. Smith, 2 Cal. 568, 568 (1852) (California governed under Roman
(Civil) Law as modified by Spanish and Mexican legislation).
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both executive and legislative capacities. 60 These forms endured dur-
ing the American occupation,61 through the Gold Rush of 1848,62 and
even past adoption of the state's first constitution in 1849 and its en-
trance into the Union the next year.63
Under California's first constitution, adopted in 1849 and ap-
proved by Congress in 1850, the State Legislature had complete power
over all forms of local government. Unhappy with the results from
this system, Californians adopted a new Constitution in 1879. This
second iteration both prevented the State Legislature from doing as
much and empowered local government to do more.64 Major consti-
60. An ayuntamiento was the chief political body in large settlements, while an alcalde
served as an administrator and judge with broad discretion. See MosEs, supra note 35, at
15-16, 18, 21, 25-29; see also BROWNE, supra note 22, at Appendix, at xxxiii (translated text
of Mexican Law of March 20 1837). Once the Americans had taken control of San Fran-
cisco, they tinkered with both offices to suit the city's current needs. See MOSES, supra
note 35, at 31-34.
61. See COMMY, supra note 57, at 6, quoting Comm. JOHN D. SLOAT, PROCLAMATION
TO THE PEOPLE OF CALFORNIA (issued at Monterey, July 7, 1847):
With full confidence in the integrity and honor of the inhabitants of the country I
invite the Judges, Alcaldes and other civil officers, to retain their offices... until
the government of the territory can be more definitely arranged;
and at 8, BRIG. GEN. STEPHEN W. KEARNEY, PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF CALI-
FORNIA (issued at Monterey, Mar. 1, 1847):
[T]he laws now in existence, and not in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States, will be continued until changed by competent authority; and those
persons who hold office will continue in the same for the present, provided they
swear to support that Constitution and to faithfully perform their duty.
62. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement between Mexico and the
United States, signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, 102 THE CONSOLIDATED
TREATY SERIES 29, 40-41, 42, (Clive Parry ed., 1981), art. VIII ("Mexicans now established
in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which remain for the future within the
limits of the United States, as defined by the present treaty, shall be free to continue where
they now reside.... retaining the property which they possess in the said territories, or
disposing thereof, and removing the proceeds wherever they please.. . ."), art. IX ("Mexi-
cans ... shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and be admitted at the
proper time (to be judged of [sic] by the Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment
of all the rights of citizens of the United States, according to the principles of the constitu-
tion; and in the mean time shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their
liberty and property .... ").
63. See CAL. CONST. OF 1849, Schedule, § 1 ("All rights, prosecutions, claims, and con-
tracts, as well of individuals as of bodies corporate, and all laws in force at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution, and not inconsistent therewith, until altered or repealed by
the Legislature, shall continue as if the same had not been adopted.") (emphasis added)
(repealed 1879); Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 228 (1860), quoting Burnett, 15
Cal. at 559; MosEs, supra note 35, at 46-47. The new State Legislature abolished alcaldes
and replaced them with justices of the peace in 1850. See CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY
HoME RULE, supra note 1, at 26, citing Cal. Stats. 1850, at 80. During the same legislative
session, the Legislature adopted the Common Law. See Fowler, 2 Cal. at 568-69.
64. See infra, notes 89-128.
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tutional amendments gave the option of charter-based Home Rule
first to cities (1896), and then to counties (1911).65
Though much amended and revised, the 1879 Constitution re-
mains California's organic law. However, during the present constitu-
tional regime, one might say that California politics has not
corresponded with the blueprint. Home Rule has been both less and
more than its founders expected: less, because courts have not permit-
ted counties and other "local agencies of the State" to operate as au-
tonomously as cities do; more, because city autonomy has stymied
regional solutions to regional problems.
i. The California Constitution of 1849
Bitterly divided over the extension of slavery into United States
territories, Congress still had not authorized a territorial government
for California even two years into the American occupation. Mean-
while, immigrants flooded into the state in search of fortune. Re-
sponding to popular impatience, California's Military Governor
authorized a constitutional convention, which met at Monterey during
September 1849. Soon after, California voters ratified the document
produced there, which was already in effect when California entered
the Union in September, 1850.
Like all State Constitutions, California's did not enumerate the
powers of the representative body of the sovereign people, the Legis-
lature, but rather placed limitations upon their exercise.66 Some of
these limits related to local government, expressly including counties
and cities. The Legislature, however, was unquestionably superior in
power to both of these.
As to counties, the constitution required the Legislature to estab-
lish a system of county governments by uniform (i.e. general) laws.6 7
Counties were not municipal corporations, but subdivisions of the
State.6s The State Constitution endowed the Legislature with the fur-
65. See infra, notes 129-146.
66. See Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395, 403 (1866); c.f. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
204-05 (1824) ("In our complex system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one
general government, whose action extends over the whole, but which possesses only cer-
tain enumerated powers, and of numerous state governments, which retain and exercise all
powers not delegated to the Union, contests respecting power must arise.").
67. See CAL. CONST. OF 1849 art. XI, § 4 (repealed). For a discussion by a California
court of "general" and "uniform" laws, see Coulter v. Pool, 187 Cal. 181, 192-93 (1921) and
John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: 11, 30 CAL. L. REv. 272,282-83 (1942)
("PEPPIN II").
68. See Sharp v. Contra Costa County, 34 Cal. 284, 290 (1867), citing Hunsacker v.
Borden, 5 Cal. 288, 290 (1855) (creditor of county has no remedy by virtue of county's
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ther power to provide for the election of county boards of supervisors,
and define their powers.69 The Legislature could also move county
seats at will.
7 °
By statute, county boards of supervisors were authorized, among
other things, to purchase and manage property; lay out and oversee
public rights-of-way; care for the indigent sick; subdivide their territo-
ries into townships; set election precincts, build and maintain neces-
sary public buildings, such as courthouses and jails; litigate cases as a
party; and "do and perform all such other acts and things as may be
strictly necessary" to discharge such powers conferred.7'
The 1849 Constitution referred also to "towns,' 72 by which the
delegates to the constitutional convention appear to have meant what
are more properly called "townships. '73 Legally, a town or township
was not like a city at all; rather, it was an unincorporated subdivision
of the county.74 The Legislature provided for town formation under
an 1850 act.75 However, it seems the few towns that were formed
under this act served merely as judicial districts at the sub-county
level.76
derivative sovereignty); see also People v. Bd. of Supervisors of Sacramento County, 45
Cal. 692, 695 (1873) (county is not a municipal corporation).
69. See CAL. CoNsT. OF 1849 art. XI, § 5 (repealed 1879). Until the Legislature got
around to creating county boards of supervisors in 1852, judges of the county courts of
sessions ran the counties, as was the style in many southern states. See CAL. COMM'N ON
CouNry HoME RULE, supra note 1, at 17, 32, citing Cal. Stats 1850, at 176, 210-11. Under
the 1849 Constitution, there was no separation of powers at the local level. County boards
of supervisors were simultaneously legislative, judicial and administrative bodies. See
Waugh v. Chauncey, 13 Cal. 11, 12 (1859); see also Murray v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mari-
posa County, 23 Cal. 492, 495 (1863) (district courts have power to grant writs of certiorari
to review action of board of supervisors in denying ferry license).
70. See Upham v. Bd. of Supervisors of Sutter County, 8 Cal. 378,382 (1857) (Legisla-
ture may confer decision on location of county seats to the people); see also Atherton v.
Bd. Of Supervisors of San Mateo County, 48 Cal. 157, 160 (1874) (because court will not
set policy, removal of county seat only reviewable for compliance with statutory
procedures).
71. See "AN ACT to create a Board of Supervisors in the Counties of this State, and
to define their duties and powers", Cal. Stats. 1855, ch. 157, § 9, at 53 (Mar. 20, 1855).
72. See CAL. CONST. OF 1849 art. XI, § 4 (repealed).
73. See Kenyon v. Johnson, 97 Cal. App. 552, 554, 555 (1929).
74. See id. at 554-555.
75. See "AN ACT to provide for the incorporation of Towns," Cal. Stats. ch. 48, at
128-31 (Mar. 27, 1850).
76. See Exparte Wall, 48 Cal. 279,321 (1874), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex
parte Beck, 162 Cal. 701, 705 (1912). Yet another provision of the 1849 Constitution re-
ferred to an "incorporated village." See CAL. CONST. OF 1849 art. XI, § 9 (repealed 1879).
It seems, however, that the Legislature ignored this form of local government altogether.
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In contrast to counties and towns, cities were municipal corpora-
tions,77 and the State could form them individually by "special" act.78
In addition, the constitution required the Legislature to provide for
city organization and to restrict cities' powers of taxation, borrowing,
contracting debts, and loaning their credit "so as to prevent abuses. 7 9
Even before Judge John Dillon enunciated it, the California Supreme
Court already observed "Dillon's Rule," that cities were purely crea-
tures of the State. 0 Thus, in 1867, the California Supreme Court held
that cities were invested with such power and capacity only as con-
ferred by statute expressly or by necessary implication.8'
During this period, many California cities had charters issued to
them by the State.82 Typically, these charters granted several powers:
to make ordinances and set penalties, to regulate businesses, to pre-
vent and remove nuisances, to regulate construction, to build and
keep public buildings, to operate schools, to manage city elections, to
borrow money, and to levy some taxes.' 4 Still, when it wished, the
Legislature could cut out the middlemen, and legislate on behalf of
specific city councils.8"
77. See Bd. of Supervisors of Sacramento County, 45 Cal. at 693 (county is not a mu-
nicipal corporation; City and County of San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541, 557-58
(1872) (municipal corporations may be created, altered, or abolished at the will of the
Legislature).
78. See CAL. CONST. OF 1849 art. IV, § 31 ("Corporations may be formed under gen-
eral laws, but shall not be created by special act, except for municipal purposes.") (re-
pealed 1879). Except for this rule, it does not appear that the State Constitution
distinguished between municipal corporations and other types of corporations:
The term corporations as used in this article shall be construed to include all
associations and joint-stock companies, having any of the powers or privileges of
corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships. And all corporations
shall have the right to sue, and shall be subject to be sued, in all courts, in like
cases as natural persons.
See id. art. IV, § 33.
79. Id., art IV, § 37; John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: 1, 30 Cal. L.
Rev. 1, 7 (1970) ("PEPPIN I").
80. Compare People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Hill, 7 Cal. 97, 103 (1857) and City of Clinton
v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River R. Co., 24 Iowa 455,475 (1868) (Dillon, J.), overruled
by state constitutional amendment as noted in City of Clinton v. Sheridan, 503 N.W.2d 690,
691 (Iowa 1995); John C. Dillon, 1 MuN. CoRPs., § 98 (5th ed. 1911).
81. See Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 134, 143 (1867); see also Johnson v. Bradley, 4
Cal. 4th 389, 394-95 (1992) (summarizing constitutional history of California cities).
82. See PEPPiN I, supra note 79, at 7-11.
83. By statute, every incorporated city in California could penalize and regulate busi-
ness and abate nuisances. See "AN ACT to provide for the incorporation of cities," Cal.
Stats. 1850, ch. 30, at 87-88 (March 11, 1850).
84. See JOHN C. BOLLENS & STANLEY ScoTr, LocAL GovRN'mNr IN CALIFORNIA,
12 (1951).
85. See PEPPiN I, supra note 79 at 16-19.
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In summary, under the Constitution of 1849, the State Legislature
had complete power over both counties and cities.8 6 The Legislature
was not shy, and often meddled in local affairs.8 7 It flouted the Con-
stitution by regulating counties through special laws,"8 and took full
advantage of its legitimate power to regulate cities' behavior. Exam-
ples from the period include: directing payments of a claim to a named
individual, ordering the issuance of bonds in specified amounts, re-
quiring tax levies to support favored enterprises, establishing special
commissions to handle local debts, and authorizing the Governor to
appoint a board to control local public works.89
ii. The California Constitution of 1879
A political movement for land and tax reform, as well as open
hostility toward Chinese labor, led California to a second Constitu-
tional Convention in 1878. 90 The resulting document, adopted in
1879, did not institute land reform,91 but it did introduce a modicum
of autonomy for California localities.92
86. See supra, notes 67-86.
87. See Daniel U. Smith, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for its Protection and
Development, 55 CAL. L. Rnv. 728, 760 (1967); BOLLENS & Scorr, supra note 84, at 13;
PEPPIN I, supra note 79, at 10-11.
88. The California Supreme Court ruled that the relevant provision was merely "direc-
tory." See W. F. HENNING, LAW RELATING TO COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA, 2
(2nd ed. 1901), citing People ex rel. Bd. of Supervisors of Solano County v. Lake County,
33 Cal. 467, 494 (1867); CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HoME RuLE, supra note 1, at 26.
89. See Smith, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for its Protection and Develop-
ment, supra note 87, at 760, citing, e.g., Cal. Stats. 1859, ch. 8, at 6; Cal. Stats. 1869, ch. 78, at
78 (claim to named person); Cal. Stats. 1862, ch. 78, at 957 (directing San Francisco super-
visors to issue school bonds in a specified amount); Cal. Stats. 1860, ch. 307, at 286 (order-
ing consolidated City and County of Sacramento to levy taxes to support State Agricultural
Society); Cal. Stats. 1851, ch. 88, at 387 (designating for the City of San Francisco "Com-
missioners of the Funded Debt"); Cal. Stats. 1875, ch. 570, at 856 (authorizing governor to
appoint a board to control public works in Los Angeles); see also PEPPIN I, supra note 79,
30 CAL. L. REv. at 11-14 nn.26-35 (citing many more examples).
90. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND PoLmcAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CAL-
FORNiA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1878-1879 (reprint ed., Da Capo Press, 1969).
Among other ideas, would-be reformers proposed limiting land ownership to 1,000 or
640 acres and removing a ceiling on real property taxes, but the convention did not adopt
them. See GATES, supra note 6 at 224, 267, 322; DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1878-1879 (Sacramento,
State Printing Office, 1880), 96 (proposal by Abraham C. Freeman (Sacramento County)
to limit land ownership to 1,000 acres, referred to Committee on Land and Homestead
Exemption), 470 (proposal by Hamlet Davis (Nevada County) to allow Legislature to limit
land monopolization).
91. See GATES, supra note 6, at 224-25.
92. One of the reformers' hopes was that the new constitution would require land held
speculatively to be taxed at the same rate as improved land. See id., at 322. However,
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Generally, the Convention delegates resented the State Legisla-
ture's interference in their local affairs.93 Not surprisingly, delegates
from the growing metropolis of San Francisco were hottest about the
issue.94 They were not the only ones. As a delegate from rural Tulare
County explained, "the people" had called for a Convention in part
because they believed they could govern themselves better than the
Legislature could.95
According to California Constitutional scholar John C. Peppin,
the delegates wanted to ensure that each locality possessed the power
to incur debts along with the power to tax.96 That way, the delegates
could eliminate the Legislature's ability to impose "unfunded man-
dates"-to use current terminology.97  Moreover, the delegates
wanted to make it harder for the Legislature to change local jurisdic-
tions by moving county seats or creating new counties. 98
The new constitution's section on local government, Article XI,
purported to end these perceived abuses by the Legislature of the
assessment and levying were left up to the discretion of the State Board of Equalization
and the counties' boards of supervisors. See id.
93. For an account of public dissatisfaction with the State Legislature's practice of run-
ning roughshod over local governments, see PEPPiN I, supra note 79, at 34-37.
94. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 6, at 139 (proposed amendment by Jacob R. Freud
(City and County of San Francisco) on special laws and city incorporation), 228 (proposed
amendment by Patrick T. Dowling (City and County of San Francisco) to empower and
authorize his community "to legislate exclusively for itself and attend to its own local af-
fairs, independent of the Legislature," referred to Committee on City, County, and Town-
ship Organizations).
95. See GATEs, supra note 6, at 1063 (remarks by Joseph C. Brown (Tulare County)
during debate on provision allowing cities to adopt freeholders' charters ).
96. See John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: IV, 34 CAL. L. Rnv. 644,
680 (1946) ("PEPPIN IV").
97. See id. at 659-60, citing with approval Wulff-Hansen & Co. v. Silvers, 21 Cal. 2d
253, 268-69 (1942) (Carter, J., dissenting) (saddling debt upon city is like imposing a tax)
and Shealor v. City of Lodi, 23 Cal. 2d 647, 653 (1944) (same); see also McCabe v. Carpen-
ter, 102 Cal. 469,471 (1894) (If Legislature cannot impose tax upon property or inhabitants
of school district, it would seem to follow that it cannot prescribe procedure through which
such tax would inevitably be levied without leaving some discretion to local authorities.).
To Peppin, the power to incur debts probably implied proprietary powers, such as the
authority to operate public works. See Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151 (1894) (city's
real estate purchase not within the police power). However, at least at one time, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court distinguished between governments' regulatory power and their
power to tax. See Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 470 (1959). Sometimes, making
such a distinction seems to work unfairly. C.f. Trebilcox v. City of Sacramento, 91 Cal.
App. 257, 263 (1928) (holding that revocation of license is not necessarily a regulatory act,
even if licensee rendered unable to do business).
98. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 6, at 156-57 (remarks of Josiah Boucher (Butte
County) on minimum size and voter approval for all new counties). During the proceed-
ings, the delegates swapped stories of the Legislature creating new counties on thin quo-
rums so that lobbyists could secure county offices. See id. at 1042.
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State's paramount power. 99 First, Section 11 of Article XI ("Section
11"), granted "police power"'100 to every county, town, township, city,
and city and county in the state.10
The grant of such power to towns and townships is a curiosity.10 2
As had been true under the Constitution of 1849, towns or townships
were unincorporated subdivisions of counties, not municipal corpora-
tions, like cities.' 3 In practice, the Legislature never authorized the
organization of towns or townships for administrative purposes, but
only judicial ones,' °" which proved unpopular.0 5 In the 1940s, Profes-
sor Peppin concluded that the Town of Antioch, formed in 1872 under
the Constitution of 1849 and incorporated as a city in 1890, was the
last bona fide town the State has seen.'06
99. See Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 395, citing People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880).
100. "The police power is the inherent reserved power of the State to subject individual
rights to reasonable regulations for the general welfare." Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of
Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 325 (1981). Modern courts give enormous deference to
government in determining what regulations serve the general welfare. See Miller v. Bd. of
Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484 (1925) (police power is elastic and evolves along with our
society); c.f. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (court will not substi-
tute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use unless the
use be palpably without reasonable foundation); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32
Cal. 3d 60, 72 (1982) ("'A public use defies absolute definition, for it changes with varying
conditions of society, new applications in the sciences, [and] changing conceptions of the
scope and functions of government."'); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) ("It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.").
101. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (repealed June 2, 1970). Section 11 applied to a consoli-
dated city and county by virtue of former Article XI, § 7 (repealed June 2, 1970). See
PEPP N III, supra note 46, at 341, citing Ex parte Keeney, 84 Cal. 304, 305-06 (1890).
102. In debate, the Convention delegates had used the terms "town" and "township"
interchangeably. Compare GATES, supra note 6, at 161-62 (proposal by James McM.
Shafter (3rd Cong. Dist.) to create at least three "towns" within every county, and require
every subsequent town to be at least 36 square miles in size) with id., at 285 (proposal by
Hiram Mills (Contra Costa County) to require three "townships" in each county, with 30
square-mile minimum size after the first three).
103. See CAL. CoNsT. art. X, § 4 (repealed June 2, 1970) (requiring Legislature to pro-
vide through general law for counties to adopt township organization whenever a majority
of county voters so determine); GATES, supra note 6, at 1046-49 (all speakers assuming
township is mere subdivision of county).
104. See Cox v. Jerome, 31 Cal. App. 97, 98-99 (1916), review denied, Sept. 18, 1916;
Kahn, 114 Cal. at 332, citing County Government Act, § 58, Cal. Stats. 1893, at 366 (di-
recting county boards of supervisors to divide their respective counties into townships for
purpose of electing justices of the peace and constables); Kenyon, 97 Cal. App. at 554
(California township officers limited to justices of the peace and constables); VAN AL-
srYNm, supra note 43, at 80-81; CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HoME RULE, supra note 1, at 72.
105. See PEPPiN III, supra note 46, at 318.
106. See PEPPni I, supra note 79, at 7-11.
Otherwise, the grant of such broad powers to local government
has had major implications for intergovernmental relations in Califor-
nia. In several places, the new Constitution forbade the Legislature
from passing special laws affecting either counties or cities.10 7 It also
stipulated that no new county could be created without a minimum
number of inhabitants. 10 8 The delegates' final innovation was Section
7 of Article XI ("Section 7"), which allowed cities with more than
100,000 residents to adopt a freeholders' charter. 0 9 Only San Fran-
cisco had a population that large.
Sadly, the delegates did not say much about the police power, and
made no attempt to define the term." 0 Section l1's plain text meant
that where there was no conflict with the State's general laws, a local-
ity's police power within its territory was as broad as the State Legisla-
107. See, e.g., CAL. CONSr. art. IV, § 25 (repealed June 2, 1970) (declaring that Legisla-
ture shall not pass local or special laws "regulating county and township business of the
election of county and township officers," or "creating offices, or prescribing the powers
and duties of officers in counties, cities, cities[-]and[-]counties, townships, election or
school districts," or "affecting the fees or salary of any officer."); id. art. XI, § 4 (repealed
June 2, 1970) ("The legislature shall establish a system of county governments which shall
be uniform throughout the State ....").
This principle appears today in Article IV, § 16(b), but, in enforcing it, courts are very
deferential to the Legislature. A law is general as long as it has a "substantial relation to
the purpose to which the legislation was designed." See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v.
Spink, 145 Cal. App. 2d 568, 572 (1956).
108. See CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 3 (repealed June 2, 1970). The delegates probably
thought this provision was important because they debated it at great length. See GATES,
supra note 6, at 104246.
109. Cities themselves initiated a "freeholders' charter," subject to veto by the State
Legislature. Formerly, cities obtained "special charters," which the Legislature drafted and
could amend.
110. But see GATES, supra note 6, at 174 (remarks of Joseph R. Weller (Santa Clara
County) proposing autonomous local legislative powers in areas of "county business" and
"city taxation and expenditures), at 1491 (remarks of William P. Hughey (City and County
of San Francisco) proposing that "local sanitary, moral, and police government" be left to
county, city, or city-and-county).
The delegates' silence may have been due partly to then-recent California Supreme
Court decisions that had protected localities to some degree. See BOLLENS & ScoTr, supra
note 84, at 13; PEPPIN I, supra note 79, at 34. For example, in 1871, the court had held that
the State Legislature could not validate illegal assessments made by a city. See Lynch, 51
Cal. at 23-24. And, in 1861, the court had held that the State could not take back lands it
earlier had granted to the City and County of San Francisco. See Grogan v. City and
County of San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, 613 (1861).
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ture's.111 Yet, it was also clear textually that the Legislature could
always render local legislation invalid by passing new general laws." 2
In the years after the new Constitution's adoption, California
courts clarified its meaning. The police power came to be as broad as
it sounded."' That is, within their own territories, counties and cities
possessed legislative powers equal to the Legislature's." 4 California
courts held that the police power included the ability both to assess
and levy certain taxes," 5 and to set the "rules of conduct to be ob-
served by the citizens.""' 6 Once zoning came into vogue during the
1920s, the California Supreme Court held, even before Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co.,"' that the police power of counties and
cities included the ability to regulate land uses." 8
111. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (repealed June 2, 1970) ("Any county, city, town, or
township may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."). Professor Van Alstyne agrees that
the delegates' intent in this was clear. See VAN ALs mN, supra note 43, at 298.
112. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (repealed June 2, 1970).
113. See Miller, 195 Cal. at 484 (police power is elastic and evolves along with our soci-
ety); see, e.g., Allied Architects' Ass'n of Los Angeles v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431, 434 (1923)
(promotion of patriotism a valid public purpose).
The police power is limited by the federal constitutional doctrine of Substantive Due
Process. Substantive Due Process requires that regulations not only serve the general wel-
fare but be "reasonable" as well. Regulations violate Substantive Due Process if they have
no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, or, stated another way, they
are irrational or plainly arbitrary. See Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.
1990); Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1579, 1592 (1991); see also
Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d
582, 607 (1976) (land use ordinance is valid if it "reasonably relates to the welfare of those
whom it significantly affects") (emphasis added).
114. See Jardine v. City of Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64,68 (1926); In re Isch, 174 Cal. 180, 181-
82 (1917); Odd Fellows' Cemetery Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 140 Cal. 226,
231 (1903). This was the delegates' intent. They voted down a proposed amendment that
would have forbidden localities to exercise power which the Legislature had not provide
for. See GATES, supra note 6, at 1052.
115. See Ex parte Mount, 66 Cal. 448, 450-51 (1885); see also County of Los Angeles v.
Eikenberry, 131 Cal. 461, 466-67 (1901) (county license tax on businesses are within Sec-
tion 11 power); Hughes v. Ewing, 93 Cal. 414, 418 (1892) (Legislature must enact general
laws to give localities taxing power); Ex parte Pfirrman, 134 Cal. 143, 149 (1901) (Legisla-
ture has discretion in passing general laws to give localities taxing powers).
116. Von Schmidt, 105 Cal. at 161 (city's real estate purchase not within the police
power).
117. 272 U.S. 365.
118. See Miller, 195 Cal. 477 (upholding residential zoning); Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works,
195 Cal. 497, 502-03 (1925) (following Miller); Fourcade v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 196 Cal. 655, 662 (1925) (following Miller and Zahn).
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In contrast to Section 11, the delegates had a lot to say about
special laws, which their new Constitution banned almost entirely." 9
One of the delegates' chief purposes in convening was to constrain the
Legislature to making only general laws of statewide application. 20
The State could no longer create counties through special acts.' 2 ' Sec-
tion 12 of Article XI provided that to pay for local government pur-
poses, the State could not impose taxes on any locality, "or upon their
inhabitants or property thereof."' 22 Section 13 of Article XI barred
the Legislature from delegating to state commissions, or any other
body, the power to: (1) preside over local money, property, or ef-
fects-governmental or proprietary; (2) levy taxes for local issues; or
(3) perform "municipal" tasks.'23
Once the new constitution was in place, the State Legislature
adopted the Municipal Corporations Act in 1883,124 which set out stat-
utory charters for six different classes of cities, based on population.' 25
Cities that availed themselves of these ready-made charters still exer-
cised their inherent police power as stated in the constitution, and
their ordinances were still subject to the Legislature's general laws. 26
119. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25 (repealed June 2, 1970) (declaring that Legisla-
ture shall not pass local or special laws "regulating county and township business of the
election of county and township officers," or "creating offices, or prescribing the powers
and duties of officers in counties, cities, cities[-]and[-]counties, townships, election or
school districts," or "affecting the fees or salary of any officer.")
120. See PEPPIN IV, supra note 96, at 644 (delegates had little to say about Article XI,
§ 11, but debated at length ban on state's imposing taxes by special laws made in Article
XI, § 12).
121. Although contrary to the delegates' intent, the Legislature remained free to effect
boundary changes by special act. See Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 228-29, 232-33
(1907) (unanimous) (State may not create new county by special act but may alter county
boundaries in that manner); see also VAN ALsTYNn, supra note 43, at 65, citing People ex
rel. Graves, 81 Cal. at 498-99 (State cannot be required to create new counties by general
law).
122. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 12 (repealed June 2, 1970); see PEPPIN IV, supra note 96, at
644. Interestingly, Section 12 protected localities' property but not their inhabitants' prop-
erty. See id. at 648-49. This was probably just a drafting error. See id. In 1974, the sub-
stance of Section 12 was reincarnated as part of Article XIII. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 24 (adopted Nov. 5, 1974).
123. See PEPPIN IV, supra note 96, at 678-79.
124. Cal. Stats. 1883, at 93.
125. See Rondell B. Hanson, Comment, Business Licensing: The City-State Conflict in
California, 49 CAL. L. REv. 330, 331 n.1 (1961); PEPPIN II, supra note 67, at 283-88, 295-
312, 317. At the Constitutional Convention, delegate W. W. Moreland (Sonoma County)
had suggested limiting the number of classes for cities to four. See GATES, supra note 6, at
222. This was not adopted.
126. See Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 138 (1929) (general law cities subject
to Legislature's general laws), overruled on other grounds by Associated Home Builders,
18 Cal. 3d at 588, 596; City of San Mateo v. Railroad Comm'n, 9 Cal. 2d 1, 7 (1937)
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In 1887, California voters amended Article XI to extend the self-
chartering privilege of Section 7 to any city with a population over
10,000.127 During the next two years, Los Angeles, Oakland, Stockton
and San Diego adopted charters. 28 In 1890, California voters lowered
the self-chartering threshold again, this time to include cities of
greater than 3,500 people.1 29
A state constitutional amendment in 1896 finally empowered self-
chartered cities to insulate themselves from state legislation in the
area of "municipal affairs.' 130 Then, as now, courts defined this term
case by case.131 The definition is complicated further by its possible
overlap with the "police power," which is allocated under Article XI
to all counties, cities, and consolidated cities-and-counties. 3
2
Even after this last innovation, California courts remained loyal
to Dillon's Rule by construing city charters strictly.' 33 Thus, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held in 1891 that the State Legislature could
not authorize a Los Angeles treasurer to deposit funds into a private
bank when the City of Los Angeles' charter did not specifically au-
thorize it.' 34 Cities responded by amending their charters to provide
for every power conceivable. 135
(chartered cities subject to Legislature's general laws when "municipal affairs" not at
issue).
127. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 43, at 218. For the text of the amendment, see Cal.
Stats. 1887, at 88.
128. See id., citing HowARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICI-
PAL HoME RULE, 204 (1916).
129. The cities of Napa, Eureka, and Grass Valley enacted their charters under this
amendment. See id., citing McBAIN, supra note 128, at 229.
130. See Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 395. For the text of the amendment, see Cal. Stats. 1895,
at 450. For a discussion of "municipal affairs," See supra part II.A.ii.b.
131. See infra notes 289-292.
132. See, e.g., McEwen, supra note 1, at 444 n.64, citing Sho Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in
California, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1055, 1095 (1972).
133. See Nicholl v. Koster, 157 Cal. 416 (1910) (holding that because City and County of
San Francisco's charter did not mention probation officers and their assistants then city
could not regulate them); see also John Rapp and Son v. Kiel, 159 Cal. 702, 706-09 (1911)
(reading city charter strictly to exclude all powers not expressed).
134. See Smith, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for its Protection and Develop-
ment, supra note 87, 55 CAL. L. REv. at 761, citing Yarrell v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal.
603 (1891), abrogated by constitutional amendment as recognized in Howard Jarvis Taxpay-
ers' Ass'n v. Fresno Metro. Projects Auth., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1359, 1370 (1995), as modified
on denial of reh'g, Jan. 10, 1996, review denied, Mar. 20, 1996.
135. See, e.g., Charter of the City and County of San Francisco, as codified in the Con-
solidation Act of April 19, 1856, and amendments, in A. E. T. WORLEY, THE CONSOLIDA-
TION ACT AND OTHER ACTS RELATING TO THE GOVERNmENT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO (San Francisco, Wm. M. Hinton & Co. 1887) (442 pages, not including
summary table and index).
Nor, for its part, did the State Legislature honor the Constitu-
tional Convention delegates' antipathy toward special laws. For ex-
ample, it passed general laws that simply created a single class for
each of the state's 58 counties, and the California judiciary acqui-
esced. 36 Also, in spite of Section 11's plain language, the courts held
that localities could tax their residents only with specific authorization
from the State Legislature, 37 although chartered cities could levy li-
cense and property taxes as a municipal affair.13 1
In 1911, California voters approved Section 71/219 of Article XI
("Section 71/2"), which added charter-based home rule for coun-
ties.140 In 1914, the voters approved yet another amendment to Arti-
cle XI,11 this time to end the enumeration-of-powers problem. 42
This last amendment assured that a chartered city could make and
enforce all laws and regulations with respect to its municipal affairs,
except as limited by its charter. 43 City charters became much shorter.
However, the effect of adopting a charter differed depending on
whether a county or a city was involved."44 From the start, California
courts have held that, while a chartered city gains autonomy over its
municipal affairs and its ordinances in that area supersede contrary
136. See Longan v. County of Solano, 65 Cal. 122, 125 (1884) (Legislature's establish-
ment of 48 classes for setting fees and salaries of county officers where 52 counties exist
does not clearly violate the State Constitution); VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 43, at 69; PEPPIN
II, supra note 67, at 293 n.67, citing Johnson v. Gunn, 148 Cal. 745 (1906) (approving 58
classes for 58 counties).
137. See Pfirrman, 134 Cal. at 149 (Legislature has discretion in passing general laws to
give localities taxing powers).
138. See Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 210 (1903). Proposition 13 and its progeny have
since complicated matters. See infra part I.C.iv.
139. For the text of this amendment, see Cal. Stats. 1911, at 2168.
140. See Pulcifer v. County of Alameda, 29 Cal. 2d 258,261 (1946) (unanimous); Reuter
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 220 Cal. 314, 326-27 (1934); Brown v. Francisco, 123 Cal. App. 2d
413, 416 (1954); Lesem v. Getty, 23 Cal. App. 2d 57, 60-61 (1937); Younger v. Bd. of Super-
visors of El Dorado County, 93 Cal. App. 3d 864, 869 (1979) ("Younger II"), review denied,
Aug. 1, 1979; VAN ALsTYNE, supra note 43, at 134.
141. For the text of this amendment, see Cal. Stats. 1913, at 1730.
142. See Bradley, supra note 77, at 396-97. Reportedly, a law review article inspired this
reform. See VAN ALsrYNE, supra note 43, at 189, citing William Carey Jones, "Municipal
Affairs" in the California Constitution, 1 CAL. L. REv. 132, 144-45 (1913).
143. See West Coast Advertising v. City of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 522 (1939)
(city charter is not a grant of power but a restriction upon it); Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal.
2d 140, 146 (1938) (same); Wolff, supra note 42 at 440; Bank v. Bell, 62 Cal. App. 320, 329
(1923), review denied, July 26, 1923; see also supra part I.A.iii.
144. Also, cities that had been chartered specially by the State Legislature could not
take advantage of the new Home Rule provisions until they adopted a new charter under
the "freeholder" system. See VAN ALsTYNE, supra note 43, at 191-92, citing Civic Ass'n v.
Railroad Comm'n, 175 Cal. 441, 444-48 (1917).
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state laws, chartered counties enjoy autonomy only over electoral and
administrative details. 45
Section 71/2 did not mention municipal affairs, nor, more prop-
erly, "county affairs," so counties did not benefit much from charter-
based Home Rule. Only six years after counties gained the option of
Home Rule, a California Court of Appeal held that a county as a
political subdivision of the state has only those powers specifically del-
egated to it by the Legislature. 146 Of course, the State Constitution
mandates the existence of counties, so there may be a limit to the
Legislature's control over them. Still, it is difficult to know where that
limit would be. The general rule is that the Legislature may not forbid
counties to enact certain regulations, but it may always preempt such
regulations.' 47
iii. California Constitutional Reform of the 1960s and 1970s
California continues to operate under its 1879 Constitution.
However, by the 1960s, the State Constitution had become top-heavy
with amendments. Article XI had become too long and too specific.
Amendments had covered every hot issue as it arose. For example,
Section 181/4 allowed easy public financing for off-street parking by
permitting government agencies to set aside parking meter receipts. 48
145. See Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. 2d 523, 536 (1957) (removal and
appointment of county officials; Reuter, supra note 123, at 326-27 (administrative duties of
county officials); Curphey v. Super. Ct., 169 Cal. App. 2d 261,265 (1959) (appointment and
removal of officers by county), review denied, May 27, 1959; Lesem v. Getty, 23 Cal. App.
2d 57 (1937); Trebilcox v. City of Sacramento, 91 Cal. App. 257, 263 (1928) ; also compare,
e.g., Dibb v. County of San Diego, 8 Cal. 4th 1200, 1210-11 (1994) ("Dibb II") (even if
legislature intends to preempt the field of subpoena powers, it may not do so with respect
to a county whose charter properly grants subpoena power to county officers) with Board
of Supervisors of Butte County v. McMahon, 219 Cal. App. 3d 286,299 (1990) (home rule
county could not escape state mandate to help pay for AFDC grants because public social
services are statewide concern).
146. See County of Sacramento v. Chambers, 33 Cal. App. 142, 149-50 (1917) (State
may delegate duties to counties and take them back at will).
147. As the California Supreme Court explained in 1920:
[A]n act by the legislature in general terms that the local legislative body would
have no power to enact sanitary or other regulations, while in a sense a general
law would have for its effective purpose the nullification of the constitutional
grant, and therefore, be invalid. [citation omitted] But it was contemplated by
the constitution[ ] that the state legislature had the absolute right by general law
to enact statutes which would have validity in all parts of the state,... and, having
done so, local laws in conflict therewith ipso facto become void.
Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 641-42 (1920). It is unclear how this rule can be squared
with situations where the Legislature acts to forbid local governments from passing laws
that would infringe upon a civil right.
148. See CAL. CONsT. Art. XI, § 181/4 (repealed June 2, 1970).
Relying upon extensive, state-sponsored studies conducted dur-
ing the 1960s, 149 a Constitution Revision Commission reorganized and
simplified Article XI. 150 Voters then approved these changes through
a series of referenda and initiatives held during the early 1970s. How-
ever, Article XI hardly changed substantively, 15 except as explained
below.
C. The Twentieth-Century Decline of California Counties
A state commission assigned to look at the issue in 1930 de-
scribed counties as the nation's most inefficient, extravagant and
wasteful political unit.' 52 Whether or not that statement applied in
California, at that time counties still served as the main locus of Cali-
fornia government. In 1929, total county expenditures topped $263
million, while California cities spent $237 million, and the State only
$145 million.' 53
However, California government was evolving. During the
twenty years leading up to the Great Depression, California's total
population more than doubled, from 2.4 million in 1910 to 5.7 million
149. The two most important studies during this period were conducted by the Gover-
nor's Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems and by Professor Arvo Van Alstyne for
the California Constitution Revision Commission. Though obviously dated, each of their
final reports are well worth reading. See GoVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON METROPOLrrAN
AREA PROBLEMS, supra note 1; VA ALsTYNE, supra note 43.
150. See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers'Ass'n, supra note 134, at 1370, citing Sumner, Consti-
tution Revision by Commission in California, 1 WEST. ST. UNv. L. REv. 48 (1972).
151. See CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 13 (stating that distribution of powers between State
and local governments shall be construed the same); Bradley, supra note 77.
However, the Commission's records do raise an interesting aspect of Article XI. Van
Alstyne, the Commission's consultant had suggested that the Commission consider amend-
ing Article XI to grant cities and counties "residual powers" over any matter upon which
the Legislature had not itself passed legislation. See VAN ALsTYNE, supra note 43, at 255-
56. However, a Subcommittee assigned to study the issue recommended against this
change, explaining that it thought it too radical. See CAL. CONST. COMM'N, ART. XI, Lo-
CAL GovER~mENT BACKGROUND STUDY, SUPPLEMENT 5, A-37 (1967) (Letter from Sub-
committee to Study Residual Powers to Commission Chair). The point deserves only a
footnote because it is much less controversial today.
152. See CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 17.
153. See CAL. COMM'N ON Cotnry HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 103. In contrast,
during fiscal year 1995-1996, total county expenditures (excluding San Francisco) were
$32.2 billion, see KATHLEEN CONNELL, CALIFORmNA STATE CONTROLLER, COUNTrs AN-
NUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1995-1996, iii, while California cities (also excluding San
Francisco) spent $ 27.2 billion. See KATHLEEN CONNELL, CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROL-
LER, CITIES ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1995-1996, xx. Over the same period, the
State spent $57.8 billion, see KATHLEEN CONNELL, CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA BUDGETARY/LEGAL BASIS ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1996, A-8, nearly as much as all county and city expenditures combined.
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in 1930.154 Although California is large, this growth was highly local-
ized. Over the same 20-year period, Los Angeles County's population
quadrupled from approximately 500,000 to over two million.' 5
After a lull during the Great Depression, wartime manufacturing
jobs during the 1940s catapulted California into a post-war boom.
During the 1950s, the number of people in the San Francisco-Oak-
land, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Sacramento, San Diego, and San Jose
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas ("S.M.S.A.'s") grew, respec-
tively, 24, 51, 73, 81 and 116%.156
To meet these changes, State officials increasingly performed
tasks traditionally left to the counties, while the counties, in turn, of-
fered more municipal services.157 The counties continued to perform
many of their original state functions, like property recordation, tax
collection, administration of justice, and road construction. The
change was that counties took on new responsibilities, such as manag-
ing park lands, providing sanitation services, and operating library
systems.' 58
The Constitution of 1879, even as amended, was not designed to
handle the metropolitan problems caused by explosive population
growth.' 59 California counties found themselves caught in transition
between their role as administrative instrumentalities of the state and
full-fledged local governments. 60 They have never really resolved
this schizophrenic existence.' 61
154. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HisTORicAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, Table A 195-209, at 25 (Bicentennial ed. 1975).
155. See CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 171.
156. See GOVERNOR'S COIvnvSSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, METROPOLI-
TAN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 7. During the same decade, statewide population grew
from 10.6 million to 15.8 million.
157. See CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 88, 139; Winston W.
Crouch, The General Status of Research in Metropolitan Affairs, in GOVERNOR'S COMMIS-
SION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 34.
158. See BOLLENS & Scotr, supra note 84, at 70; JOHN C. BOLLENS, ET AL., COUNTY
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION IN CALIFORNIA 1 (rev. ed. 1947); CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY
HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 139.
159. See Winston W. Crouch, The General Status of Research in Metropolitan Affairs, in
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 36. The
1880 census shows that California was predominantly rural. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 6.
There were only eight cities with at least 5,000 residents each, but five of these were along
the San Francisco Bay (San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, Vallejo, and Alameda). See id.
Still, although San Francisco had over 230,000 people, the next largest (Oakland) had only
35,000, and all five were far enough apart so that regional problems were still unknown.
160. See BOLLENS & Scor, supra note 84, at 70.
161. C.f. David R. Berman & Katheryn A. Lehman, Counties, Change, and Reform: An
Overview, in COUNTY GOVERNMENTS IN AN ERA OF CHANGE xii (David R. Berman, ed.,
Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993).
i. Urbanization
Some counties, notably Los Angeles, rose to the challenge. 162
They cut back their numbers of elected officers and appointed chief
administrative officers ("C.A.O.'s") to act as county executives. 163
However, California counties could never operate as efficiently as
California city governments, 64 nor as flexibly as special districts. New
cities sprang up, and California led the nation in its creation of special
districts to provide municipal services.'65
Much of the State's postwar residential and commercial growth
came to unincorporated, suburban areas, where land prices were
cheaper. 166 Seeking greater autonomy, many of these suburbs incor-
porated. 67 Boundaries were gerrymandered to exclude poor and mi-
nority-inhabited areas and to include high generators of property and
sales tax.' 61 The City of Vernon was a paradigm, of sorts. In the
1960s, the neighboring City of Los Angeles had 11,000-times its popu-
lation, but only 20-times its assessed property value.1 69
In 1933, the Legislature reduced the number of signatures needed
for an incorporation petition from fifty percent of qualified electors of
162. See GEORGE W. BEMIS & NANCY BASCH8, Los ANGELES COUNTY AS AN AGENCY
OF MUNICIPAL GovERNmENr xi (1946) ("The county [sic] of Los Angeles performs more
individual functions for its people than [does] any other county in the country."); CAL.
COIM'N ON COUNTY HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 194 (claiming Los Angeles to be best-
run county in the United States).
163. See BOLLENS & ScoTT, supra note 84, at 80-87. The State's Commission on
County Home Rule had recommended such a reform well before World War II. See CAL.
COMM'N ON COUNTY HoME RULE, supra note 1, at 9, 25. By the late 1960s, 43 of the
State's 58 counties had C.A.O.'s. See JANE GLADFELDER, CALIFORNIA'S EMERGENT
CouNrIES 12-23 (1968).
164. By this time, California cities increasingly had shifted to the city-manager system.
See BOLLENS & Scorr, supra note 84, at 4, 23-28.
165. See CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 139, 162.
166. See id. For a classic account of the Federal Government's role in America's post-
war suburbanization, see KENNETH JACKSON, THE CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 190-230 (1985). For the role transportation
technologies played, see Peter 0. Muller, Transportation and Urban Form: Stages in the
Spatial Evolution of the American Metropolis, in Tim GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPOR-
TATION, at 26-52 (S. Hanson ed., 2nd ed. 1995).
167. A study of city incorporations by the California Assembly's Interim Committee on
Municipal and County Government conducted during the late 1950s concluded that there
were "no set patterns of motivation to the ... movement." See Cal. Assembly Interim
Comm. on Mun. & County Gov't, Incorporation Practices, 6 ASSEM. INT. RM'rs. 1957-1959
No. 11, 1, 9. Among the motivations identified by the Interim Committee were a fear of
annexation by existing cities, and the desires to control local land uses and capture local
sales-tax revenue. See id., at 9-12.
168. See Sherwood, Some Major Problems of Metropolitan Areas, in GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 18-19.
169. See VAN ALsTYNE, supra note 43, at 26.
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the county who were residents within the limits of the proposed city to
merely twenty-five percent.17° During the 1950s, the State Legislature
reduced the six classes of non-chartered cities to one. 7' Since then,
California law has countenanced only two types of cities, chartered
cities (which include chartered cities-and-counties) and general law
cities.
From 1954 to 1959, there was a fifty percent increase in the
number of cities in the Los Angeles Area, one having fewer than 300
residents . 2 At the beginning of the 1960s, California had a total of
294 general law cities, and 70 chartered cities. 3 In 1940, there had
been only 226 and 57 respectively. 7 4
Even having captured so much wealth, many of California's new
cities were too small to provide their own municipal services. This did
not stop them. Under an approach refined7 5 by the City of Lake-
wood and Los Angeles County, small cities contracted with their
counties to provide municipal services that their residents needed, like
fire and police protection. 7 6 As an alternative to the "Lakewood
Plan," 7 cities could employ California's Joint Exercise of Powers Act
of 1921 to set up separate entities to provide them all with services at
170. See PEPPIN II, supra note 67, at 315-16.
171. See Hanson, supra note 125, at 331 n.1 (1961), citing Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 624,
p.1114 (May 20, 1955).
172. See Sherwood, Some Major Problems of Metropolitan Areas, in GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, METROPOLITAN CALIFORNIA, supra
note 1, at 17.
173. See Hanson, supra note 125, at 331 n.1.
174. See PEPPIN I, supra note 79, at 4-5.
175. It would be inaccurate to write "pioneered" instead of "refined." A quarter-cen-
tury earlier, the State's Commission on County Home Rule suggested that counties be
empowered to perform more "municipal functions." See CAL. COMM'N ON CoUNTY HoME
RULE, supra note 1, at 10, 91. Already by that time, counties could do so by virtue of a
State Constitutional amendment passed in 1914. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 43, at 163.
In fact, the roots of the Lakewood Plan run even deeper than that. As early as 1891,
certain chartered cities could agree to have counties perform their taxing duties, and in
1895 the privilege was extended to all cities except the State's very largest. See CAL.
COMM'N ON CoUNTY HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 31, citing Cal. Stats. 1891, at 22 ff.
176. Californians surveyed in the Los Angeles area around the year 1960 were more
interested in garbage collection and street maintenance than police protection. See Wil-
liam B. Storm & Wallace H. Best, Public Awareness of Metropolitan Problems: Some Sur-
vey Research Estimates, in GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA
PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 43.
177. For an early but detailed description of the Lakewood Plan, see Mark B. Feldman
& Everett L. Jassy, The Urban County: A Study of New Approaches to Local Government
in Metropolitan Areas, 73 HARV. L. REv. 526, 545-58 (1960).
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shared cost.178 Finally, cities offered each other mutual aid for emer-
gency services. 79 California cities perfected all these techniques.'
Also, by the 1940s, State courts had begun to soften Dillon's Rule
to resolve all doubts in favor of cities.' The political gulf widened
between counties and cities. This was especially so between chartered
cities and chartered counties, because only the former had autonomy
over its municipal affairs.
Special districts made up the final part of the postwar political
landscape. These entities provided a quick and relatively cheap way
for citizens to secure municipal services. 82 California was not the
only state using special districts,'183 but it used them more often and
for a wider variety of services, including irrigation, reclamation, water
conservation, drainage, levee management, mosquito abatement,
schools, highways, and revenue-producing utilities. 84
By the 1960s, California's present, convoluted structure of local
government had taken form. Typically, Californians lived, worked,
studied, shopped, drew their water from and emptied their sewage
into separate jurisdictions,'85 which did not coordinate their planning
with one another. Furthermore, Californian's local taxing jurisdic-
tions and government-service areas did not coincide. 8 6 This local
governmental structure misallocated the tax burdens away from the
178. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6500-99.1 (West 1995); see also "An Act providing for the
joint exercise of powers by counties, by municipalities, or by municipalities and counties,"
Cal. Stats. 1921, ch. 363, at 542 (May 20, 1921); City of Oakland v. Williams, 15 Cal. 2d 542,
549 (1940) (cities may contract so that one of them performs services for both). For an
example of a separate body organized under the Joint Powers Act. See Preamble to By-
Laws of the Association of Bay Area governments (1961) (forswearing regulatory power).
179. Professor Sherwood commented that such arrangements could be coercive. See
Sherwood, Some Major Problems of Metropolitan Areas, in GOVERNOR'S COMIUSSION ON
METROPOLrTAN AREA PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 95. As an example, Sherwood ex-
plained that the City of Los Angeles, out of self-interest, had to help the City of Vernon
protect its factories from fire, but that the Vernon Fire Department was all but useless to
the City of Los Angeles. See id.
180. See VAN ALsrYt, supra note 43, at 32.
181. See, e.g., Ravettino v. City of San Diego, 70 Cal. App. 2d 37, 47 (1945) (all doubts
about the propriety of means used in exercise of an undoubted municipal power should be
resolved in favor of the municipality where there is no abuse of power or discretion), re-
view denied, Aug. 27, 1945.
182. See BOLLENS & Scotrr, supra note 84, at 138.
183. See John C. Bollens, Metropolitan Districts, in URBAN GovERNvmrr 68 (Edward
C. Banfield ed., 1961).
184. See BOLLENS & Scorr, supra note 84, at 124.
185. See VAN ALs-rYN, supra note 43, at 34; Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Con-
serv., Ping., & Pub. Works, Subcommittee on Plng., A Metropolitan Multipurpose District
for California, 13 ASSEM. INT. Rprs. 1957-1959 No. 24, 1, 31 (1959).
186. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 43, at 34.
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true beneficiaries. It also skewed the considerations of local govern-
ment when they did their land use planning.
ii. Local Agency Formation Commissions (LAFCOs)
Unable to serve their residents by themselves, California munici-
pal officials found ingenious ways to cooperate.'87 Formal regional
bodies were tried but usually failed to get far off the ground. For ex-
ample, the Los Angeles City-County Local Government Consolida-
tion Study Committee was formed during the late 1950s, but it soon
died aborning.' 88
In response to battles during the 1960s between cities over the
annexation of county land, the State Legislature created local agency
formation commissions ("LAFCOs") in every county.189 LAFCOs
serve as the State's direct agents, exercising its delegated legislative
powers over the boundary adjustments, annexations, detachments,
consolidations, mergers and reorganizations of local governments. 19°
The Legislature's stated policy in creating the LAFCO system was to
encourage orderly growth and development, with "appropriate con-
sideration" of preserving open space.191 Furthermore, it was clear de-
cades before the creation of LAFCOs, that special districts complicate
local government, create multiple bureaucracies, and burden residents
with extra layers of taxes and elections over unknown issues.' 92
Through the formation of LAFCOs, the Legislature has expressed its
preference for fewer governmental agencies within counties. 93
187. See id. at 249; Sherwood, Some Major Problems of Metropolitan Areas, in GovER-
NOR'S COMMISSION ON MEROPoLrrAN AREA PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 19; Stanley
Scott, Major Metropolitan Studies and Action Programs in California, in GOvEmOR's
COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 22, 23.
188. See Stanley Scott, Major Metropolitan Studies and Action Programs in California,
in GOvEm OR's COMMISSION ON METROPOLrrAN AREA PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 19,22,
23.
189. See CAL. SEN., COMM. ON LOCAL GOV'T, LAFCO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AFTER
20 YEARS: THE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE INTERIM HEARING OF THE SENATE ComMIT-
TEE ON LocAL GOVERNMENT 206 (1991).
190. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 56100 (West 1997) ("[Tlhis division provides the sole and
exclusive authority and procedure for the initiation, conduct and completion of changes of
organization and reorganization for cities and districts.").
191. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 56001, 56300, 56301 (West 1997).
192. See CAL. COMM'N ON CoUNTY HOME RuLE, supra note 1, at 163; Scorr & BOL-
LENS, GOVERNING A METROPOLITAN REGION: THE SAN FRANcIsco BAY AREA supra
note 10, at 74.
193. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 56001 (West 1997) ("The Legislature finds and declares
that a single governmental agency, rather than several limited[-]purpose agencies, is in
many cases better able to assess and be accountable for community service needs and fi-
Under the scheme's present incarnation, the Cortese-Knox
Government Reorganization Act of 1985 ("Cortese-Knox Act"),194
LAFCOs act after making several determinations' 95 supported by
substantial evidence' 96 gathered by staff. The statutory system is
vague but clean. The political reality is uglier:
[S]phere decisions are highly political. Some landowners and
developers will lobby the LAFCO to be included in a city's
sphere; others will lobby to be left out. And because developers
are major contributors to both city and county election cam-
paigns, the city and county officials who sit on the LAFCO will
often try to accommodate them. 97
Certainly counties have not been above reproach in the LAFCO
system. Their officials have clear conflicts of interest in deciding
which lands may leave the county's jurisdiction to join a city, and
which may not. Still, even with LAFCOs as a weapon, counties fight a
losing battle in the annexation process. Conceptually, politically, and
fiscally, unincorporated areas-where counties exercise control-are
the scraps left over after annexation.
iii. Reapportionment of the California Senate
Originally, statute required both houses of the California Legisla-
ture, the Assembly and the Senate, to be apportioned by districts con-
forming to county lines.198 In 1926, California voters adopted
Proposition 28, amending the State Constitution to apportion the Sen-
ate largely on the basis of geography. Proposition 28 introduced a so-
called "Federal Plan," which divided the State into 40 senatorial dis-
tricts, which had to conform to county boundaries. 199 No county was
nancial resources and, therefore, is the best mechanism for establishing community service
priorities.")
194. See id. §§ 56000-57550 (West 1997).
195. See id. § 56841 (West 1997) (listing factors LAFCO must consider).
196. "Substantial evidence" means evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value. See CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat. Hockey League, Players' Ass'n, 39 Cal. App.
4th 1347, 1354 n.4 (1995).
197. See CAL- SEN., COMM. ON LOCAL GOV'T, supra note 189, at 205, quoting FULTON,
supra note 15, at 238-39.
198. See Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 59, at 154-55 (Apr. 4, 1850). The California Constitution of
1879 changed this, by requiring apportionment on the basis of population. See Yorty v.
Anderson, 60 Cal. 2d 312, 313 (1963); Silver v. Jordan, 241 F. Supp. 576, 578 (1964), affd,
381 U.S. 415 (1965).
199. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (repealed by the Voters, June 30 1980); Yorty, 60 Cal.
2d at 313; Jordan, supra note 201, at 578. For the full text of Proposition 28, Cal. Stats.
1927, at 85, as well as the ballot arguments for and against it, see Jordan, 381 U.S. at 416 n.3
(Harlan, J., joined by Black and Stewart, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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entitled to more than one senator, and no senatorial district could in-
clude more than three counties.2°
In 1963, California had 27 senatorial districts that contained one
county, eight contained two counties, and five contained three.2° '
This led to strange political results. Most dramatically, the 38th Sena-
torial district, comprising heavily urbanized Los Angeles County, had
450-times the number of voters (6,380,771 in 1960) as the 28th Senato-
rial district, comprising the rural counties of Mono, Inyo and Alpine
(14,294 in 1960).20
In 1964, a federal district court, following the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims 20 3 that diluting a citizen's vote
because of his or her place of residence was as invidious as racial dis-
crimination, rejected arguments that California's size, diversity, inter-
ests, and activities could support geographical apportionment of its
Senate.20 4 The next year, the California Supreme Court ordered the
Legislature to reapportion itself on the basis of population in time for
the next statewide election. 0 5
Today, county boundaries in California are not sacrosanct for ap-
portionment purposes. The State Constitution merely requires that
"the geographical integrity of any city, county, or city and county, or
200. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (repealed by the Voters, June 30 1980); Yorty, 60 Cal.
2d 192, 313; Jordan, 241 F. Supp at 192, at 578.
201. See Yorty, 60 Cal. 2d at 314.
202. See Jordan, 241 F. Supp at 578-79.
203. 377 U.S. 513 (1964).
204. See Jordan, 241 F. Supp at 584. Writing for the Court in Reynolds, then-Chief
Justice Earl Warren had explained away the federal Senate as the product of "unique
historical circumstances." See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 513, 574 (1964). In a stunning
non sequitur, Warren had reasoned that because no conceivable analogy could be drawn
between Congress and the reapportionment proposed for the Alabama Legislature, which
was at issue in the case, the federal analogy was, therefore, inapposite and irrelevant to all
state legislative districting schemes. See id. at 572-73. In particular, Warren rejected the
validity of apportioning State senates by reference to local governments because the latter
"never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities." See id. at 575. Pre-
sumably, Warren was well aware of the principle of Home Rule from his years of public
service in California, serving as District Attorney for Alameda County, Attorney General
and finally Governor. Yet, Warren seems to have ignored Home Rule entirely in Reyn-
olds. In his defense, the Alabama Legislature was grossly malapportioned, and racial ani-
mus was at work, so the result in Reynolds is beyond reproach. See id. at 537-554 (reciting
facts and history of case).
205. See Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 270,276-77 (1965) (unanimous); Legislature v. Rei-
necke, 10 Cal. 3d 396 (1973) (unanimous). Currently, the California Constitution requires
that electoral districts for the State Senate be reasonably equal in population. See CAL.
CONsT. art. XXI, § l(b) (adopted by the Voters, June 30 1980); Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal. 4th
707, 758 (1992) (Appendix: Report and Recommendations of Special Masters on
Reapportionment).
of any geographical region shall be respected to the extent possible."2 °6
In this way, counties have lost considerable political power in the
State Legislature." 7 Meanwhile, the makeup of county boards of su-
pervisors has remained relatively unchanged. By statute, non-
chartered counties must have five supervisors, no matter how many
residents live there.208
iv. Proposition 13 and the Redevelopment Game
During the mid-1970s, a speaker at a conference of the County
Supervisors' Association of California ("CSAC") told his audience
that counties would not survive unless they improved their effi-
ciency.2"9 In June 1978, California voters forced the hand of counties
and cities alike by approving Proposition 13 ("Prop. 13").
Prop. 13 added Article XIIIA to the California Constitution,
which curtails every locality's taxing power by reserving to the State
Legislature the power to apportion property tax revenues among the
various government entities within counties.210 To some, Home-Rule
powers mean nothing without the power to raise revenue.211 For-
merly, while the taxation powers of counties, general-law cities and
special districts were limited to those delegated by the State,21 2
206. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1(b) (adopted by the Voters, June 30 1980) (emphasis
added). California is divided into 40 Senatorial and 80 Assembly districts, each one send-
ing a single elected official to the State Capitol. See id. art. IV, § 6.
207. Ironically, the California Senate is thought to be less sympathetic to local issues
than the Assembly, because, with present term limits, its members stay longer in Sacra-
mento. See LEAGUE OF CAL. CrImEs, CrTEs ON THE CUTrING EDGE: A SYMPOSIUM ON
EMERGING MuNIc'rAL LEGAL IssUEs, Keynote Panel, remarks of Hon. Michael Sweeney,
Chair, Cal. Assembly Comm. on Local Gov't (San Francisco, Sept. 20, 1997). The differ-
ences between the California Assembly and Senate vindicate Chief Justice Warren's argu-
ment in Reynolds v. Sims that bicameralism would remain viable even under one-person,
one-vote apportionment. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579.
208. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25000 (West Supp. 1998). Empirical studies show that
this arrangement correlates to county supervisors' tendency to be more politically con-
servative than their constituents. See CROUCH, Er AL., supra note 3, at 237.
209. As quoted in CROUCH, ET AL. supra note 3, at 227.
210. See CAL. CONST. Art. XIIIA, § 1(a) (one-percent cap on ad valorem real property
taxes), § 4 (prohibiting local governments from imposing local ad valorem, sales or transac-
tion taxes on real property).
211. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. County of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d
426, 429 (1947) ("[T]he power of taxation for revenue purposes is probably the most vital
and essential attribute of the government. Without such power it cannot function.");
LEAGUE OF CAL. CrriEs, supra note 207, Workshop: Allocating Power Between State and
Fed. Gov'ts, remarks of San Francisco Dep. City Att'y Burk E. Delventhal.
212. See Santa Clara County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th 220, 247-48
(1995), citing CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 24.
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chartered cities' municipal-affairs powers213 included the ability to as-
sess and levy taxes for municipal purposes.214 However, California
courts hold that Prop. 13 does not abrogate Home Rule.215
The voters' intent was to limit local taxes permanently, especially
local property taxes,21 6 which Prop. 13 capped at one percent of the
property's full cash value.21 7 Prop. 13 also rolled back property as-
sessments to their levels during fiscal year 1975-1976.21s As a result,
most local governments, especially school districts, suffered immedi-
ately from severe revenue shortfalls.21 9 Before Prop. 13, local elected
officials would set policy, determine which segments of the electorate
were most suited to pay to support that policy, and then enact taxes
accordingly.220 Afterwards, local policy makers checked their treasur-
ies first.22 '
To take up the slack for counties, the State took control of certain
welfare programs, including Aid for Families with Dependent Chil-
dren ("AFDC") and Medi-Cal.22 However, the Legislature remained
213. See infra part III.A.ii.b.
214. See West Coast Advertising Co., 14 Cal. 2d at 524 (upholding municipal sales and
use taxes); Braun, 141 Cal. 204 (upholding license and property taxes).
215. See Amador Valley Jt. Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 224-27 (1978); County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1453 (1994),
review denied, June 23, 1994; see also City of Woodlake v. Logan, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1058,
1065 (1991) (local government has no inherent power to tax, citing CAL. CONsT. art. XIII,
§ 24), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Howard Jarvis Taxpayers' Ass'n, 48 Cal.
App. 4th at 1367.
216. See Sinclair Paint Co., 15 Cal. 4th at 872; accord Sasaki, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1451.
217. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(a).
218. See id., § 2(a). Real property is reassessed when a change of ownership occurs, see
id., unless one of several exceptions apply. See id., § 2(g); CAL. REV. CODE §§ 62-66, 68
(West 1998).
219. In 1977, the year before Prop. 13's adoption, property taxes contributed 22.4%,
36.3% and 67.4% of the revenues of cities, counties, and non-enterprise special districts,
respectively. Julie K. Koyama, Financing Local Government in the Post-Proposition 13
Era: The Use and Effectiveness of Nontaxing Revenue Sources, 22 PAC. L.J. 1333, 1332 n.2
(1991). One year after adoption of Prop. 13, property tax revenues dropped by 51%, a
$5.09 billion decrease. Id. at 1339; see also Terri A. Sexton, et al., Proposition 13: Unin-
tended Effects and Feasible Reforms, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 99, 107 (1999) (citing slightly differ-
ent figures); Peter J. May & Arnold J. Meltsner, Limited Actions, Distressing
Consequences: A Selected View of the California Experience, 41 PUB. ADrNm. REv. 172, 173
(1981) (study of ten local entities in Northern California). Local shortfalls would have
been worse without huge bailouts from the State treasury: $4.2 billion in fiscal year 1978-
79, followed by $4.9 billion and $5.5 billion the next two. Koyama, supra, at 1339.
220. LEAGuE OF CAL. Crrms, supra note 207, Workshop: Local Government Fiscal
Constraints: Predicting the Public Policy Outcomes, remarks of Richard B. Dixon, Frmr.
C.A.O., Los Angeles County.
221. See id.
222. See Sasaki, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1451-52.
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constitutionally unable to impose taxes for local purposes, although it
could authorize local governments to do so.2' Prop. 13 does permit a
locality to impose "special taxes"224 but only if approved by two-thirds
of the electorate.2' This requirement has proven nearly impossible to
meet.226
Out of necessity, local governments have had to find other ways
to pay for services.227 One common tactic has been to use benefit
assessment districts and fees to generate revenue,228 because they do
not require support by a super-majority vote of the electorate.229
However, unlike taxes, fees must be supported by both a nexus with
the payor's proposed activity, and a rough proportionality between
the amount of the fee and the impacts from the proposed activity. 230
Thus, for example, development fees exacted in return for building
permits or other governmental privileges are not special taxes, as long
as the amount of the fees bear a reasonable relation to the develop-
223. See CAL. CONsr. Art. XIII, § 24(a).
224. "Special taxes" are those levied for a specific purpose rather than for general gov-
ernmental purposes. See City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 57
(1982).
225. "Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors
of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad valorem taxes on real
property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real property within such City,
County or special district." CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
226. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF CAL. Crrms, supra note 207, Workshop: Allocating Power
Betveen State and Federal Governments, remarks of San Francisco Dep. City Att'y Burk E.
Delventhal.
227. See generally Koyama, supra note 219; see also Sexton, et al., supra note 221, at
107-09.
228. See Koyama, supra note 219 at 1350-66 (discussing both benefit assessments and
fees); Lloyd J. Mercer and W. Douglas Morgan, California City and County User Charges:
a Post Proposition 13 Assessment, URB. L. & POL'Y 187 (1985) (analyzing cities and coun-
ties experience with fees); see also Henke, supra note 219, at 29 (discussing development
fees to pay for school construction). Whether impositions are "taxes" or "fees" is a ques-
tion of law. See Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866, 873-74
(1997) (unanimous). The distinction is frequently blurred, taking on different meanings in
different contexts. See id. at 874. There are important differences between "taxes" and
"fees." Unlike taxes, government imposes fees in return for a specific benefit conferred or
privilege granted. See id. Also, most taxes are compulsory, but government imposes fees
in response to a voluntary decision to develop or to seek other government benefits or
privileges. See id.
229. The Government Code excludes from its definition of special taxes "any fee which
does not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the service or regulatory activity for
which the fee is charged and which is not levied for general revenue purposes." CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 50076 (West 1983).
230. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66000-29 (West 1997) ["Mitigation Fee Act"]; Ehrlich v.
City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854, 865-67 (1996).
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ment's probable costs to the community and benefits to the
developer.23'
The anti-tax lobby remains vigilant and powerful, and even the
fee loophole has been partially closed in recent years by passage of
Proposition 218 ("Prop. 218").32 Adopted by the voters in 1996,
Prop. 218 added Articles XIIIC and XJIID to the State Constitution,
which require voters to approve all special assessments (including
benefit assessment districts) and fees or charges that are "property
related," and forbids special districts, including school districts, to levy
general taxes?.3
Prop. 13 and the Cortese-Knox Act have spawned sales-tax mer-
cantilism. Because property taxes are so limited, localities have come
to rely on sales taxes.2 4 When an unincorporated community be-
comes a city or merges into one, all future sales tax revenues go to the
city instead of the county government.235 Consequently, counties re-
sist attempts by unincorporated areas to incorporate if they contain
land uses that generate high sales taxes, such as shopping malls, and
justifiably so.236
Also, under Prop. 13, property tax assessments increase only if a
new project is constructed or if a property changes hands." 7 Under
the Community Redevelopment Law,2 38 incremental increases in tax
revenue can be captured within cities' redevelopment areas so that
they are not shared with the county.? 9 Therefore, cities often gerry-
mander the boundaries of redevelopment areas in order to include
every property that is likely to be sold or redeveloped in the foresee-
able future.24 The State reimburses school districts for the resulting
231. See Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 875. In a victory for planning, the California
Supreme Court held in Sinclair Paint that the police power is broad enough to include
mandatory remedial measures to mitigate the past, present, or future adverse impact of the
fee payer's operations, at least where the measure requires a causal connection or nexus
between those operations and their adverse effects. See id. at 877-78.
232. Codified as CAL. CONsT. arts. XIIIC, XIIID.
233. See CuRrIN's CALoRNiA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAw 201-03 (17th ed., 1997).
Prop. 218 defines "fees" or "charges" as "any levy other than an ad valorem tax, a special
assessment, or an assessment, imposed by an agency on a parcel or a person as an incident
of property ownership, including user fees or charges for a property related service." See
id., citing CAL. CONsT. art. XIIID, § 2(c).
234. See FULTON, supra note 15, at 233.
235. See id. at 212.
236. See id. at 233-35; Bd. of Supervisors of Sacramento County v. LAFCO of Sacra-
mento County, 3 Cal. 4th 903, 906 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 988 (1993).
237. See FULTON, supra note 15, at 251.
238. See CAL. HEALTH & SA=ET CODE § 33000-33799 (West Supp. 1998).
239. See id., at 252.
240. See id., at 253.
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property-tax shortfalls, but not counties or special districts, which are
left to negotiate "pass-through" agreements with cities on their
own.
24 1
D. Summary of Brief History
While California State government grew more important from
the Great Depression onward, 242 urbanization also made California
cities more important. In postwar California, the county's role has
become increasingly uncertain and marginal.
Even before the advent of Prop. 13, counties had fewer revenue
sources than did cities.2 43 After Prop. 13, the State took control over
real property taxes, which had been local governments' bread and but-
ter.2 1 Meanwhile, President Ronald Reagan's administration essen-
tially ended the flow of federal money to local governments. 45 Worse
still for local governments, during California's economic recession in
the early 1990s, the State Legislature responded to its own budget def-
icit by enacting the Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund to redi-
rect $3 billion a year in property taxes from cities, counties, and
special districts to school districts.246
241. See id., at 255.
242. Pursuant to a constitutional revision adopted by California voters, the State Legis-
lature began to meet full-time after 1966. See Walsh v. Bd. of Admin. of the Pub. Employ-
ees' Retirement Sys., 4 Cal. App. 4th 682, 691 (1992), review denied, June 11, 1992, cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 981 (1992).
243. For example, cities had business license taxes in addition to the counties' sources,
property and sales tax. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 43, at 38. In 1977, counties were far
more dependent on intergovernmental transfers, which accounted for about half of their
total revenues, than were cities (33.2%). See Sexton et al., supra note 219, at 107.
244. In fiscal year 1977-78, property taxes made up 33.2% of counties' total revenues, as
compared to 11.6% in fiscal year 1995-96. See Sexton et al., supra note 219, at 107, table 3.
Over the same period, the same statistic of cities changed from 12.4% to 5.6%. Id.
245. See J. Edwin Benton & Donald C. Menzel, County Services: The Emergence of
Full-Service Government, in LocAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY IN CALIFORNIA 53 (Linda
Martin ed., 1984). Federal aid to counties dropped by 73% from 1980 to 1986. See Beverly
A. Cigler, The Special Problems of Rural County Governments, in id., at 99.
246. See Sexton, et al., supra, note 219, at 109. A major side effect of Prop. 13 was to
force fully centralized state funding of California schools. Henke, supra note 228, at 23.
Prop. 13 is not the only reason California public schools have changed since the mid-1970s.
In its 1971 and 1976 Serrano v. Priest decisions, the California Supreme Court invalidated
the traditional system of local school financing for violating students' rights to Equal Pro-
tection. See generally icL; Fabio Silva & Jon Sonstelie, Did Serrano Case a Decline in
School Spending, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 199 (1995); see also William A. Fischel, How Serrano
Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607 (1996); William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause
Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 188 (1995). In any event, the State now apportions 53%
of its $20 billion in annual property tax revenues to school districts, as compared to the
18% shares it gives to both counties and special districts, and 11% to cities. Id. at 109.
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In the resulting fiscal crisis, cities have proven more resilient than
counties, in part by incorporating neighborhoods and businesses selec-
tively, and manipulating the redevelopment process to capture both
sales-tax revenue and property-tax increments.24 7 Meanwhile, coun-
ties have been less able than cities to generate revenue by using fees
instead of property taxes.248 In this climate, it seems that counties
have been too financially strapped to embrace a regional-planning
role.
Without a formal institution to guide them, California cities nev-
ertheless have found ways to cooperate, through methods such as the
Lakewood Plan or the Joint Exercise of Powers Act. In addition, Cali-
fornia city residents have long benefited from capable civil servants
who provide relatively high-quality city services. 2 9 Lastly, Home
Rule helps serve democracy by bringing political decisions geographi-
cally and practically closer to the individual California citizen.
Unfortunately, California's regional problems remain unad-
dressed because cities decide if and when they will cooperate. While
economic and political factors motivate cities, California's legal struc-
ture gives them the freedom to address issues or to ignore them. This
is why the law matters. The following section describes the legal
framework of California county government.
Hm. The Legal Framework of California County Government
In today's political scheme, California counties are almost vestig-
ial. This has come about because of the growth of other political or-
gans. However, it is not constitutionally preordained. The
Legislature could make counties virtually as powerful as itself, without
going before the voters. The reluctance of citizens to cede local con-
trol to regional entities has frustrated previous attempts to solve met-
ropolitan problems. Counties' constitutional status allows the
Legislature to avoid this obstacle.
247. Since passage of Prop. 13, the number of redevelopment agencies has more than
doubled, to reach 400 during 1996-97. Sexton et al., supra note 219, at 108. However,
there is no evidence that Prop. 13 has caused an increase in the number of cities and special
districts. Id. at 109.
248. See Mercer & Morgan, supra note 227, at 204. By 1995, intergovernmental trans-
fers had grown to make up a 64% share of counties' total revenues, compared to a mere
13% share of cities' total revenues. Sexton et al., supra note 219, at 107.
249. "[S]tructure never tells the whole story. I am convinced that the large number of
fine career professionals in our local government has done much to bring about a unity of
approach that the organization charts do not reveal." See Sherwood, Some Major
Problems of Metropolitan Areas, in GOVENOR'S COMMISSION ON METROPOLrr'N AREA
PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 19.
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Although California law affords its local governments considera-
ble autonomy, the State Legislature ultimately has paramount author-
ity over land use policy. Setting the boundary lines between local
jurisdictions is a statewide concern. Also, only the State is sovereign,
and the Legislature alone decides when it will delegate such power to
local government. Counties are subdivisions of the state, rendering
them the natural agents for such delegation.
In this context, federal law is almost entirely irrelevant." Local
California governments interact on the basis of State constitutional
and statutory law. Californians may therefore improve their situation
by looking to their own laws, and reforming them where necessary.
A. County Government Under Current California Constitutional Law
In California, all "political power" inheres in the People," who
reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum. 2
With these exceptions, the State's entire power to make law is vested
in its Legislature.3 Given this scheme, it has been held that there is
no inherent right of local self-government in California.254
250. See Railroad Comm'n of Cal. v. Los Angeles Railway Corp., 280 U.S. 145, 152
(1929) ("This court is bound by the decisions of the highest courts of the States as to the
power of their municipalities."); Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U.S. 400, 410 (1884)
(extent and character of powers of political and municipal organizations relate to state
constitutions); Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78, 81 (1881) ("Whether territory shall
be governed for local purposes by a county, a city or a township organization, is one of the
most usual and ordinary subjects of state legislation."); see also Williams v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (city may not invoke Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause against its own state); City of Newark v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196
(1923) (city may not bring claim against own state under Equal Protection Clause to Four-
teenth Amendment); City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188-92 (1923)
(diversion of water from city use by its state is not a taking of property because it is a
governmental affair); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177 (1907) (City may not
bring claim against own state under Contracts Clause).
But see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343 (1960) (Court has rejected only
two classes of federal claims made by cities against their states: boundary disputes invoking
the Contracts Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and claims
that loss of municipal identity causes serious economic damage). Another important ex-
ception may be the federal Voting Rights Act., 42 U.S.C. §1973.
251. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
252. See id. art. II, § 11.
253. See id. art. IV, § 1; Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 180 (1981);
see also Los Angeles Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 863, 868
(1963).
254. See Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308 (1931); accord Wil-
liams v. City of San Carlos, 233 Cal. App. 2d 290,331 (1965); see also Howard Lee McBain,
The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government: 1, 16 COLuM. L. REv. 190,
208 (1916) (distinguishing as dictum contrary language in People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15). For
two famous cases where state supreme courts implied the existence of such a right see
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Nevertheless, the State Constitution mandates the creation of
counties to administer state law, 5 and, within counties, it permits the
creation of cities. 6 Every county and city possesses the police power,
albeit subject to preemption by the Legislature,2 7 which is an attri-
bute of sovereignty. 8 Moreover, the State Constitution permits
chartered counties and cities to immunize themselves from State con-
trol in certain areas of local interest. This implies some right to local
self-government. 9 Counties are at the center of this tangled web of
legislative authority, particularly in the area of land use controls.
i. County Police Power
As a subdivision of the State,260 a California county conducts the
People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871) (Cooley, J.) and Higginson v. Treas. of
Schoolhouse Comm'rs of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N.E. 525 (1912).
255. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 1(a) ("The State is divided into counties .... "); Cle-
land, 52 Cal. App. 2d at 535 (Legislature must provide for county boards of supervisors and
certain other county officers); 16 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 79, 81 (1950) (same).
256. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a) ("The Legislature shall prescribe uniform proce-
dure for city formation and provide for city powers."); McClellan, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 142
(quoting Kahn, 114 Cal. at 319), review denied, Sept. 4, 1953.
257. See CAL. CoNs-r. art. XI, § 7.
258. See McKay Jewellers, Inc. v. Bowron, 19 Cal. 2d 595, 600 (1942).
259. See generally PEPPIN I, supra note 79, at 30-32 (asserting that the contrary language
in Lynch was holding, and expressly rejecting Professor McBain's view
260. County of Marin., 53 Cal. 2d at 638; accord County of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal.
2d 625, 627-28 (1936); Estate of Miller, 5 Cal. 2d 588, 597 (1936); Reclamation Dist. No.
1500 v. Sup. Ct. in and for Sutter County, 171 Cal. 672, 679 (1916); Coburn, 130 Cal. at 636-
37; Kahn, 114 Cal. at 319; Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618, 621 (1895); People ex rel.
Graves, 81 Cal. at 498; Sharp, 34 Cal. at 290; Hunsacker, 5 Cal. at 290; Sacramento Mun.
Util. Dist. v. County of Solano, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1166 (1997); Community Mem.
Hosp. v. County of Ventura, 50 Cal. App. 4th 199, 209 (1996), review denied, Nov. 13, 1996;
Vagim v Bd. of Supervisors of the County of Fresno, 230 Cal. App. 2d 286, 290(1964);
County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d 160, 164 (1963), review
denied, Mar. 20, 1963; McClellan, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 142-43; Otis, 52 Cal. App. 2d 605;
Wilkinson v. Lund, 102 Cal. App. 767,772 (1929), review denied, Feb. 24, 1930; Dillwood v.
Riecks, 42 Cal. App. 602, 607 (1919), disapproved on other grounds by Guidi, 41 Cal. 2d
623; see also CAL. CONsT. art. XI, sec. 1(a); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 23002 (West 1988); Cham-
bers, 33 Cal. App. at 149 ("All the people of the state, while not directly interested in the
administration of the affairs of municipal corporations of which they are not members, are
so interested in the administration of the governmental affairs of a county, whether they
reside there or own property there or not.... ."); Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 31 Cal.
App. 4th 166, 175 (1994) (statutory references to "the State" may include counties), review
denied, Mar. 17, 1995; c.f United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Riverside County, 67
F. Supp. 780,798 (C.D. Cal. 1946) (a California county is not a corporation and cannot sue
or be sued except where specifically permitted by statute).
But c.f. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23003 (West 1988) ("A county is a body corporate and
politic.... .") 20 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 69, 70 (1959) (a county is an agency of the state for
many purposes, but it is a distinct legal entity from the State and is not part of the latter's
executive branch).
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State's political affairs on a local level.261 Whether or not the Legisla-
ture delegates such authority, a county may make and enforce within
its boundaries all ordinances and regulations not in conflict with gen-
eral laws. 262 Among these is the power to zone for land uses.263 The
same section of the California Constitution endows cities with identi-
cal police powers within their own geographical limitS.26" It follows
that a county's planning and zoning power extends only within that
portion of its territory not incorporated within a city.2 65
261. See Orange County, 97 Cal. at 331; County of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 164.
But see also Guidi, 41 Cal. 2d 623 (counties do not always act in governmental capacity
but sometimes in proprietary capacity).
262. See CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7; Candid Entertainers, 39 Cal. 3d at 885; accord Hall,
47 Cal. 2d at 184; Pulcifer, 29 Cal. 2d at 261; In re Mingo, 190 Cal. 769, 772 (1923); see also
Daniels, 183 Cal. at 641-42 (Legislature may supplant local police power ordinances with
statutes but it may not forbid their passage).
But see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23003 (West 1988) ("A county is a body corporate and politic,
[and] has the powers specified in this title and such others necessarily implied from those
expressed."); San Vincente Nursery Sch. v. County of Los Angeles, 147 Cal. App. 2d. 79, 85
(1956) (same); see also Watson v. Greely, 67 Cal. App. 328, 337 (1924) (Legislature uses its
general laws to apportion and delegate only specified functions to counties).
263. See Hurst, 207 Cal. at 138 (zoning ordinance is a police measure); Dwyer v. City
Council of Berkeley, 200 Cal. 505, 511-12 (1927) (same); Wesley Inv. Co. v. Alameda
County, 151 Cal. App. 3d 672, 675 (1984).
264. See Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 271, 278 (1953); accord McKay
Jewellers, 19 Cal. 2d at 600; Jardine, 199 Cal. at 68; In re Kazas, 22 Cal. App. 2d 161, 165
(1937).
265. See Pfirrman, 134 Cal. at 145 (county and city have mutually exclusive jurisdic-
tion); Ex parte Roach, 104 Cal. 272, 275 (1894) (city ordinances supersede ordinances of its
county upon same subject); Campbell, 74 Cal. at 25 (county's ordinances are not general
law within meaning of the State Constitution); City of Dublin v. County of Alameda, 14
Cal. App. 4th 264, 274-75 (1993) (California Constitution specifies that county may exer-
cise its police power only in its unincorporated territory), review denied, June 3, 1993; City
of South San Francisco v. Berry, 120 Cal. App. 2d 252, 253 (1953) (county's zoning no
longer applies in area once annexed by a city); Miller v. Fowle, 92 Cal. App. 2d 409, 419
(1949) (City of Oakland may not accept dedication of streets lying within City of Berke-
ley); Coelho v. Truckell, 9 Cal. App. 2d 47,55 (1935); In re Knight, 55 Cal. App. 511,513-14
(1921) (county ordinances effective only within county borders); People v. Velarde, 45 Cal.
App. 520, 524 (1920) (county ordinances work only locally); 28 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 282,
283 (1956) (a county's exercise of its police power is circumscribed not by subject matter
but geographically); VAN ALsTrNE, supra note 43, at 305-06, citing PEPPIN IV, supra note
96, at 689-90 cf City of Oakland v. Brock, 8 Cal. 2d 639, 641 (1937) (city has no govern-
mental powers beyond its own boundaries); Ferran v. City of Palo Alto, 50 Cal. App. 2d
374, 379 (1942) (city's ordinances have no extraterritorial effect without express permission
of the sovereign power);
But see In re Blois, 179 Cal. 291, 296 (1918) (conceding that municipalities may exer-
cise certain extraterritorial powers when their possession and exercise are essential to the
proper conduct of its affairs, such as building and maintaining a system of waterworks or
inspecting dairies that supply milk to its inhabitants).
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ii. Charter-Based Home Rule
In certain subject areas, the California Constitution also allows
counties and cities to insulate themselves from preemption by adopt-
ing charters. However, charter-based Home Rule creates only a lim-
ited form of autonomy, which differs depending on whether the
chartered entity is a county or a city. Neither chartered counties nor
chartered cities may contradict state legislation affecting a "statewide
concern." '266 For example, housing and housing supply is such an is-
sue, 267 requiring localities to comply with state statutes relating to
it. 26
8
a. Chartered counties are marginally autonomous.
Chartered counties in California have all the powers of general
law counties.269 Moreover, the State Constitution declares that
266. See, e.g., Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 52 Cal. 3d 531,547
(1990) (zoning and planning); Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60
Cal. 2d 276, 294-95 (1963) (firefighters' right to unionize); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City
and County of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 774 (1959) (telecommunications); Eastlick v.
City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 665-68 (1947) (municipal tort liability); Hall, supra
note 17, 47 Cal. 2d at 179 (public schools); Henshaw v. Foster, 176 Cal. 507, 512 (1917)
(regional water supply); Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152, 160 (1914) (sewerage system for
more than one city); Redevelopment Agency of City of Berkeley v. City of Berkeley, 80
Cal. App. 3d 158, 169 (1978) (redevelopment of blighted areas); Wilson v. City of San
Bernardino, 186 Cal. App. 2d 603, 611 (1960) (any public improvement involving more
than one city); People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Works v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. App. 2d
558,566 (1960) (State highway system); County of San Mateo v. City Council of Palo Alto,
168 Cal. App. 2d 220, 221 (1959) (extramural annexation to city); Fellom v. Redevelop-
ment Agency, 157 Cal. App. 2d 243, 247 (1958) (urban redevelopment), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 56 (1958); Cralle v. City of Eureka, 136 Cal. App. 2d 808, 811 (1955) (recordation of
real property); In re Shaw, 32 Cal. App. 2d 84, 87 (1939) (judicial system and jurisdiction
over crimes); Peterson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Solano County, 65 Cal. App. 670, 677-78
(1924) (reclamation of land); see also Smith, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for its
Protection and Development, supra note 87, at 762 nn.171-7, 763 nn.176-79, 765 n.189, 766
n.163 (citing some of these cases and others in which courts found at stake a "larger munic-
ipality," a "statewide purpose," or activity with "extramunicipal effects").
267. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65580(a) (West 1997); Buena Vista Gardens Apartments
Ass'n v. City of San Diego Planning Dept, 175 Cal. App. 3d 289, 306-07 (1985).
268. See Lesher Communications, 52 Cal. 3d at 546-47. The Legislature has anticipated
and forbidden cities from using growth control ordinances to limit their obligations to help
address the State's pressing housing needs. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65584(d)(1) (West
1997); See also CAL. EviD. CODE § 669.5(a) (growth control ordinances limiting number of
building permits for residential uses is presumed to impact supply of residential units avail-
able in the area); id. § 669.5(b) (city bears burden of proof that growth control ordinance is
"necessary' to protect public health, safety, or welfare of its population); Murphy v. City of
Alameda, 11 Cal. App. 4th 906, 912-13 (1992) (city must prove present necessity, not neces-
sity at time of ordinance's passage), review denied, Mar. 11, 1993.
269. See CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 4(h) (chartered counties must have all the powers that
are provided for them by the State Constitution or by statute).
county charters "supersede all laws inconsistent" with them.270 It is
not immediately clear whether "all laws" refers to state statutes or
county ordinances.27'
However, other provisions of the State Constitution help clarify
the issue. Among other things, every county charter must provide for
the "powers and duties of governing bodies and all other county of-
ficers .... 272 Additionally, a county's charter supersedes general
laws adopted by the Legislature to provide for "county powers. '273
Read together, these two provisions could mean that a chartered
county has the power to supersede the Legislature's definition of its
powers.274
Although this may be the syntactical meaning, in practice, Cali-
fornia chartered counties do not have this much autonomy.275 This
lack of autonomy is due, in part, to the conceptual difference between
a county and a city. Whereas the State creates counties as its legal
subdivisions, it is the residents of a given area who choose to incorpo-
rate as a city, which seems to imply greater autonomy for cities.2 76
Nor does a county become a municipal corporation by adopting a
freeholders' charter. 7
The problem with this line of analysis is that by statute the Legis-
lature does not create counties unless local residents so petition.278
270. Id. § 3(a).
271. However, the State Constitution does specify that the term "laws" must be con-
strued as a continuation and restatement of those terms as used in the Constitution in
effect immediate prior to June 2, 1970. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 13.
272. Id. § 4(e).
273. See Id. § 4(f)-(g).
274. See Reuter, 220 Cal. at 320-21, 326-27 (duties delegated by the State to one county
officer may be reassigned to another by county charter). I am not the only one who has
thought so. See, e.g., VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 43, at 41, 141-43, citing Estate of Miller, 5
Cal. 2d at 592 ("a county may, in its charter, provide for the powers and duties of its
officers, and may do this without limitation by the general law").
275. See Dibb v. County of San Diego, 29 Cal. App. 4th 159, 166 (1993) ("Dibb F),
aff'd, Dibb II, supra note 145; Wilkinson, 102 Cal. App. at 770; Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in
California, supra note 132, at 1115.
Through loose language, the California Supreme court implied in In re Hubbard, 62
Cal. 2d 119, 128 (1964), overruled in part by Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 63 n.6
(1969), that counties have Home Rule powers equal to those of cities. See Sho Sato, Mu-
nicipal Occupation Taxes in California, the Authority to Levy Taxes and the Burden on
Intrastate Commerce, 53 CAL. L. REv. 805, 808 n.42 (1965). On at least this point, Hubbard
is completely erroneous. See Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, supra note 132, 1072-
74, 1115.
276. See supra part II.A.ii.
277. McClellan, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 142 (holding that chartered County of San Diego
has no control over incorporation of sixth-class City of Carlsbad).
278. See, infra, notes part III.B.i.
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Nevertheless, it is now beyond question that a California county that
adopts a charter gains autonomy over only electoral and administra-
tive details.279 Given that general law counties already enjoy this
much flexibility, one wonders why a county would bother adopting a
charter at all.28
b. Chartered cities are autonomous in their "municipal affairs."
In contrast to counties, California cities may adopt charters that
enable them to make and enforce all legislation regarding "municipal
affairs. '281 This gives them greater autonomy282 because powers
granted in their charters must supersede all inconsistent state laws in
that area.283 It is unsettled whether the Legislature retains concurrent
jurisdiction over municipal affairs. In other words, if the laws of a
chartered city do not address a particular municipal affair, it does not
necessarily follow that State law on that issue controls. 84
The extent of a chartered city's autonomy turns on the meaning
of "municipal affairs." The State Constitution includes a non-exclu-
279. See VAN AISTYNE, supra note 43, at 144, citing, e.g., Pearson, 49 Cal. 2d 523
(county civil service procedures to dismiss deputy sheriff after felony conviction); Hedlund
v. Davis, 47 Cal. 2d 75 (1956) (elections to fill vacancies); Kelly v. Kane, 34 Cal. App. 2d
588 (1939) (county purchasing agents); see also Dibb II, 8 Cal. 4th at 1210-11 (even if
legislature intends to preempt the field of subpoena powers, it may not do so with respect
to a county whose charter properly grants subpoena power to county officers); McMahon,
219 Cal. App. 3d 286 (home rule county could not escape state mandate to help pay for
AFDC grants); Younger 11, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 869; see also Koster, 157 Cal. at 420 (City and
County of San Francisco's power over municipal affairs relate only to city functions, not
county functions like court administration); c.f also Professional Fire Fighters, 60 Cal. 2d
276 (State has complete control over city firefighters' right to unionize).
But see City of Dublin, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 285 n.15 (enumeration in constitution of
specific provisions that must appear in county charters does not imply the preclusion of all
else).
280. See VAN ALSTNE, supra note 43, at 144-45. Also, the Legislature approves
county charters, so, theoretically, it could exercise a veto over their contents. See CAL.
CONsT. art. XI, § 4(g). However, the Legislature has never vetoed a charter submitted to
it. See VAN ALsr yNE, supra note 43.
281. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
282. See VAN AsTYNE, supra note 43, at 234, citing City of Roseville v. Tulley, 55 Cal.
App. 2d 601, 605 (1942) (chartered cities more autonomous than general law cities or
chartered counties by virtue of their superseding power over municipal affairs), review de-
nied, Jan. 14, 1943.
283. See Butterworth, 12 Cal. 2d at 146 (city is supreme in area of municipal affairs even
if its charter is silent on a particular matter); Cramer v. City of San Diego, 164 Cal. App. 2d
168, 170-71 (1958).
284. Compare City of Sacramento v Adams, 171 Cal. 458, 461 (1915) [State law con-
trols] with Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 399 n.9 [conflict possible even where city's charter is
silent].
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sive 85 list: (1) the makeup, regulation, and management of city police
forces; (2) "subgovernment"'' 6 in all or part of a city; (3) conduct of
city elections; (4) the manner and method in which a city elects, ap-
points, pays or removes its municipal officers; and (5) the qualifica-
tions, methods of appointment, tenure, removal and number of
deputies, clerks and other city employees.287 Otherwise, the definition
is not fixed288 or exact.289
California courts, not the Legislature,2 90 define municipal affairs
case by case, by looking at their dialectical opposite, "statewide con-
cerns." 291 If the subject of a state law fails to qualify as one of state-
wide concern, by default a chartered city's conflicting ordinance on
the same subject is a municipal affair.292 Conversely, if there is a con-
vincing basis in "extramural concerns" for the statute, and the statute
is reasonably related and narrowly tailored to resolve those concerns,
then the matter is not a municipal affair.2 93
c. Chartered cities-and-counties are like chartered cities.
Finally, the State Constitution allows formation of a chartered en-
tity that is both city and county, although San Francisco is the only
one.2 94 Bolstering the notion that chartered cities are more powerful
than chartered counties, San Francisco's chartered city powers super-
sede conflicting chartered county powers.295 However, because a
combined city-and-county has territorial jurisdiction exclusive of other
285. See Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 398, citing Wolff, 84 Cal. App. 2d at 442-43.
286. Before Article X's overhaul in 1970, subgovernments were known as "boroughs."
Borough government had been constitutionally possible in California since last century,
but attempts to use them never succeeded. For example, the City of Los Angeles had
intended to make the City of San Pedro one of its boroughs after annexation but it did not
happen. See VAN ArsT-NE, supra note 43, at 233. Reporting to the Constitution Revision
Commission in 1967, Professor Van Alstyne doubted that chartered cities had an inherent
right to create boroughs. See id. However, as currently written, Article XI leaves no doubt
that boroughs are a "municipal affair." See CAL. CONST. REv. CoMM'N, PROPOSED Rvi-
SION 2, 71-72 (1968).
287. See CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 5(b).
288. See Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 400 n.12; Pacific Tel & TeL, 51 Cal. 2d at 771; Younger 11,
93 Cal. App. 3d at 497-98.
289. See Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 398.
290. See id. at 405.
291. See id. at 400 ("As applied to state and charter city enactments in actual conflict,
'municipal affairs' and 'statewide concern' represent, Janus-like, ultimate legal conclusions
rather than factual descriptions.").
292. See id. at 399.
293. See id. at 399-400.
294. See CAL CONST. Art. XI, § 6(b).
295. See id.; Kahn, 114 Cal. at 319, 322 ("Geographically, [San Francisco] is one of the
legal subdivisions of the state .... Politically, it is regarded in [the State Constitution] as a
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counties', for certain State purposes296 it is a county and has county
officers.297
iii. State Power Over Land Use Planning
As previously discussed, where there is no conflict with general
laws, a California locality's police power within its territory is as broad
as the State Legislature's.298 For example, in the area of land use, a
locality may use its police power to regulate mere aesthetics.299 How-
ever, planning and zoning are a statewide concern, and therefore are
not municipal affairs.3 00 This means that not even a chartered Califor-
nia city may adopt a zoning ordinance that conflicts with the State
Planning and Zoning Law.3 0' In short, the State may preempt the
municipal corporation."); see also Martin, 126 Cal. at 412 (provisions of constitution apply-
ing to counties do not apply to City and County of San Francisco).
296. See id. at 326:
It would not be contended if the city was only a portion of the county, or if the
county should be composed entirely of incorporated cities, that the state would be
precluded from authorizing the election, by voters of the county, of officers to
carry out those provisions of its laws which pertain to the state at large, and which
have no connection with municipal affairs; and this rule is not changed where the
county consists of a single city instead of several.
297. Such officers include district attorney, sheriff, county clerk, county recorder and
county coroner. See Kahn, 114 Cal. at 335; see also Koster, 157 Cal. at 420 (City and
County of San Francisco's power over municipal affairs relate only to city functions, not
county functions like court administration); c.f also Professional Fire Fighters, 60 Cal. 2d
276 (State has complete control over city firefighters' right to unionize). As already noted
above, a California county that adopts a charter gains autonomy over only electoral and
administrative details. See supra note 267. Such details have been held to include county
civil service procedures to dismiss a deputy sheriff after his felony conviction, elections to
fill vacancies in county offices, the duties of county purchasing agents, and the subpoena
powers of county officers. See id.
298. See Candid Enters. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist., 39 Cal. 3d 878, 885
(1985) (School Facilities Act does not preempt local governments from imposing school-
impact fees to finance facilities), citing Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 140
(1976); Jardine, 199 Cal. at 68.
299. See Ehrlich, 12 Cal. 4th at 886 (plurality), 902 (Mosk, J., concurring), 907 (Ken-
nard, J., joined by Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 912 (Werdegar, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (unanimously upholding monetary exaction for
artwork as condition of project approval).
300. See Lesher, 52 Cal. 3d at 547; Johnston v. Bd. of Supervisors of Marin County, 31
Cal. 2d 66, 75 (1947).
But see Younger 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 498 n.18 ("We do not, of course, say that planning and
zoning are in all instances matters of more than local concern; we merely hold that under
the instant facts [i.e. protection of the Lake Tahoe Basin] they are of regional
significance.")
301. Although the State Planning and Zoning Law requires a general law city's zoning
ordinances to be consistent with its general plan, See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West
1997), a chartered city's zoning ordinances need not be. See id. § 65803 (West 1997); Garat
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land use regulations of every local government, city or county,
chartered or not.30 2
a. The State may preempt local legislation expressly or impliedly.
California courts recognize two types of preemption: express and
implied. The question of express preemption turns on whether the
purportedly occupied field encompasses the ordinances. 3  In other
words, where the State has completely occupied the subject matter, a
locality is expressly preempted from legislating. 04 In contrast, courts
use three different tests to determine implied preemption, making the
question fairly unpredictable. 5
Still, the California Supreme Court has ruled that in all cases pre-
emption occurs only where there is an irreconcilable conflict between
state and local law.30 6 If that language is too broad, the State
Supreme Court has also ruled that courts should be hesitant to find
preemption by implication where local conditions can vary substan-
v. City of Riverside, 2 Cal. App. 4th 259, 280-84 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds
by Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, 7 Cal. 4th 725, 744 n.11 (1994).
But see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65860(d) (West 1997) (City of Los Angeles' zoning ordi-
nances must conform to its general plan).
302. See Hurst, 207 Cal. at 138 (general law cities subject to Legislature's general laws);
c.f. City of San Mateo, 9 Cal. 2d at 7 (chartered cities subject to Legislature's general laws
when "municipal affairs" not at issue); Kehoe v City of Berkeley, 67 Cal. App. 3d 666,673-
75 (1977) (Community Redevelopment Law preempts local zoning and planning laws
where they conflict) review denied, Mar. 17, 1977; Redevelopment Agency of City of Berke-
ley, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 169 (State Legislature has manifested intent to preempt field of
community development).
303. If the field is defined narrowly, preemption is circumscribed; if it is broad, the
exemption is expanded. See Morehart, 7 Cal. 4th at 748, quoting Candid Enters., 39 Cal. 3d
at 886 n4; see, e.g., Channing Properties v. City of Berkeley, 11 Cal. App. 4th 88, 94 (1992)
(Ellis Act-Cal. Gov't Code § 7050 et seq.-preempts local action with regard to substantive
controls over landlords who wish to withdraw all accommodation from residential market).
304. See supra, note 299.
305. The three tests are: (1) Subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by
general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern;
(2) Subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to
indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local
action; and (3) Subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is
of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the
state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality. See Morehart, 7 Cal. 4th at 751,
citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 707-09 (1984), appeal dismissed in part,
probable jurisdiction noted, 471 U.S. 1124 (1985), affd 475 U.S. 260 (1986). Despite the
breadth of these tests, courts will not read procedural requirements imposed upon a "local
legislative body" to imply preemption of the electorate's ability to ignore the requirements
through initiative or referendum. See DeVita v. County of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 785-86
(1995).
306. See California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 1, 16-
17 (1991).
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tially from one jurisdiction to another.3 0 7 In practice, this leaves con-
siderable room for localities to enact their own land use controls.
b. The State may delegate some of its power to counties or cities.
The federal government may not use regulation to compel the
states, its fellow sovereigns, to do its bidding. 0 In contrast, the Cali-
fornia Legislature may enact legislative schemes in which chartered
cities act as their agents.3" 9 Thus, the Legislature may require its legal
subdivisions, or any other local government agency, including
chartered cities, to perform State functions. 3 10 Courts do not care if
the Legislature is fickle in the exercise of this power. The State may
307. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 707, citing Gluck v. County of Los Angeles, 93 Cal. App.
3d 121, 133 (1979).
308. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997); c.f. Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 207 ("Congress cannot enable a state to legislate...")-
Of course, Congress may use its powers under the Spending Clause to reach the same
result. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). For example, the Airports and
Airways Improvement Act of 1982 ("A.A.I.A.") uses federal funds as a carrot to further
federal aviation policy. Under the A.A.I.A., the Secretary of Transportation can approve a
grant for airport development only if the Secretary receives satisfactory, written assurances
that, among other things, the airport will be available for public use on reasonable condi-
tions and without unjust discrimination, see 49 U.S.C.A. § 47107(a)(1) (West 1997); ATA v.
Dept. of Transp., 119 F.3d 38, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and that air carriers making "similar
use" of the airport will be subject to substantially comparable charges for air-related facili-
ties and regulations and conditions. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 47107(a)(2) (West 1997).
309. See City of Santa Monica v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. App. 710, 713 (1911).
For example, under the Community Redevelopment Law, a city council approves redevel-
opment plans as an agent of the state. See Andrews v. City of San Bernardino, 175 Cal.
App. 2d 459, 462 (1959) ("Neither [the City nor the redevelopment agency] is functioning
independently of... state law and neither may exercise powers not vested or recognized
by that law."), citing Housing Auth. of City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.
2d 853, 862 (1952), cert denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); c.f e.g., Daniels, 183 Cal. at 639 (cities
control street traffic as agencies of the State, whose people own all public rights-of-way,
including city streets).
310. See, e.g., Adams, 171 Cal. at 461 (Legislature may delegate authority to city to
spend funds for non-municipal purposes); County of Modoc, 103 Cal. at 501 (when district
attorney acts as public prosecutor county has no control over him); Boys' & Girls' Aid Soc.
v. Reis, 71 Cal. 627, 632 (1887) (county must pay expenses for delegated duty to support
delinquent children); Fellom, 157 Cal. App. 2d at 248 (city acts as administrative arm of the
State in pursuing redevelopment in conjunction with State's local housing authority); Ack-
erman v. Moody, 38 Cal. App. 461 (1918) (Legislature determines extent to which it will
confer upon municipal corporation any power to aid in the discharge of obligation which
Constitution has imposed upon itself); c.f. Friends of the Library of Monterey Park v. City
of Monterey Park, 211 Cal. App. 3d 358, 371-72 (1989) ("A local office mandated by state
law may not be abolished by local ordinance."), citing De Merritt v. Weldon, 154 Cal. 545,
549 (1908).
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always resume exercise of functions that it has earlier delegated.3 ' In
principle, there is nothing to prevent the State from delegating to the
counties any or all of its land use regulation powers that preempt con-
flicting municipal laws.
c. The State may create special districts at will.
California courts give the Legislature free rein over the state's
various types of special districts, including: school, irrigation, reclama-
tion, drainage, bridge and highway districts, and redevelopment agen-
cies.312 Special districts are always agencies of the State.313 As such,
their creation and attributes are wholly in the Legislature's discre-
tion.314 Therefore, it does not matter that a special district spans more
than one county.
315
In the landmark case In re Madera Irrigation District,316 decided
after the advent of charter-based Home Rule, the court left no doubt
about the State Legislature's complete discretion vis d vis special dis-
tricts. Specifically, the Madera court found that:
In providing for the welfare of the state and its several parts, the
legislature may ... make special laws relating only to special
districts, or it may legislate directly upon local districts, or it may
intrust [sic] such legislation to subordinate bodies of a public
character. It may create municipal organizations or agencies
within the several counties, or it may avail itself of the county or
other municipal organizations for the purposes of legislation, or
it may create new districts embracing more than one county, or
parts of several counties, and may delegate to such organiza-
tions a part of its legislative power to be exercised within the
311. See Watson, 67 Cal. App. at 337; Buckingham v. Commary-Peterson Co., 39 Cal.
App. 154 (1918); County of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 164; Chambers, 33 Cal. App.
at 149-50.
312. See PEPPIN IV, supra note 96, at 692-94, citing County of Los Angeles v. Rocklhold,
3 Cal. 2d 192, 209 (1935); Joint Highway. Dist. No. 13 v. Hinman, 220 Cal. 578, 584 (1934).
313. TWo types of special districts, drainage districts (not to be confused with irrigation
districts) and school districts, are only agencies of the State and are not public corpora-
tions. See People ex reL Chapman v. Sacramento Drainage Dist., 155 Cal. 373, 382 (1909)
(drainage districts); People ex reL Wiflliamson v. Rinner, 52 Cal. App. 747, 751 (1921)
(school districts).
314. See Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist, 214 Cal. at 320-21 (State may create
bridge and highway district by special act because it is a State purpose, not a local one);
Orosi Pub. Util. Dist., 196 Cal. at 50 (State may create utilities district by special act);
McDonald v. Richards, 79 Cal. App. 1 (1926) (State may create school districts by special
act); Peterson, 65 Cal. App. at 677-79 (State may create reclamation districts by special act).
315. See Williams, 76 Cal. at 370; Madera Irrigation Dist., 92 Cal. at 308. That said, an
exception may or may not exist for Business Improvement Districts that lie solely within a
single chartered city.
316. 92 Cal. 296.
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boundaries of said organized districts, and may vest them with
certain powers of local legislation, in respect to which the parties
interested may be supposed more competent to judge of their
needs than the central authority.317
Today, the Legislature can delegate any amount of its own power
to special districts as it wishes, except authority to enact penal ordi-
nances. 18 In addition, counties' and cities' police powers are not of-
fended when a special district seeks regional goals.319 For example,
because the State expressly permits it, the San Francisco Bay Conser-
vation and Development Commission ("B.C.D.C.") can preempt local
police power affecting the bay, a regional issue.320
B. County Government Under Current California Statutory Law
The power to partition California counties or to create new coun-
ties resides exclusively in the State Legislature.32' As discussed above,
constitutional provisions limiting the exercise of that power were im-
portant at California's Constitutional Convention of 1878. However,
amendments during the 1970s moved these into statutory law.
i. Creating County Governments
Article XI, Section 1(a), of the State Constitution requires the
Legislature to enact general legislation to form, consolidate, and alter
the boundaries of counties.322 Under the California Government
317. Id. at 308.
318. See Younger 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 496; accord Moore v. Salinas Mun. Ct., 170 Cal. App. 2d
548, 556 (1959) ("[S]o long as the Legislature determines the penalty it may leave to the
administrative body the actual making of the multiple rules called for by the specific matter
regulated."); VAN ALsTYrN, supra note 43, at 304-05; see also, e.g., In re Sanitary Bd. of
East Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 457 (1910) (sanitary districts); Galt County
Water Dist. v. Evans, 10 Cal. App. 2d 116, 118 (1935) (water districts); Antelope Valley
Union High Sch. Dist. v. McClellan, 55 Cal. App. 244, 246 (1921) (school districts); 15 Cal.
Att'y Gen. Op. 27, 28 (1950) (police protection districts). However, the Legislature may
not delegate authority to levy taxes to a private body for any purpose, regional or local.
See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers' Ass'n, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1390, 1396.
319. See Younger 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 496.
320. See People ex reL San Francisco B.C.D.C. v. Town of Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533,
549 (1968) (State Legislature may alter grants to cities under tideland trust); Smith, supra
note 87, at 768.
321. See Tulare County v. Kings County, 117 Cal. 195 (1897).
322. See CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 1(a). Despite this constitutional imperative, in 1997 the
Legislature created by special law a "Los Angeles County Division Commission" to study
the fiscal health of Los Angeles County and its capability and efficiency in delivering mu-
nicipal services, prior to its proposed division. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 23345-49 (West
Supp. 1998).
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Code,3 ~ county creation begins with a petition from residents of the
area at issue,324 rather than a decision by the Legislature. A certified
petition then triggers formation of a governor-appointed committee.
If the committee approves the proposed new county, the counties that
will cede territory for its formation then refer the issue to their
electors.
The Legislature has set some minimum sizes for counties. By
statute, no creation can occur if it would reduce any affected county to
a population of fewer than 20,000 people or to an area of fewer than
1,200 square miles, or if it would create a new county with a popula-
tion of fewer than 10,000 people.32  Further, perhaps merely out of
respect for the status quo, new counties cannot divide any existing
cities.326
Similarly, the petition process favors larger secessions to small
ones. When the proposed county's population comprises less than
five percent of the population of the affected counties, the petition
must be signed by at least 25% of registered voters living in the terri-
tory of the proposed county, plus at least 10% of registered voters
within the balance of the affected counties.327 Otherwise, the petition
need only be signed by at least 25% of registered voters living in the
territory of the proposed county.32 In any case, a copy of the petition
must be filed simultaneously with the clerk of each affected county.329
Once the petition is certified, 3 ° the various counties' boards of
supervisors turn matters over to the governor,33 ' who must appoint
five people to a County Formation Review Commission.3 3 2 In a bow
to local self-determination, two of the commissioners must reside
323. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 23300-98 (West 1988). This legislative scheme has nothing to
do with the system devised for the incorporation of cities. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 23310
(West 1988). City incorporation is regulated by the Cortese-Knox Government Reorgani-
zation Act of 1985. See supra part I.C.ii.
324. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 23320 (West 1988).
325. See id. § 23306. The Legislature discourages repeated petitions to form new coun-
ties out of existing ones with a small population. No person may file a petition within five
years of the date of certification of a prior petition that included any territory also included
in the new petition. See CAt. GOV'T CODE § 23330.5 (West 1988). However, there is no
limit on submitting petitions where the population of any affected county exceeds five
million people (i.e. Los Angeles County).
326. See id. § 23309.
327. See id. § 23321(a).
328. See id. § 23321(b).
329. See id. § 23325.
330. See id. § 23328.
331. See id. § 23330.5.
332. See id. § 23331.
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within the territory of the proposed county, two must reside in the
territory remaining in the affected county or counties, and one of the
five commissioners must be a non-resident of any affected area.33
ii. Redrawing County Boundaries
The California Constitution also empowers the State Legislature
to pass uniform procedures for county boundary changes. Accord-
ingly, the Legislature has established a two-track system to adjust
boundaries between existing counties.
3 34
The State has assigned sole discretion over "minor '335 boundary
changes to the affected counties and the inhabitants of the territory
proposed for transfer.336 A county board of supervisors may initiate
the process by passing a resolution describing its proposal, and filing it
with its counterparts in the other affected county or counties. 37
Affected residents have a strong influence over even minor
boundary changes. If the affected territory is inhabited and more than
half of the resident-voters protest in writing, then the board of super-
visors must abandon the proposed boundary change.338 Failing that,
and assuming they favor the proposal,339 the boards of supervisors
must adopt the proposed boundary change through ordinances ap-
proved by a majority of their members.3 40 Nevertheless, if between
twenty-five and fifty percent of the resident-voters have filed written
protests, the ordinances must be referred to voters in the affected ter-
ritory who may reject it by majority vote.3 41
333. See id.
334. The Legislature regulates the incorporation, reconfiguration or dissolution of cities
and special districts under the Cortese-Knox Government Reorganization Act of 1985. See
supra part I.C.ii.
335. Statute defines a minor alteration as one moving a boundary fewer than five miles
from its original location, and reducing the area and population of any affected county by
less than five percent. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23202 (West 1988).
336. See id. §§ 23200-20.
337. See id. §§ 23203-04. Alternatively, the proposal may be initiated by a petition filed
with the board of supervisors of any affected county, and signed by at least 25% of the
affected territory's resident-voters or by 25% its property owners who also own at least
25% of the assessed value of real estate in the territory. See id. § 23205. The boards of
supervisors for the affected counties then must hold a noticed hearing. See id. § 23206-08.
338. See id. § 23209(a). Where uninhabited territory is at issue, more than 50% of the
property owners who own more than 50% of the value of the land and improvements in
the affected territory can exercise the same veto power. See id. §§ 23209(b).
339. See id. § 23209(c).
340. See id. § 23210. These ordinances may include any terms and conditions to which
the boundary change is subject, including a division of any county debt or property. See id.
§ 23210(b).
341. See id. § 23210(c)-(d).
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A major boundary change requires a lengthier procedure, involv-
ing a governor-appointed commission.342 The process may be initi-
ated by voter petition, or by a resolution of either the county's board
of supervisors or of a city council within the county proposed to cede
territory.343 A petition requires the signature of at least 25% of the
registered voters within each county as of the last gubernatorial
344election. 4
Assuming a sufficient petition, or alternatively, a suitable resolu-
tion, the governor must create a five-member County Boundary Re-
view Commission to examine the proposed major change.345 Two
commissioners must reside in each of the two affected counties, and
the fifth commissioner may not live in either county.3 46 After gather-
ing information through a public hearing,347 the Commission must de-
termine an equitable distribution of the affected counties'
indebtedness, as well as the foreseeable economic viability and alloca-
tion of functions for each.348
The Commission then transmits its determinations in the form of
a resolution to both counties' boards of supervisors, 349 who then must
disapprove the proposed boundary change, or accept the Commis-
sion's determinations as both final and binding. 5 0 Finally, there is an
election in the territory proposed for transfer,35' and if at least 50% of
residents approve, the boundary change occurs. 2
iii. Consolidating Counties
The procedure to consolidate two or more counties is almost
identical to the one for major boundary changes. The process begins
342. See id. §§ 23230-23296.
343. See id. § 23233.
344. See id. § 23235. All of the signatures must be collected within a six-month period.
See id. § 23240. If the territory to be transferred is uninhabited, owners of at least one-
fourth of the land, measured by both area and assessed value, must sign the petition. See
id. § 23236. Even with a sufficient petition, if a majority of such owners subsequently pro-
test the boundary change, no change may be made involving the same territory for the next
year. See id. § 23255.
345. See id. § 23248.
346. See id.
347. See id. § 23252.
348. See id. § 23249. To determine fiscal impact, the commission must consider the cost
of providing services in each county, the projected revenues to each county, and the effect
of any projected reduction in revenue available to each county. See id. § 23250.
349. See id. § 23264.
350. See id. §§ 23264-65.
351. See id. § 23267.
352. See id. § 23281.
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with either a voter petition or a resolution of each counties' board of
supervisors.353 Again, the petition must be signed by at least 25% of
the registered voters within each county as of the last gubernatorial
election.354
Likewise, upon receipt of a sufficient petition or resolution, the
governor must create a County Consolidation Commission,355 which
must hold a public hearing to receive relevant information,356 and
then make a series of final and binding determinations of the terms
and conditions for the proposed consolidation.3 57 Through separate
elections, a majority of voters in each affected county must approve
the consolidation.358
Because of all these procedural requirements, it is more difficult
to effect a major boundary change or consolidate counties than it is to
amend the State Constitution. Voters may approve the latter by a
simple majority,359 and a petition to put such initiatives on the state-
wide ballot requires signatures by only eight percent of the number of
votes cast in the last gubernatorial election.36° Suffice it to say that no
major boundary changes have occurred since Imperial County split off
from San Diego County in 1907.
Neither the redrawing of county lines nor the wholesale consoli-
dation of counties appears to be a fruitful way to achieve regional
governance. As a matter of practical politics, either would likely
prove as difficult as persuading cities and voters to cede their auton-
omy to new regional entities.
C. California Intergovernmental Relations
As discussed above, the State Constitution allows counties to
make and enforce within their boundaries all ordinances and regula-
tions not in conflict with general laws.36' A county's power to control
353. See id. § 23510.
354. See id. § 23511. As with petitions for major boundary changes, all of the signatures
must be collected within a six-month period. See id. § 23514.
355. See id. § 23530.
356. See id. § 23531.
357. See id. §8 23535, 23538. These determinations include the location of the proposed
consolidated county's county seat. See id. § 23535(f).
358. See id. § 23567.
359. See id. art. II, § 10(a). The Legislature may also amend the Constitution but only
on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of each house. See id. art. XVIII, § 1. A constitu-
tional convention is yet another possibility. See id.
360. See CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(b).
361. See supra note 258.
land uses lies within this inherent "police power. '362  However,
neither the police power nor even a chartered city's exclusive control
over its municipal affairs permits regulating the State itself.3 6 3
This is so because local governments are necessarily subordinate
to the State's sovereign power. By virtue of its "sovereign immunity,"
the State is exempt from all local laws, even those of a chartered city
regulating its municipal affairs. Even private agents of the State enjoy
this immunity if they are acting toward a public purpose.
Five harder questions are: (1) May a county or a city regulate a
special district, (2) May a county regulate the internal activities of a
city or of another county, (3) May a city regulate a county's external
activities, (4) May a county regulate the external activities of a city or
county, and (5) May a city regulate another city's external activities?
Because of comity between California localities, courts have encoun-
tered these questions only rarely. When called upon to answer, the
California courts have muddled the law even when they reach the
right result.
i. Sovereign Immunity
The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine is a discredited principle that
once immunized governmental activities but not proprietary functions
from tort liability.36  The problem was in the details because the dis-
362. See DeVita, 9 Cal. 4th at 782 ("'Land use regulation in California has historically
been a function of local government under the grant of police power contained in Califor-
nia Constitution, article XI, section 7.' ... [A] city's or county's power to control its own
land use decisions derives from this inherent police power, not from the delegation of
authority by the state."); accord Hurst, 207 Cal. at 138; Foster v. City Council of City of
Berkeley, 201 Cal. 769 (1927); Fourcade, 196 Cal. 655; Miller, 195 Cal. 477; Taschner v.
City Council of City of Laguna Beach, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48 (1973), disapproved on other
grounds in Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 596 n.14; Scrutton v. Sacramento
County, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412 (1969); People v. Johnson, 129 Cal. App. 2d 1 (1954); City of
Stockton v. Frisbie & Latta, 93 Cal. App. 277 (1928); A. C. Blumenthal & Co. v. Cryer, 71
Cal. App. 668 (1925); see also Santa Monica Pines Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd. of City of Santa
Monica, 35 Cal. 3d 858 (1984) (city's police power gives it independent authority to regu-
late subdivisions and it was not preempted by Subdivision Map Act).
But c.f Brougher v. Bd. of Pub. Works of City and County of San Francisco, 205 Cal.
426, 439 (1928) (method of adopting zoning ordinances is a "municipal affair").
363. There seems to be a special exception to permit localities to abate nuisances cre-
ated by the State. See Bloom v. City and County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. 503, 504 (1884).
This is perhaps because, by definition, a nuisance impairs the property rights of citizens
that the State must respect.
364. See, e.g., City of Pasadena v. Railroad Comm'n, 183 Cal. 526 (1920), overruled in
part on other grounds by Los Angeles Metro. Transit Auth., 59 Cal. 2d at 869; accord Chafor
v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478,486-87 (1917); Davoust v. City of Alameda, 149 Cal. 69
(1906); Town of Ukiah v. Ukiah Water & Improvement Co., 142 Cal. 173, 179 (1904);
Chope v. City of Eureka, 78 Cal. 588, 590 (1889); Holland v. City of San Francisco, 7 Cal.
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tinction between governmental and proprietary activities was not
sharp and clear. 65 For over a century, California courts struggled to
distinguish the two.36 6 Sometimes, the court looked to historical func-
tions; other times, it looked to see if there was a profit motive.
3 67
For purposes of tort law, the State Supreme Court swept the doc-
trine away in 1961, holding in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District3 68
that "it must be discarded as mistaken and unjust. '3 69 The Legislature
has since partially waived the tort immunity of the State and its of-
ficers through the California Tort Claims Act. 7 ° The doctrine, how-
ever, still matters in intergovernmental relations.
Sovereign immunity also plays a role in federal constitutional law.
The United States Supreme Court interprets the Eleventh Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution to mean that each state is sovereign,
and that it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to suit by an individual without the sovereign's consent.371 Thus, even
when Congress has complete lawmaking power over a particular area,
the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of
suits by private parties against non-consenting states.372 Furthermore,
Congress may abrogate states' sovereign immunity only by unequivo-
361, 376 (1857), overruled in part on other grounds, McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16
Cal. 591, 622 (1860); Touchard v. Touchard, 5 Cal. 306, 307 (1855); see also Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 103 Cal. 531, 534-35 (1894) (municipal corporation liable on common counts for
contract claims).
365. See Barrett, 161 Cal. App. 2d at 42.
366. Proprietary uses fall into two classes: those engaged in by a municipal corporation
which are for public purposes, such as operation of public utilities, and other proprietary
activities which are not for public purposes. See Marin City Water Power Co. v. Town of
Sausalito, 49 Cal. App. 78, 83 (1920); Board of Trustees of Cal. State Univ. & Colleges v.
City of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. App. 3d, 49-50 (1975); S.F. City Att'y Op. No. 3963, at 3 (May
21, 1947).
367. See, e.g., Manning v. City of Pasadena, 58 Cal. App. 666, 669 (1922) (garbage dis-
posal a traditional governmental function), review denied, Oct. 2, 1922; Foxen v. City of
Santa Barbara, 166 Cal. 77, 79 (1913) (water sold for profit, so city water works held in
proprietary capacity); see also 17 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 125, 127 (1951) (because city oper-
ates oil wells as proprietary function, it is subject to same charges imposed on private oil
producers).
368. 55 Cal. 2d 211 (1961) (5-2 decision), reh'g denied, Feb. 21, 1961 (two justices
dissenting).
369. Id. at 213.
370. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-997 (West 1995); see also CAL.. CONsr. art. III, § 5
("Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be
directed by law.").
371. See Alden v. Maine, - U.S. _, _, 119 S.Ct. 2240,2246 (1999); Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
372. See Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 72.
cally expressing its intent to do so, 373 and only under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment.374
The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is con-
troversial. Some scholars believe that the Court erects sovereign im-
munity as an obstacle only if and when it feels our federalism is
unfairly endangered.375 Indeed, the Court seems hardly to have stum-
bled where it felt it was important for "states' rights" to give way, as in
racial desegregation of schools. 376 Still, the doctrine is as important
today as it ever was.3 77
a. Sovereign immunity's most logical basis is as a rule of statutory
construction.
Apart from policy, there is a purely logical basis for sovereign
immunity. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was a strong proponent
for this view stating that:
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal con-
ception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends. [Citations
omitted].
As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is
not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of
juridical theory, but naturally extended to those that, in actual
administration, originate and change at their will the law of con-
tract and property, from which persons within the jurisdiction
derive their rights.378
Holmes' rule of construction traces its pedigree back to English
and early American jurisprudence. Sir William Blackstone included it
in his commentaries, 379 and New York State's Chancellor James Kent
373. See id. at 55.
374. See id. at 59.
375. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THm ELEVENTH AMENDMENT ANr SOVEREIGN IMMUN=TY
156 (1972).
376. See id., citing, e.g., Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 228
(1964) and Brief of Respondent in Griffin (1963).
377. The Supreme Court recently expanded the effect of the Eleventh Amendment by
holding in Alden v. Maine, that Congress lacks the power under Article I of the U.S. Con-
stitution to subject non-consenting States to private suits even in their own courts. See
Alden, supra note 367.
378. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (dictum).
379. See WLLI.M BLAcFswoNE, COMMENTARMS ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND, VOL. I,
261(Philadelphia, Robert Bell, Printer, 1770-71), quoted in Balthasar v. Pac. Elec. Ry. Co.,
187 Cal. 302, 305 (1921). Blackstone assumed that England's sovereign (the King) would
do justice whenever a valid claim arose. See JACOBS, supra note 371, at 8.
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used a similar formulation. 8 ° Sitting for a First Circuit case, Justice
Joseph Story firmly established the rule in American law, emphasizing
that it was not grounded in any prerogative of the government, but in
a favoritism to the public interest, and a need to further the intent of
the legislature. 8
According to Professor Clyde Jacobs, the Holmesian view as-
sumes its own conclusion, and is objectionable for postulating a con-
ception of sovereignty that is "even more authoritarian than the
theory of kingship upon which the supremacy of the English ruler was
based. ' 382 Jacobs contends that American constitutionalism assumes
that the people in their constituent role are their own lawgivers, and
that in this role the people do not have an exemption from liability or
from amenability to suit.383 Also, he writes that precisely because of
the people's ultimate sovereignty, the government cannot invoke im-
munity against them.3 4
Jacobs cites no authority for the proposition that the people in
their "constituent role" lack sovereign immunity, and thus assumes his
own conclusion. Furthermore, Jacobs contradicts himself by conced-
ing the logic that there can be no legal right against the lawmaker
unless the lawmaker has created it.38 5 The people of California cre-
ated their government.386 It follows that the State Legislature's power
represents the people's independent sovereignty, unlimited except by
the State Constitution.387 Therefore, the people must say if they want
to be held liable by individual citizens.
At the root of Jacobs' view is that sovereign immunity is "morally
indefensible. ' 3 8 This may be true, but it does not respond to Holmes'
380. See Kent's Commentaries, at 460, quoted in Balthasar, 187 Cal. at 305.
381. [T]hough this is sometimes called a prerogative right, it is in fact nothing
more than a reservation or exception, introduced for the public benefit, and
equally applicable to all governments ....
But, independently of any doctrine founded on the notion of prerogative, the
same construction of statutes of this sort ought to prevail, founded upon the legis-
lative intention .... In general, acts of the legislature are meant to regulate and
direct the acts and rights of citizens; and in most cases the reasoning applicable to
[citizens] applies very different, and often contrary force to the government itself.
United States v. Hoar, 26 F. 329, 330 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821).
382. JACOBS, supra note 371, at 155.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id.
386. See Lynch, 51 Cal. at 28.
387. See Beals v. Bd. of Supervisors of Amador County, 35 Cal. 624, 630 (1868).
388. California Supreme Court Chief Justice Traynor shared this view. See Muskopf, 55
Cal. 3d at 159. Of course, Traynor expressed his view only in regard to the government's
tort liability, and at a time when the State probably enjoyed its greatest prosperity. With
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syllogism. Perhaps there exists better criticism of the Holmesian view
as it applies to the states' internal affairs, but it has yet to be found.389
b. California courts apply sovereign immunity as a rule of
construction.
Whatever its merits, the Holmesian view is law in California.
State courts hold that sovereign immunity derives from a fundamental
rule of statutory construction that a law may not be construed to bind
the State or its agencies unless the law mentions the State or its agen-
cies expressly or by necessary implication.39 °
In another formulation, the doctrine will not allow laws to trench
upon the State's sovereign rights, injuriously affect its capacity to per-
form its functions, or establish a right of action against it.391 However,
where the sovereign power is not impaired, the reason underlying this
formulation ceases to exist and the courts may impute legislative in-
tent to apply the statute to governmental bodies.392
today's limitations on public revenues, even the morality of unlimited government tort
liability may have changed.
389. I agree with Justice John Paul Stevens that Justice Holmes' explanation does not
speak to the question whether Congress should be able to authorize a federal court to
provide a private remedy for a State's violation of federal law. See Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 44, 116 S.Ct. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the other hand, in his dissent to
Alden, joined by Stevens and three other justices, Justice Souter had to concede that
Holmes' theory is "logically impeccable." See Alden, _ U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 2287. In
any case, debate over the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment is beyond the scope of this
article.
390. See Hall, 47 Cal. 2d at 183; In re Means, 14 Cal. 2d 254, 258 (1939); accord But-
terworth, 12 Cal. 2d at 150; Estate of Miller, 5 Cal. 2d at 597; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City
of Pasadena, 1 Cal. 2d 87, 98 (1934); City of Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles, 207 Cal.
697, 707 (1929); C. J. Kubach Co., 199 Cal. 215; Chenu, 188 Cal. at 736; Balthasar, 187 Cal.
at 305; County of Solano, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 1167; Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. Cities Servs.,
Inc, 43 Cal. App. 4th 630, 635 (1996); Del Norte Disposal, Inc. v. Dept. of Corrections, 26
Cal. App. 4th 1009, 1012-13 (1994), review denied, Oct. 27, 1994; Churchill v. Parnell, 170
Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1097-98 (1985); Siegel v. City of Oakland, 79 Cal. App. 3d 351, 357
(1978); City of Orange v. Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d 240, 245 (1974); Town of Atherton v.
Super. Ct., 159 Cal. App. 2d 417, 428 (1958).
391. See Mayrhofer v. Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. 110, 112 (1891).
392. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 533,536 (1976); accord City of
Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 276-77 (1975); In re Bevilacqua's
Estate, 31 Cal. 2d 580, 585 (1948); Community Mem'l Hosp. v. County of Ventura, 50 Cal.
App. 4th 199, 210 (1996), review denied, Nov. 13, 1996); see also Hoyt v. Bd. of Civil Serv.
Comm'rs of City of Los Angeles, 21 Cal. 2d 399, 402 (1942) (where effect would impair
sovereign powers, the word "person" in a statute does not mean the State or its political
subdivisions without an express indication of legislative intent); Balthasar, 187 Cal. at 308
(same); Berton v. All Persons, 176 Cal. 610, 617 (1917); Philbrick v. State Personnel Bd., 53
Cal. App. 2d 222, 228 (1942) (same); see, e.g. People v. Centr-O-Mart, 34 Cal. 2d 702, 704
(1950) (stated legislative purpose to "safeguard the public" construed to mean Unfair Prac-
tices Act applies to government agencies).
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California courts have long applied either or both formulations of
the rule with a liberal eye. For example, in Berton v. All Persons,393
the court held that the general language of an act did not apply to a
city even though the State Legislature had made one of its provisions
"binding on the whole world." '39 4 As the court explained:
Law is a rule of conduct dictated by the superior, the state, for
the conduct and control of its people. It is only by its own grace
that the state ever becomes subject to the operation of its own
laws, and while in later governmental development the state fre-
quently makes declaration that it will submit its own rights to
determination in its own or other courts, yet, as such declara-
tions are always the nature of impairments of the sovereign
power, this submission of the state is never inferred in favor of the
private litigant, but must be found either actually expressed in an
act or by fair intendment and interpretation belong in the act..'95
In the area of land use controls, this rule of statutory construction
still applies, modified only by the relatively recent applicability of
voter initiatives and referenda. 96 The State and its agencies are pre-
sumptively immune from all local land use regulations, even those of a
chartered city regulating its municipal affairs.397 Such immunity even
extends to cover private lessees from the State, as long as they are
acting toward a state purpose.398 To remove the presumption, the
Legislature must explicitly waive its immunity.399 Neither a private
393. 176 Cal. 610 (1917).
394. See Balthasar, 187 Cal. at 307.
395. Berton, 176 Cal. at 617, quoted in Balthasar, 187 Cal. at 307.
396. C.f City of Woodlake, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1065 (voters possess independent power
to waive sovereign immunity).
397. See Hall, 47 Cal. 2d at 183; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. City of Santa Monica, 77
Cal. App. 3d 130, 136-37 (1978).
398. See Means, 14 Cal. 2d at 260 (journeyman plumbers need no certificate of registra-
tion when working on state fairgrounds); 57 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 124, 126 (1974) (county's
immunity for property located within city's boundaries extends to public purposes by pri-
vate lessee); 56 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 210, 216 (1973) (district agricultural association should
make efforts, in the interests of city-state relations, to generally respect the city building
and zoning scheme, but neither association nor its lessee subject to city building and zoning
ordinances); 54 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 158, 161 (1971) (chartered city may not regulate oil
and gas lessee of State-owned tidelands and submerged lands); 36 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 179,
184 (1960) (if the state is immune, its lessees are immune if the incidence of the regulation
would be borne by the state); 31 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 46, 51 (1958) (lessee at city-owned
arena immune from business taxes because they would interfere with State-approved
lease).
But see 61 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 599, 560 (1978) (independent contractor to the State
may not avoid paying local business tax); S.F. City Att'y Op. No. 634 (Dec. 5, 1932) (lessee
of property owned by Municipal Railway for drugstore must pay city business taxes).
399. See Hall, 47 Cal. 2d at 183 (school district immune from city land use controls);
Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 244-45; County of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 165.
lessee of state land, nor an agency of the State may waive the immu-
nity.4" Only the Legislature may do so.
Finally, although localities are not considered sovereign, they still
can benefit from the sovereign immunity doctrine as a rule of statu-
tory construction. Thus, the city attorney for the City and County of
San Francisco has opined that an incinerator franchised out by the city
could be sited regardless of the city's zoning code,410 and that the city
could site a firehouse in a residential district without rezoning the
neighborhood for that kind of use.4°2
c. The State's sovereign immunity trumps Home Rule.
By providing counties and cities with the police power within
their respective territories, Article XI, Section 11, of the California
Constitution does not abrogate the State's sovereign immunity.40 3
There still remains, however, the Constitution's provision for charter-
based Home Rule. If a chartered city controls its own municipal af-
fairs, and if one of that city's ordinances affecting a municipal affair
expressly identifies the State as part of the regulated class, should not
the State have to comply with the ordinance? No.
In 1956, the California Supreme Court unanimously held in Hall
v. City of Taft,40 4 that because a school district is an agency of the
State4 5 it is necessarily immune from local land use controls.40 6 The
Hall court's theory rested on a conception of the city, chartered or
not, as a creature of the State:
It is competent for the state to retain to itself some part of the
government even within the municipality; which it will exercise
directly, or through the medium of other selected and more suit-
able instrumentalities. How can the city ever have a superior au-
thority to the state over the latter's own property; or in its control
and management? From the nature of things it cannot have.417
The Hall court took this quotation from a Kentucky case. The
Commonwealth of Kentucky's Constitution differed significantly from
400. See Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 245.
401. See S.F. City Att'y Op. No. 490 (Oct. 2, 1931).
402. See S.F. City Att'y Op. No. 7 (Nov. 30, 1949).
403. See Hall, 47 Cal. 2d at 183.
404. 47 Cal. 2d 177 (1956) (unanimous).
405. See Compton Junior College Dist., 77 Cal. App. 2d at 728 (school district is not a
municipal corporation), review denied, Mar. 20, 1947; Rinner, 52 Cal. App. at 751 (same).
406. See also Town of Atherton, 159 Cal. App. 2d 417 (following Hall v. City of Taft, 47
Cal. 2d 177).
407. See Hall, 47 Cal. 2d at 183-84, quoting Kentucky Inst. for Educ. of Blind v. City of
Louisville, 123 Ky. 767, 97 S.W. 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906).
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California's, notably in regard to chartered cities, whose Home Rule
powers had been recognized in the California Constitution sixty years
before Hall came down. One could reason that the California Legisla-
ture's ability to preempt a city's police power under the State Consti-
tution, in effect, reserves immunity for the State from city ordinances.
On the other hand, because the State Constitution, not the Legisla-
ture, grants chartered cities exclusive power over their municipal af-
fairs, it is hard to see how the State can "retain" immunity there.
One way around this difficulty is to assume that municipal affairs
can never involve regulating the State. Recall that California courts
define "municipal affairs" to mean everything that is not a "statewide
concern." 40 8 Here, geography is not determinative, even in the land
use context, because "[u]nder certain circumstances, an act relating to
property within a city may be of such general concern that local regu-
lation concerning municipal affairs is inapplicable. '40 9
Analogizing to federal-state relations helps clarify the issue.
Under the Supremacy Clause of United States Constitution, an instru-
mentality of the federal government is generally immune from regula-
tion by state or local authorities. 410  To remove that immunity,
Congress must affirmatively subject federal installations to local regu-
lation.411 For example, the Office of the California Attorney General
has construed the Postal Reorganization Act412 to immunize the Pos-
tal Service from local zoning regulations that affect the construction of
a post office.413
408. Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 399-400.
409. Means, 14 Cal. 2d at 259.
410. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....
"); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178 (1976); M'Culloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 427 (1819). In M'Culloch, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned, in part, that allowing a
state to tax federal instrumentalities unfairly denied representation to U.S. citizens living in
other states. See id. at 435-36.
411. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988); accord Hancock, 426
U.S. at 179 (no clear declaration by Congress requiring federal installations to obtain state
air pollution permits); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447-48 (1943) (Congress has
not subjected itself to payment of state inspection fees), reh'g denied 320 U.S. 810 (1943).
412. 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-6440 (West 1997).
413. See 68 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 310 (1985). The A.G.'s opinion rests on solid authority.
See id. at 311-12 citing Middletown TP v. N/E Reg. Off., U.S. Postal Svc., 601 F. Supp. 125,
127 (D. N.J. 1985) (Postmaster General's authority to erect post office on proposed site
may not be restricted by local ordinance); Stewart v. United States Postal Serv., 508 F.
Supp. 112, 116 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (Postal Service need not comply with local zoning ordi-
nances that hamper its functions); Andrews v. Srogi, 431 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (1980) (same);
Thanet Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Township of Princeton, 104 N.J. Super. 180,249 A.2d
31 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1969) (same), aff'd 108 N.J. Super. 65, 260 A.2d 1 (NJ. Super.
All this goes to show that because no city is sovereign,414 it would
be incongruous if a city could regulate a sovereign State that cannot
itself regulate another sovereign. As for chartered counties, their au-
tonomy is limited to electoral and administrative matters.415 These
matters are unlikely even to involve direct regulation of the State.
Additionally, because counties are subdivisions of the State,416 it is
easier to imagine that the State could "retain" immunity from county
ordinances in all cases. Indeed, a California court of appeals held that
the State's sovereign immunity trumps Home Rule.41 7
d. Under California law, counties are sovereign but cities are not.
Counties are subdivisions of the State.418 The principal purpose
in establishing counties was to make effectual the State's political or-
ganization and civil administration requiring local direction, supervi-
App. Div. 1969), cert. denied 55 N.J. 360, 262 A.2d 207 (N.J. 1970); Black v. City of Berea,
137 Ohio St. 611, 32 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ohio 1941) (location of mailbox on post road is matter for
postal authorities and city can take no action on it).
Federal immunity from local regulation derives separately from the Property Clause,
which provides: "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This language essentially grants Congress unlimited power
over its land. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580
(1987). The Property Clause does not forbid other governments from regulating federal
lands, see id. at 580, 59, but exempts federal lands from such regulation where contrary
federal law exists. See id. at 580-81, 593.
On the other hand, the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act ("I.C.A.") requires fed-
eral agencies, such as the Postal Service, "[t]o the extent possible," to consider all local
viewpoints in planning its development programs and projects. 31 U.S.C. § 6506(c); Exec.
Order No. 12372, 47 Fed.Reg. 30959, 3 C.F.R. § 197 (1982) ('For those cases where the
concerns [of elected State and local officials] cannot be accommodated, Federal officials
shall explain the bases for their decision in a timely manner.").
Finally, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321-95
(West 1994), applies to all federal projects. Pursuant to NEPA, federal agencies operating
in California must take the necessary "hard look" at environmental consequences before
approving any major action. See LaFlamme v. F.E.R.C, 852 F.2d 389,398 (9th Cir. 1988),
citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
414. See supra part III.A.iii.b.
415. See supra part III.A.i.a.
416. See supra note 260.
417. "Since the question is one of immunity... not preemption, it makes no difference
whether the local government is a charter city as opposed to some other form of local
government. The sovereign immunity of a state agency from local regulation does not
depend upon the source of the local government entity's [power] to make regulations, it
depends upon whether consent to regulations has been expressly stated by the Legislature
or in the state constitution." Laidlaw, 43 Cal. App. 4th at 638-39.
418. See supra note 260.
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sion, and control.419 County powers and functions therefore have
direct and exclusive reference to general state policy.4 2 In California,
as agents of the state performing state-related functions, counties ex-
ercise the State's delegated sovereign power.
The United States Supreme Court has held that sovereign immu-
nity, as recognized in the Eleventh Amendment, forbids a citizen from
asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 ("Section 1983")
against any state.421 In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court does not
think it possible for a county to be sovereign for purposes of the Elev-
enth Amendment.422 Therefore, the High Court has held that Section
1983,42 3 which bars deprivations of one's civil rights by "any person,"
applies to local governments.424
That is federal law. In contrast, the California Supreme Court
has held that a county enjoys sovereign immunity because it is "a por-
tion of the State Govermment. ' '4 2  Furthermore, unlike a city, a
419. See Dineen v. City and County of San Francisco, 38 Cal. App. 2d 486, 490 (1940),
review denied, June 13, 1940.
420. See Central Pacific Ry. Co. v. Costa, 84 Cal. App. 577 (1927); see also Riley, 6 Cal.
2d at 625-27 (with certain exceptions, the powers and functions of counties have direct and
exclusive reference to general policy of the State and are but a branch of general adminis-
tration of that policy).
But see People v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. 2d 754, 762-63 (1947) (counties act in proprietary
capacity, not just governmental capacity).
421. See Arizonans v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 48, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1059 (1997) (§ 1983
actions do not lie against a State), citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989) (neither a State nor its officials acting in official capacities are "persons" under
§ 1983); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla., 116 S.Ct. at 1125 (Congress may abrogate the 11th
Amendment solely through the Fourteenth Amendment where it clearly expresses its in-
tent to do so through statute); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,338-41 (1979) (Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871 did not abrogate States' sovereign immunity under 11th Amendment).
422. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (county may not invoke
Eleventh Amendment because the State is not the "real" defendant); see also Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 718-21 (1973) (California counties have the indicia of
independence relative to the State of California so they are "citizens" for purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)); Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College of S.
Carolina College, 221 U.S. 636, 646 (1911) (imputed liability for local officials wrongs); Ex
parte Taylor, 149 U.S. 164 (1893); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906).
But c.f Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320 ("cities are not sovereign entities.") (emphasis
added).
423. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 1994).
424. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
425. See Sharp, 34 Cal. at 290, citing Hunsacker, 5 Cal. at 290 (creditor of county has no
remedy by virtue of county's derivative sovereignty); see also Baldwin, 31 Cal. App. 4th at
175 (statutory references to "the State" may include counties).
But see LAFCO of Sacramento County, 3 Cal. 4th at 914 ("In our federal system the
states are sovereign but cities and counties are not; in California as elsewhere they are
mere creatures of the state and exist only at the state's sufferance.").
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county is not a corporation 42 6 and so is not a person in any sense.427 A
county always performs the State's business, even when managing its
property.4' Therefore, California courts hold that a county may in-
yoke immunity from city ordinances affecting its property,429 even
when leased to a private party that does not itself benefit from the
immunity,43 and even when a chartered city is regulating a municipal
affair.4
3 1
ii. The Intergovernmental Immunity Fiasco
Under California's Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, courts may not
by implication immunize mere cities, which are not sovereign, from
the valid regulations of counties, which are. In other words, county
regulation applying within that county's own territorial limits pre-
sumptively should preempt a city's activities outside of that city's ter-
ritorial jurisdiction. Unfortunately, that is not the law.
a. By statute, the State has waived sovereign immunity for all its
special districts, except certain transit agencies.
The Hall decision of 1956,432 which had immunized school dis-
tricts from local land use controls, was politically unpopular. Soon
after, the California Assembly's Interim Committee on Municipal and
County Government conducted a study of the problem, including
analysis by the Legislative Counsel and testimony from local officials.
Published as "Problems of Local Government Resulting from
Hall v. City of Taft Case Decision," this study had two stated pur-
poses: first, to inquire into the problems arising out of regulatory and
426. See Vagim, 230 Cal. App. 2d at 290 ("Speaking generally, a county is a legal subdi-
vision of the state. It is neither a private nor a public corporation, nor strictly speaking, a
corporation of any kind.").
427. Hunsacker, 5 Cal. at 290 (holding that county cannot be sued).
428. See Chambers, 33 Cal. App. at 149 (counties' governmental functions are per-
formed on behalf of the State); Guidi, 41 Cal. 2d 623 (counties do not always act in govern-
mental capacity but sometimes in proprietary capacity); County of Marin, 53 Cal. 2d at 638-
39 (because a county is merely a subdivision of the State, a county holds property in trust
for the people of the State); San Miguel Consol. Fire Protection Dist., 25 Cal. App. 4th 134,
143 (1994) (same), rev. denied, Aug. 25, 1994; see also Reclamation Dist No. 1500, 171 Cal.
at 680 (when State damages or takes its own property held by a county, it is not required to
provide compensation); Vagim, 230 Cal. App. 2d at 290 (same).
429. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 130-31 (1950); County of Santa Barbara
v. City of Santa Barbara, 59 Cal. App. 3d 364, 371 (1976); Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 244;
Vagim, 230 Cal. App. 2d at 291-92, 293; County of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 165.
430. See, e.g., Akins v. County of Sonoma, 67 Cal. 3d 185, 194 (1967).
431. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 165.
432. See supra part II.C.i.c.
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inspection powers pertaining to school construction, and second, to
inquire into "the overall problems of a possible complete immunity
from local regulations by those governmental agencies which might be
termed 'local agencies of the state.' [citation omitted] 4 33
Here, the Interim Committee cited to a letter from the Office of
the Legislative Counsel, which it also included as Appendix A to its
report. In that letter, the Legislative Counsel had written that under
Hall, most, but not all, government bodies in California could be in-
terpreted as a "local agency of the State."434
The Legislative Counsel4 35 went on to explain correctly that cities
are agencies of the State only when performing particular state pur-
poses, such as executing housing laws.43 6 Otherwise, cities are munici-
pal corporations, incorporated by their inhabitants for local
government purposes.437 That is, generally cities are not agencies of
the State, and, therefore, fall outside both of the Interim Committee's
stated purposes for its inquiry.4 38 Given the prominence of the Legis-
lative Counsel's letter in the Interim Committee's report, one can as-
sume that the Interim Committee made its recommendations with
reference to it.439
The Interim Committee's report also included testimony from
several city attorneys alarmed by the implications of extending the
Hall decision beyond school districts. All the city attorneys who
spoke called on the Legislature to submit at least some of its agencies
to local land use controls." 0 The representative for the County Su-
433. Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Mun. & County Gov't, Problems of Local Gov-
ernment Resulting from Hall v. City of Taft Case Decision, 6 AsSEM. INr. RPrS. 1957-1959
No. 8, 1, 7, as quoted in 56 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 210, 213 (1973) (emphasis added).
434. [A]s a general proposition, counties and all of the various types of districts, agen-
cies, and authorities, exercising governmental functions within limited territorial bounda-
ries and created or authorized by state law are agencies of the State for the local operation
of some particular function. For certain purposes cities may fall within such classification,
although as a general proposition they do not. See id., Appx. A, at 20 (Letter dated Sept.
24, 1958, from Legislative Counsel Ralph N. Kleps to Hon. Clark L. Bradley).
435. The Legislative Counsel, Ralph N. Kleps, signed the letter himself. See id.
436. See id., Appx. A, at 20-21, citing Housing Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d
at 861-62.
437. See id., Appx. A, at 21, citing Griffin v. County of Colusa, 44 Cal. App. 2d 915, 920
(1941), Dillwood, 42 Cal. App. at 607, and Coburn, 130 Cal. 636.
438. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
439. See Reuter, 220 Cal. at 323, quoting Knowles v. Yates, 31 Cal. 82, 89 (1866). "Con-
temporaneous exposition has ever been esteemed by jurists and statesmen as strong evi-
dence in support of an interpretation or construction of a statute, or of a provision of the
organic law in consonance with such expression." Id.
440. See Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Mun. & County Gov't, supra note 428, at 18-
19.
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pervisors Association of California ("CSAC") expressed the counties'
concern about their ability to site locally unwanted land uses, like
county jails, within cities.441 However, the CSAC spokesman thought
that localities could work out their differences outside of the courts,
without requiring new legislation."'
According to the report, the most important aspect of the Hall
case is "whether or not districts other than school districts should be
immune to local regulation and zoning."" 3 Several solutions to this
perceived problem were bandied about, most suggesting some kind of
waiver by the State of its immunity as it related to school districts and
other state agencies.
Presumably acting on what they had learned, two members of the
Interim Committee introduced Assembly Bill 156 ("A.B. 156") 4 4 4 to
waive sovereign immunity for "local agencies of the state" and to sub-
ject them to local land use regulation." 5 The Legislature passed A.B.
156 and then codified it as Government Code Sections 53090-53095, 4 6
with the intent to vest cities and counties with control over zoning and
building restrictions," 7  thereby strengthening local planning
authority.448
The Legislature expressly stated that the statutes apply to "each
local agency," 449 a term defined as: "an agency of the state for the
local performance of governmental or proprietary functions within
limited boundaries.""45 In the background study for the bill, this type
441. See id. at 19.
442. See iL
443. See id. at 17.
444. Interim Committee members William Biddick, Jr. and Carl A. Britschgi, intro-
duced the bill early in 1959. See Cal. Legis., Assem. Bills 1959 Regular Session, A.B. 80-
199, Assembly Bill No. 156 (Jan. 12, 1959, original draft).
445. See City of Lafayette v. East Bay Mun. Utils. Dist., 16 Cal. App. 4th 1005, 1013-14
(1993); accord Baldwin Park County Water Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, 208 Cal. App.
2d 87, 95-96 (1962); City of Santa Clara v. Santa Clara Unified Sch. Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d
152, 157 (1971), review denied, Feb. 16, 1972; City of Santa Cruz v. Santa Cruz Sch. Bd. of
Educ., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1, 5 (1989); 40 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 243, 246 (1962); see also Cal.
Legis., Assem. Bills 1959 Regular Session, A.B. 80-199, Assembly Bill No. 156 (Jan. 12,
1959, original draft), Legislative Counsel's Digest (A.B. 156 "[r]equir[es] each local agency
(excluding a city or county) to comply with all applicable building and zoning ordinances of
the county or city in which the local agency is situated.").
446. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53090-53095 (West 1997).
447. But see Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. City of Modesto, 210 Cal. App. 2d 652, 656-57
(1962) (Government Code §§ 53090-95 do not apply to Subdivision Map Act).
448. See City of Lafayette, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1014, citing Lawler v. City of Redding, 7
Cal. App. 4th 778,783 (1992), Modesto Irrigation Dist., 210 Cal. App. 2d at 656 and 37 Cal.
Att'y Gen. Op. 89, 91 (1961).
449. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53091 (West 1997).
450. Id. § 53090(a).
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of entity was referred to more succinctly as "local agencies of the
state."
451
Courts have since held that the class essentially includes all local
government agencies except counties, cities, and consolidated counties
and cities. For example, local state agencies include redevelopment
agencies4 52 and school districts,453  but, the class does not include
State agencies that are not "local," but instead operate statewide, like
the University of California. 45
b. Relying on an erroneous opinion by the Office of the California
Attorney General, California courts have misinterpreted A.B.
156.
The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a
court should ascertain the legislature's intent so as to effectuate the
purpose of the law.455 In determining the government bodies to which
A.B. 156 applied, the Legislature expressly excluded the following: (1)
the State, (2) counties, (3) cities, and (4) certain special districts han-
dling transit functions.456
Incredibly, California courts have interpreted this exclusionary
provision to mean that the Legislature intended to exempt all counties
and cities from having to comply with other counties' and cities' build-
ing and zoning ordinances.457 Although some of these court decisions
451. See Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Mun. & County Gov't, supra note 428, at 7.
452. See, e.g., City of Lafayette, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1013 (municipal utilities districts);
Kehoe, supra note 303, 67 Cal. App. at 673 (redevelopment agencies); 55 Cal. Att'y Gen.
Op. 375, 376 (1972) (local hospital districts); 37 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 89, 90 (1961) (irriga-
tion districts).
453. See, e.g., Santa Cruz Sch. Bd. of Educ., 210 Cal. App. 3d at 6-7 (school district);
Santa Clara Unified Sch. Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d at 156-158 (same).
454. See City of Santa Monica, 77 Cal. App. 3d at 136-37. According to the A.G., dis-
trict agricultural associations are not "local" agencies of the State either. See 56 Cal. Att'y
Gen. Op. 210, 215 (1973).
455. See California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Dist., 28 Cal. 3d
692, 698 (1981); Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222, 230
(1973); Select Base Materials v. Bd. of Equalization, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 645 (1959).
456. See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 53090(a) (West 1997). There are special immunity rules
for water districts. Water districts are generally required to comply with the building and
zoning ordinances of the county or city in which they are located, but they are immune
from those ordinances regulating construction of facilities directly and immediately used
for the protection and generation, of water, and merely related to storage or transmission
of water. See id. §§ 53091, 53096; City of Lafayette, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1015-16; accord
Baldwin Park County Water Dist, 208 Cal. App. 2d at 95-96; 78 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 31, 36-
37 (1995). Courts narrowly construe these exceptions for water districts. See 78 Cal. Att'y
Gen. Op. at 35-36, citing City of Lafayette, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1017.
457. See, e.g., Akins, 67 Cal. 3d at 194 (county); Lawler, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 783 (city);
County of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d at 166 (county); County of San Mateo v. Bartole,
reach the right result, they rest on a single erroneous opinion by the
Office of the California Attorney General ("A.G."),458 who misinter-
preted the Legislature's intent, if the A.G. considered it at all.
c. The California Attorney General did not give the statutes their
plain meaning.
To construe a statute, California courts first look to its language,
attempting to give effect to the usual, ordinary import of that lan-
guage, and seeking to avoid mere surplusage.459 The A.G.'s facial
analysis of the intergovernmental immunity statutes was limited to a
single, declaratory paragraph:
If the Legislature had not specifically exempted cities and coun-
ties after the use of the phrase, "'Local agency' means an agency
of the State for the local performance of governmental or pro-
prietary function within limited boundaries," an immediate
question would have arisen as to whether those entities had to
comply with all building and zoning ordinances as set forth in
section 53091. By the specific listing of these agencies as not be-
ing included as an affected agency in section 53090, it is clear that
the Legislature did not intend cities and counties to be subject to
building and zoning ordinances.46 °
However, the exemption of counties and cities from Government
Code Sections 53090 and 53091 does not mean that they are necessar-
ily immune from local ordinances regulating land use. The only logi-
cal conclusion from the statutes' plain language is that the Legislature
intended to ensure that "local agencies of the state," as defined in
Section 53090(a), are not immune from local land use regulation.
There is no textual basis to find that the statutory scheme in any way
granted immunity. Rather, the Legislature's words merely waive sov-
ereign immunity for only those state agencies it defined through ex-
clusion of all other possibilities.
184 Cal. App. 2d 422,434 (1960) (county); 57 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 124, 126 (1974) (county);
see also 38 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 156, 157-58 (1961) (city-owned improvements included in
assessment district but lying in unincorporated county territory are an extension of the city,
so they are immune from county ordinances).
458. See, e.g., Lawler, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 783 and Akins, 67 Cal. 3d at 194, both citing 40
Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 243, at 245.
459. See California Teachers Ass'n, 28 Cal. 3d at 698; Moyer, 10 Cal. 3d at 230; Select
Base Materials, 51 Cal. 2d at 645; see also Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 734
(1988) (normally, legislative intent is apparent from the enactment's language alone).
460. 40 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 243 at 245 (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, the A.G.'s opinion fails to harmonize A.B. 156 with
constitutional law.46' As the Legislative Counsel explained in his let-
ter to the Interim Committee, there are important constitutional dif-
ferences between California counties and cities,462 as there are
between the State and localities. The Attorney General's opinion
does not account for these differences.
Assuming arguendo that a legislative intent to grant intergovern-
mental immunity to cities and counties could be shown by negative
implication from the definition of local state agencies, why would the
Legislature have made such a grant to itself-"the State? '463 Under
California's Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, the State is never subject
to its own regulations,464 or those even of Home Rule localities, unless
it expressly says so. 465 Furthermore, counties are subdivisions of the
State,4 66 so the State cannot waive its sovereignty as exercised by
counties without doing so expressly.467 Therefore, A.B. 156 could not
immunize cities from county land use regulations by mere implication,
as the A.G. wrongly assumed.
d. The statutes' legislative history does not support but contradicts the
Attorney General's opinion.
Nor does the legislative history of A.B. 156 support the A.G.'s
opinion. Reading the enacted statutes to give an exemption to coun-
ties and cities from one another's land use controls contradicts the
State Legislature's undisputed intent in passing them: to invest in cit-
ies and in counties control over zoning and building restrictions, there-
by strengthening local planning authority.468
461. See County of Marin., 53 Cal. 2d at 638, 639; Riley, 6 Cal. 2d at 627; California
Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott, 17 Cal. 3d 575, 594 (1976) (same).
462. See supra part I.A.ii.
463. As initially proposed, Government Code Section 53090(a) defined local agencies
of the state to exclude "a city or a county". See Cal. Legis., Assem. Bills 1959 Regular
Session, A.B. 80-199, Assembly Bill No. 156 (Jan. 12, 1959, original draft). The Assembly
amended the definition to also exclude the San Francisco Port Authority, see id. (Apr. 28,
1959, draft), and, in the bill's final iteration, the Senate added "the State." See id. (May 22,
1959, draft).
464. See supra part III.C.i.b.
465. See supra part III.C.i.c.
466. See supra note 259.
467. See supra part III.C.i.d.
468. See City of Lafayette, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1014, citing Lawler, 7 Cal. App. 4th at
783, Modesto Irrigation Dist., 210 Cal. App. 2d at 656 and 37 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 89, 91
(1961).
As the Attorney General acknowledged in his opinion, 469 the
Legislature acted on the basis of the Interim Committee's published
study.47 The study is relevant because statutory construction should
take into account matters such as context, the object in view, the evils
to be remedied, and the history of the times.47 ' According to the
study, neither any witness nor the Interim Committee itself suggested
that the Legislature grant immunity from local regulations, not even
to cities as a quid pro quo for letting counties have their way.4 72 On
the contrary, the Interim Committee approached intergovernmental
immunity as a problem,473 which it suggested the Legislature either
ameliorate by waiving some of its agencies' immunity from local land
use regulation, or leave alone.474
Furthermore, it was two members of the Interim Committee who
sponsored A.B. 156. Normally, courts will not consider the motives or
understandings of individual legislators who authored a bill because
the others who supported their proposal may not have shared their
views.4 7 5 However, legislators' statements should be considered when
they reiterate legislative discussion leading to the adoption of pro-
posed amendments rather than when they merely express personal
opinion.476 That exception applies here.
In sum, there is no evidence that the Legislature ever intended to
express any opinion about intergovernmental immunity where "local
agencies of the state" were not involved. In fact, as discussed above,
what evidence there is suggests the opposite intention. Finally, even if
the Legislature had intended to positively immunize counties and cit-
469. See 40 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 243, at 245.
470. To ascertain legislative intent, courts may rely upon committee reports provided
they are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the statute. See Smith v. Rhea, 72
Cal. App. 3d 361, 369 (1977).
471. See Cossack v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 726, 733 (1974).
472. See Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Mun. & County Gov't, supra note 429, at 8-
14 (discussing school building issue), at 15-17 (discussing zoning issue), at 18-19 (discussing
sovereign immunity issue), at 23 ("Principal Witnesses Recommendations").
473. See id. at 7.
474. See id. at 23 ("Principal Witness Recommendations"); see, e.g., id. at 13 (witnesses
suggest empowering local jurisdictions to enforce ordinances with higher standards against
school districts).
475. See California Teachers Ass'n, 28 Cal. 3d at 698; accord In re Marriage of Bouquet,
16 Cal. 3d 583, 589-90 (1976), limited by Evangelatos v. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1209
(1988).
476. See California Teachers Ass'n, 28 Cal. 3d at 698; accord Marriage of Bouquet, 16
Cal. 3d at 589-90.
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ies from each other's ordinances, it had to do so expressly. Even the
A.G. recognized that the Legislature did not do this.
477
iii. Reconciling Sovereign Immunity with A.B. 156
The Legislature had a particular intent in passing A.B. 156.
Bringing together those statutes with the Sovereign Immunity Doc-
trine allows us to answer the five questions posed before: (1) May a
county or a city regulate a special district, (2) May a county regulate
the internal activities of a city or of another county, (3) May a city
regulate a county's external activities, (4) May a county regulate the
external activities of a city or county, and (5) May a city regulate an-
other city's external activities?
a. Neither a county nor a city may regulate a special district unless
given statutory authority to do so.
Although most special districts are "public corporations" operat-
ing only locally, they are all agencies of the State.478 Therefore, no
locality may regulate special districts unless the Legislature has
granted specific statutory authority for it to do so.47 9 Of course, if it
wishes, the State may waive the immunity of its various agencies.
That is exactly what the State has done in enacting A.B. 156 for "local
agencies of the state. '4 0 In comparison, the State has chosen not to
waive immunity for its other agencies, such as the University of Cali-
fornia,48 or, as just shown, for counties.48 2
b. A county may not regulate another county or city's internal
activities.
The police powers given to a county and to a city by the State
Constitution may be exercised by each only within their respective
477. See 40 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 243, at 245, 246.
478. See supra part III.A.iii.
479. See Rodeo Sanitary Dist. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1447 (1999).
480. See supra part IlI.C.ii.a. The State may also allow local residents to vote on
whether or not to form a special district. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 43, at 328, citing
City of Whittaker v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 2d 664, 667 (1944) (State may delegate decision to city
commission whether to activate vehicle parking district).
481. C.f. City of Santa Monica, 77 Cal. App. 3d at 136-37 (no mention of California
Government Code Section 53090). The University of California has long enjoyed immu-
nity from local regulation. See Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 622-23 (1913) (Con-
stitution of 1879 elevated University of California to the dignity of a constitutional
department or function of the State). Even the Eleventh Amendment applies. See Re-
gents of the Univ. of California v. John Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997).
482. See supra parts III.C.ii.c., III.C.ii.d.
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territorial jurisdictions.483 Consequently, one county cannot regulate
another county when the latter acts within the confines of its own ter-
ritorial jurisdiction. Similarly, a county, chartered or not, cannot regu-
late a city's internal affairs.
The State Legislature may empower one governmental agency,
such as a county, to perform functions for another governmental
agency, such as a city.484 However, while counties are rarely able to
use Home Rule as a shield against the State,485 chartered cities can
use this defense in the area of municipal affairs.486 Hence, the State
could not empower one of its agencies, not even a county, to intrude
on chartered cities' municipal affairs.
c. No city, even if chartered, may regulate a county, no matter where
the county's activities occur, unless it has specific statutory
authority to do so.
In Lawler v. City of Redding,487 a California court of appeal cited
the A.G.'s analysis of A.B. 156 to hold that a city may.develop propri-
etary land in an unincorporated area without having to comply with
the county's general plan.4 8 Apparently, Lawler had argued against
the A.G.'s reasoning, but the court refused to question it because the
plaintiff had not cited any authority to support a contrary view. 489
Thus, the Lawler court took the final, illogical step on the path laid
out by the A.G. by holding that municipal corporations are immune
from regulations by a subdivision of the State.
There is little benefit in recapping the flaws in the A.G.'s opinion.
Significantly, where California courts have not relied on it, they have
reached the right result. For example, they have held that any locality,
including a city, when exercising an interest in public improvements
deemed to jointly benefit publicly owned and used property, may in-
clude county-owned property for tax assessments.490 However, this is
true only where the Legislature expressly permits it.491
483. See supra note 267.
484. See Los Angeles County v. Super. Ct., 17 Cal. 2d 707 (1941).
485. See supra part III.A.iii.
486. See supra part III.A.ii.b.
487. 7 Cal. App. 4th 778.
488. See id. at 783.
489. See id. at 783 n.9.
490. See County of Santa Barbara, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 370, citing City of Saratoga v.
Huff, 24 Cal. App. 3d 978 (1972).
491. See id., citing City of Inglewood, 207 Cal. at 707.
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The reasoning begins with the premise that counties are political
subdivisions of the State,49 2 and perform many functions that are state
functions. Therefore, a county's operation and maintenance of its
property is a state function 93 which a city may not regulate. Califor-
nia courts have used this reasoning many times to immunize counties
from city land use regulation.494
d. A county may regulate a city's external activities even without
express statutory authority to do so, but it probably may not
regulate another county without such authority from the
Legislature.
The California Supreme Court has held that a county is, for cer-
tain purposes, "sovereign" because it is "a portion of the State Gov-
ernment. ' 495 Furthermore, unlike a city, a county is not a corporation
and therefore, not a legal "person. '496 Therefore, California courts
hold that a county may invoke immunity from city ordinances.497
In contrast, a municipal corporation is not constitutionally
equivalent to a county.498 Counties are legal subdivisions of the State,
created by the sovereign power of the State without particular solicita-
tion, consent, or concurrent action of inhabitants.499 Municipal corpo-
492. See supra note 260.
493. See County of Marin, 53 Cal. 2d at 638; c.f. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 171 Cal. at
679-80 ("In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the Legislature has full control of the
property held by counties as agencies of the state, and may dispose of that property with-
out the consent of the county or without compensating it.").
494. See, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Byram, 36 Cal. 2d 694,699 (1951) (board of super-
visors provision of suitable quarters for the municipal and superior courts is an administra-
tive function delegated by the State to the local governing body); Hite, 36 Cal. 2d at 130-31
(same); Vagim, 230 Cal. App. 2d 293 (counties need not consult with local authorities in
any manner when deciding where to locate a new courthouse on county land); see also 15
Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 67, 68 (1950) (city may not tax a county performing a State function).
495. See Sharp, 34 Cal. at 290, citing Hunsacker, 5 Cal. at 290 (creditor of county has no
remedy by virtue of county's derivative sovereignty).
496. Of course, the Legislature has empowered California counties to behave as if they
were legal persons in many situations. For example, county boards of supervisors may
acquire real and personal property for county purposes by purchase, gift, lease or condem-
nation. See Cal. Gov't Code §§25351 (public buildings), 25351.3 (land and buildings and
other facilities), 2352 (machinery); Reinking v. County of Orange, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1024; 45
Cal. Jur.3d, Municipalities, § 310, at 461.
497. See, e.g., Hunsacker, 5 Cal. at 290 (holding that county cannot be sued).
498. See Riley, 6 Cal. 2d at 627; Estate of Miller, 5 Cal. 2d at 597; People ex rel. Graves,
81 Cal. at 498; Bd. of Supervisors of Sacramento County, 45 Cal. 692; Southern California
Utils. v. City of Huntington Park, 32 F.2d 868 (1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 587 (1929); c.f
Colusa County, 44 Cal. App. 2d at 920 (counties are "state agencies" and are no more
liable than the State for injuries caused by their employees' negligence in performance of
governmental functions, but cities are "municipal corporations," not state agencies).
499. See supra note 31.
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rations, on the other hand, are called into existence through direct
solicitation or by free consent of the people composing them.5 00 Since
the passage of A.B. 156 in May 1959, at least one appellate court has
used this reasoning instead of A.B. 156 to uphold counties' immunity
from local ordinances.5 0 1
In addition, although counties are constitutional equals to each
other, this status exists only when they operate within their own terri-
torial jurisdictions. It would seem, then, that a county may also regu-
late another county's external activities.50 2 However, a county's
governmental functions are delegated by the State, so when perform-
ing such functions, within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to the
State's sovereignty. Sometimes, a county's proprietary functions are
also delegated by the State, as in the construction of a county jail. As
a result, when the Legislature delegates such a function to a county to
exercise outside of its normal territory, that county acts with the
State's sovereignty. Therefore, because the State must expressly
waive immunity from its own regulations, a county is presumptively
immune from other counties' land use regulations.
e. A general law city may regulate another city's external activities.
There can never coexist within the same territory, two distinct
municipal corporations exercising the same powers, jurisdiction, and
privileges. 0 3 Furthermore, there is no logical basis for allowing a mu-
nicipal corporation to flout the laws of another municipal corporation.
500. See id.
501. See Bartole, 184 Cal. App. 2d at 434 (the board of supervisors can override deci-
sions of the municipality with respect to the zoning of county-owned property, citing Cal.
Gov't Code § 65554 and Town of Atherton, 159 Cal. App. 2d at 423, 428).
502. Even a chartered local government's regulations may not exceed its territorial ju-
risdiction. In determining whether land use regulations are reasonably related to the pub-
lic welfare, courts will look to the public welfare of the entire affected region, not just the
public welfare of the local government's citizens. See Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d
582 ("[M]unicipalities are not isolated islands remote from the needs and problems of the
area in which they are located; thus an ordinance, superficially reasonable from the limited
standpoint of the municipality may be discerned as unreasonable when viewed from a
larger perspective."); Amel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 338
(1981) (applying "Livermore tests" to invalidate rezoning initiative operating to preclude
multi-family housing project and thereby failing to reasonably accommodate regional
housing needs).
503. See Allied Amusement Co. of Los Angles v. Bryam, 201 Cal. 316, 319-29 (1927);
accord Henshaw, 176 Cal. at 509; E. D. & A. L. Stone Co. v. Reilly, 158 Cal. 466 (1910);
East Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. at 457; Ex parte Roach, 104 Cal. at 277 (quoting
Judge Dillon); City of Burlingame v. San Mateo County, 103 Cal. App. 2d 885, 888 (1951).
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For example, in City of South Pasadena v. City of San Gabriel,"4
South Pasadena owned a tract of land in San Gabriel, where it in-
tended to drill a well to supplement its water supply. By ordinance,
San Gabriel required anyone wishing to drill wells within its jurisdic-
tion to first obtain a permit, and it refused South Pasadena's permit
application.50 5 The District Court of Appeals rejected South
Pasadena's attempt to compel issuance of the permit by writ of man-
date, and explained that sovereign immunity was irrelevant in the
case:
South Pasadena attempts to make much of the fact that in the
operation of its water plant it is engaged in the discharge of a
sacred trust in behalf of the beneficiaries thereof .... It is con-
tended, in effect, that because of this circumstance South
Pasadena was entitled to special consideration .... We think
the circumstance leads to the contrary conclusion. San Gabriel,
too, is engaged in the administration of a trust, that of protecting
its people from dangers to their health, comfort and general wel-
fare. San Gabriel is not concerned with the trust with which
South Pasadena burdened itself... if the execution of the latter
trust improperly impinges upon the rights of the people of San
Gabriel.... Under the law South Pasadena could not levy such
a tribute upon San Gabriel as would have been paid if the per-
mit had been granted." 6
The logic of the City of South Pasadena case still rings true.
D. Summary of Legal Framework
Current California case law holds that counties, cities, and consol-
idated cities-and-counties need not comply with any other localities'
land use regulations. As it happens, they usually comply anyway.
Generally, they do not want to harm relations with neighboring local
governments, but there are non-political factors at work, too. For ex-
ample, environmental statutes, like the California Environmental
Quality Act, 07 serve as a second line of land use planning defense.508
504. 134 Cal. App. 403 (1933), review denied, Nov. 27, 1933, appeal dismissed, 292 U.S.
602 (1934).
505. See id. at 406.
506. See id. at 416-17, quoted with approval in Sunny Slope Water Co., 1 Cal. 2d at 97-
98.
507. CAL. PUB. Ris. CODE §§ 21000-21178.1 (West 1996).
508. Under CEQA both public and private projects that have a "significant environ-
mental effect" require the preparation of an Environmental Impact Report ("E.I.R."). See
id. § 21165 (West 1996); Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247 (1972);
CuRnN's CALIFORNIA LAN- USE ArD PL.rN'ro LAW, supra note 236, p. 87. Some inter-
governmental cooperation also comes of the statutory prohibition on counties and special
districts' acquiring, building, or disposing of real property outside of their boundaries with-
Further, owners of property adjacent to government property have a
constitutional right to reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
prior to an adjudicative decision on a proposed project that will de-
prive those owners of a significant property interest.50 9
It is good public policy that a locality should be immune from the
regulations of other localities when it is performing a state-directed
task, such as constructing a jail. Conversely, a city should not be enti-
tled to ignore local land use regulations when it uses its property for
profit. 1° Counties are different. Because they are subdivisions of the
State,5 ' they share the State's presumptive immunity from all State
and local regulation.
The City and County of San Francisco is a unique case because it
exercises the functions of both city and county. 12 For example, San
Francisco plans to develop a golf course and residential subdivision on
its surplus land in Alameda County.5 13 Courts have construed A.B.
156 to immunize San Francisco from having to comply with local land
out first having submitted such projects for review by the planning agency of the county or
city with territorial jurisdiction. (Cal. Gov't Code § 65402(b)-(c).) The planning agency
then has forty days to check the project for conformity with the relevant general plan and
make a report. (Id.) Of course, the holding in Lawler makes this check and report purely
advisory.
509. See Horn v. City of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 612-13 (1979).
510. The State Constitution immunizes local governments' property from taxation, re-
gardless of profit motive. See CA. CONST. art. XIII, § 3(b). However, when such property
is located in other local jurisdictions it is subject to taxation. See id., § 11; see generally City
and County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo, 10 Cal. 4th 554 (1995). In 1960, San
Francisco Mayor George Christopher complained to the Governor's Commission on Met-
ropolitan Problems that his city paid over $600,000 in property taxes to San Mateo County
on its 23,000 acres of watershed and for San Francisco International Airport. See Hon.
George Christopher, Statement, in GovERNOR'S COMMIrSSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA
PROBLEMS, METROPOLTrrAN CALiFoRNLX, supra note 1, at 47-48. For property owned by
San Francisco's Water Department, Christopher reported over $350,000 in property taxes
paid to Alameda County, over $20,000 paid to Santa Clara County, and nearly $30,000 paid
to Tuolumne, Mariposa, Stanislaus and San Joaquin counties. See id. Christopher thought
it especially unjust that his city should pay so much to San Mateo County when the airport
had done so much to stimulate the local economy. San Francisco's argument is the same as
that made by business owners the world over. Perhaps, the key determinant should have
been whether the Water Department and the airport were profit-seeking operations.
511. See supra note 260.
512. See Dineen, 38 Cal. App. at 490, citing Keyes, 177 Cal. at 323-24 and Nicholl, 157
Cal. 416.
513. See CrrY OF PLEASANTON AND SAN FRANCISCO WATER DEPARTMENT, STATE OF-
FICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH CLEARINGHOUSE No. 96-013005, FINAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT REPORT: BERNAL PROPERTY, CITY OF PLEASANTON PROJECr No. SP-95-02,
SPECIFIC PLAN, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT, PREZONING, AND OTHER RELATED ACTIONS
5-16 (May 1999).
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use laws, though San Francisco has done so voluntarily. 14 Although
the courts' reasoning is wrong, the result may be correct. San Fran-
cisco's county status gives it sovereign immunity, so it need not com-
ply with laws unless the State Legislature affirmatively requires it. On
the other hand, San Francisco would operate as a developer in Ala-
meda County, not only outside of its territorial jurisdiction, but in
search of profit.
The sovereign immunity doctrine has fallen into disrepair in the
California courts, which tend to think that the distinction between
governmental and proprietary activities is old-fashioned and unwork-
able. In fact, when deciding tort cases, the courts have not missed
sovereign immunity much. 15 Yet, when deciding cases involving in-
tergovernmental relations, the courts are hopelessly lost without the
doctrine's careful legal distinctions. Lacking a new, coherent theory
by which to distinguish between the State, counties, cities, chartered
counties, chartered cities, chartered cities-and-counties, and special
districts, California courts become understandably confused.
If political realities were all that mattered, this might be irrele-
vant. However, any land use decision reached in violation of the con-
stitution is vulnerable to attack in the courts. Without a firm
constitutional basis, no regulatory scheme is viable. If California
counties are to serve a supervisory role in regional planning, courts
must recognize their superior constitutional status to cities. Either
that, or the State Constitution must be revised yet again.
514. Although in an area addressed by the Alameda County's East County Area Plan,
the project site also lies within the City of Pleasanton's planning area and its sphere of
influence. San Francisco has chosen to seek land use entitlements from Pleasanton. See
CITY OF PLEASANTON AND SAN FRANcisco WATER DEPARTMENT, STATE OImcE OF
PLANNING & REsEARCH CLEARINGHOUSE No. 96-013005, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT REPORT: BERNAL PROPERTY, CrrY OF PLEASANTON PRoJecr No. SP-95-02, SPECIFC
PLAN, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT, PREZONING, AND OTHER RELATED AcnONs 4-6
(May 1997).
515. The California Tort Claims Act establishes public entities' complete non-liability
for injuries arising outside of contract or constitutional provisions, but permits exceptions
by specific statute. See Odello Bros. v. County of Monterey, 63 Cal. App. 4th 778, 792
(1998) (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815, Legis. Com. Comment-Sen. at 1 (West 1985)),
review denied Aug. 12, 1998. Thus, the Legislature has abolished all common law or judi-
cially declared forms of government liability in California, and set out "with precision and
clarity" the rights and duties of claimants and public entities. See Stanley v. City and
County of San Francisco, 48 Cal. App. 3d 575, 579 (1975).
IV. A Suggested Strategy for County-Based Regional
Planning in California
Having first traced the political history of California counties in
Section II, Section III explained how they are uniquely positioned
under State law to make intergovernmental land use decisions. In this
final section, I propose a strategy for regional planning based on
county government, and suggest how it might happen.
Theoretically, California's regional planning strategy need not be
based on institutions at all. Comprehensive planning based upon
building consensus among all interested parties presents a compelling
alternative.516 Recently, the consensus-building model has been used
to address several regional problems in California; most notably the
allocation of water rights among environmental, residential and farm-
ing interests under the CALFED Bay-Delta Program.5 17 However,
while useful in some cases, it is unclear how a consensus-based strat-
egy can compel compliance with its resulting decisions.518 Moreover,
the model is ad hoc because it can only work when stakeholders re-
spond to particular issues.
California's regional problems arise because there is little incen-
tive for local governments to care about their nonresidents or, for that
matter, non-voters. In contrast, government institutions have the ad-
vantage of compelling cooperation. Just because there are few institu-
tions currently serving this function in regard to regional planning,
does not mean it must be so.
California counties are not the only institutions that could serve
in this role. As noted in Section I, planners tend to favor creating new
regional bodies, such as special districts, that are custom-tailored for
516. See generally, Judith E. Innes, Planning Through Consensus Building: A New View
of the Comprehensive Planning Ideal, 62 J. AM. PLAN. ASs'N 460 (1996).
517. CALFED is a consortium formed in 1994 of state and federal agencies with man-
agement and regulatory responsibilities in the Bay-Delta. CALFED Bay-Delta Program
Overview, CALFED, http://calfed.ca.gov/generalloverview.html; Framework Agreement,
CALFED, http://calfed.ca.govfhistorical/framework.html; see also 110 Stat. 3009-748
(1996), Pub. L. 104-208, Div. E, Title I (California Bay-Delta Environmental Enhancement
and Water Security Act). CALFED's massive draft plan took four years to complete. See
CALFED Announces Plan for Bay-Delta, CALFED, June 25, 1999, http:llcalfed.ca.gov/
events/announce.html.
518. The consensus-based model assumes that public policy is merely the result of con-
sensual agreement by competing groups. See Innes, supra note 512, at 463, 465. While it is
vital to involve stakeholders in planning decisions, allowing consensus to rule supreme
renders planners into apolitical technicians, an undesirable, and perhaps impossible, result.
Our constitutional systems, both national and state, do not rely upon unanimity. Rather,
they assume that good public policy often requires implementing unpopular policies, and
protecting minority viewpoints.
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each region's particular problems. The California Legislature proba-
bly cannot transfer all county and city functions to special districts,519
but it may wholly preempt land use planning and implementation
schemes, like zoning. The Legislature could create a single special dis-
trict able to control planning and land use approvals made within that
district's territory. In fact, the Legislature employed this method in
creating the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA"). 520
Unfortunately, TRPA is a poor model of California regional plan-
ning for several reasons.521 First, while TRPA has express authority to
devise a regional plan and to effectuate it by all necessary means,522
TRPA has no role in the city formation process.5 1 That task falls to
county-based LAFCOs.124 Second, Lake Tahoe is a unique natural
resource. 51 Except where other such resources are at stake-the Cal-
ifornia coastline, or the waters of San Francisco Bay-regional
schemes regularly fail in California for overambition.
An attempt from 1974 is illustrative. That year, Assemblyman
John Knox introduced Assembly Bill 2040 ("A.B. 2040"), which
would have created a new planning agency for the San Francisco Bay
Area, the Association of Bay Area Governments ("ABAG") in place
of its council of governments ("COG").526 The new agency was to
govern several special districts in the Bay Area, including its clearing-
519. The State Constitution vests general police power only in counties and cities. Con-
sequently, the State Constitution probably forbids the Legislature from transferring all
county and city functions to special districts. See Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. at 641 ("[A]n
act by the legislature in general terms that the local legislative body would have no power
to enact sanitary or other regulations, while in a sense a general law would have for its
effective purpose the nullification of the constitutional grant, and therefore, be invalid.")
520. See Younger I, 5 Cal. 3d at 497; see generally Gary J. Spradling, Regional Govern-
ment for Lake Tahoe, 22 HASTINGs L. J. 705 (1971). In Younger I, the court observed
cryptically that only regional planning and zoning were at issue, not local planning and
zoning. See Younger I, 5 Cal. 3d at 497. The court did not say where one ends and the
other begins.
521. An obvious reason is that TRPA's enabling act, the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact, see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66800-66901 (West 1997), required Congressional ap-
proval, making it a product of federal law. See Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
566 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub. nom. Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). Of course, this fact
does not prevent California from setting up similar agencies without interstate jurisdiction.
522. Se CAL. GOV'T CODE § 67109 (West 1997).
523. See id.
524. See supra part I.C.ii.
525. See Younger 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 485.
526. See Brunetti, supra note 1, 42 HASTINGs L.J. at 1115, citing A.B. 2040, Cal. Legis.
Reg. Sess. 1974, at 3 (as amended by Senate on Aug. 5, 1974).
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house for transportation funds, the Metropolitan Transportation Com-
mission ("M.T.C.")527 , and B.C.D.C.51
A.B. 2040's mistake was to grant the new agency power to review
and comment upon any application by a city, county, or special district
for state or federal funds for any project deemed to have a regional
impact.52 9 Posing such a direct threat to dollars alarmed local officials,
and A.B. 2040 died in the Senate, albeit by a close vote.53°
Creating a new level of regional government, no matter how lim-
ited its powers, has often suffered from bad public relations in Califor-
nia. A decade before A.B. 2040, a regional Bay Area government
that was to serve as an advisor in regional planning died amid accusa-
tions of "metropolitan supergovernment. ''5 31 Still other efforts during
this century sought to consolidate counties or create new consolidated
cities-and-counties; some using a federal model.5 32 These all failed.533
Today, statutory requirements for county consolidation are strin-
gent,534 and county residents remain jealous of their autonomy.535
527. M.T.C. serves as the Bay Area's "metropolitan planning organization," or "MPO,"
for the purpose of earning federal transportation grants. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66500-
66532 (West 1997) (Metropolitan Transportation Commission Act).
528. See id., citing A.B. 2040, Cal. Legis. Reg. Sess. 1974, at 35 (as amended by Senate
on Aug. 5, 1974).
529. See id., citing A.B. 2040, Cal. Legis. Reg. Sess. 1974, at 27-28 (as amended by Sen-
ate on Aug. 5, 1974).
530. See id., citing Cal. Legis., Sen. Local Gov't Comm., hearing on A.B. 2040-Bay
Area Regional Planning Agency, May 17, 1974, held in City and County of San Francisco,
at 45-65, 108-13, 114-16.
531. See BOLLENS & SCoTT, supra note 84, at 10.
532. Any time a large city is involved, history has shown that voters living outside it
tend to be wary of a merger. See, e.g., William E. Glazer, Pres., Oakland Chain. of Com-
merce, Argument Against Initiative measure to Amend Art. XI, § 7, AMENDMENTs TO CON-
STITrTION AND PROPOSED STATUTES WITH ARGUMENTS RESPECTING THE SAME TO BE
SUBMITrED TO THE ELECTORS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AT THE GENERAL ELECTION
ON TUESDAY, Nov. 5, 1912, at 23-24 (Sacramento: Super. of State Printing, 1912) (attack-
ing amendment to county consolidation procedure as attempt by City and County of San
Francisco to build an empire).
533. See Scor & BOLLENS, GOVERNING A METROPOLITAN REGION: TE SAN FRAN-
CiSCO BAY AREA, supra note 10, at 54-65 (describing failed borough-based consolidation
campaigns in Alameda County, and for San Francisco and San Mateo counties); VAN AL-
sTYNE, supra note 43, at 225 (describing failed borough-based consolidation of San Fran-
cisco and San Mateo counties); BOLLENS & SCOTT, supra note 84, at 9 (describing failed
borough-based consolidation campaigns in Alameda County, and for San Francisco and
San Mateo counties); Wallace v. Bd. of Supervisors, 2 Cal. 2d 109, 110-12 (1934) (describ-
ing failed consolidation of several cities with Alameda County); CAL. COMM'N ON CoUNTrY
Holm RULE, supra note 1, at 170.
534. See supra part III.B.iii.
535. The 1930 Commission on County Home Rule mentioned rural suspicion of bigger
cities as a particular problem, and reported that county consolidation would require careful
salesmanship. See CAL. CONIM'N ON COUNTY HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 140.
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In short, movements for regional government have often begun
optimistically, only to end in disappointment. Some regionalists stub-
bornly persist in playing the role of Charlie Brown trying to kick the
football, only to have the voters, like Lucy, yank it away at the last
minute.53 6 Accordingly, it makes sense to abandon this approach, and
try something else.
A county-based strategy for regional planning is more realistic
than one that requires eliminating Home Rule. Unlike regional plan-
ning authorities, counties already exist. Special districts, councils of
governments and the like are more mysterious and, therefore, less
compelling to voters than are counties. As political scientists John C.
Bollens and Stanley Scott put it, voters do not care about government
bodies they have never heard of.5 3
7
Also, unlike some extant regional bodies, counties already pos-
sess general "police power," including the power to plan and imple-
ment land use controls.538 It seems almost irresponsible for
regionalists to dream of new organizations governing within ideal ju-
risdictional lines when counties already exist, spread across the State
map.
As currently configured, few California counties correspond to
useful regional planning areas.539 Many counties were obsolete by the
time the Gold Rush had ended, when their populations and property
values evaporated.540 Some never made sense.54' Unfortunately, ob-
536. Because I liked it so much, I have stolen this metaphor directly from the mouth of
Michael B. Teitz, of the Public Policy Institute of California. Michael B. Teitz, private con-
versation, May 14, 1998.
537. Scorr & BoLLENS, supra note 10, at 27. Most voters have only heard of govern-
ment agencies that send them bills for taxes or services. On this score, voters tend to know
their municipal utilities districts, like East Bay MUD and Sacramento MUD.
538. Even in California's rural counties, supervisors are accustomed to dealing with
land use matters on their dockets. C.f Alvin D. Sokolow, Legislators and Legislating in
County Government, in LocAL GovERNMENT AUTONOMY IN CALIFoRNiA, at 32-35 (Linda
Martin, ed., 1984) (comparing proceedings of Glenn and Amador county boards of super-
visors to those of two comparable bodies in rural Illinois).
539. The County of San Diego nearly corresponds to a logical planning region, but the
Mexican City of Tijuana complicates things considerably because it is part of another sov-
ereign nation. See CROucH, ET AL., supra note 3, at 261.
540. See CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HOME RULE, supra note 1, at 145.
541. See supra, note 25. The time-honored example is Alpine County, home to little
over a thousand people pressed up against California's border with Nevada. Alpine was
carved out of five other counties (El Dorado, Amador, Calaveras, Tuolumne, and Mono)
in 1864 without legitimate reason. See CAL. COMM'N ON COUNTY HOME RULE, supra note
1, at 21. The delegates at the 1878-1879 Constitutional Convention mentioned Alpine's
creation as one of the follies they hoped new Article XI would arrest. See, e.g., GATEs,
supra note 6, at 1042-43.
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scure political machinations have left a legacy of undersized counties
with illogical boundaries.542
One may also fault counties for their parochialism. The San
Francisco Bay Area provides two good examples. Contra Costa
County's recalcitrance in addressing regional air quality problems
prompted the State, in 1955, to create the Bay Area Air Pollution
Control District, today's Bay Area Air Quality Management Dis-
trict.543 During the 1960s, the counties of San Mateo and Main with-
drew from the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District
("BART"), which did not need any more help on its way to planning
ignominy. 5" Finally, and most importantly, counties cannot regulate
matters within incorporated areas.5 45
For these reasons, it seems that counties are not ready-made re-
gional governments. Nevertheless, they are not simply second-rate lo-
calities either. Nearly fifty years ago, two distinguished California
political scientists, Bollens and Scott, wrote that county planning com-
missions are the "logical unit to provide coordination and assistance in
metropolitan planning." '546 For all their shortcomings, counties re-
main a viable and logical focus for regional planning in California.5 47
Even accepting county boundaries as immutable, giving counties some
542. Sixty years ago, when the automobile was still young, the State's Commission on
County Home Rule opined that "modern highways" meant that no California county
should cover fewer than 1,000 square miles. See CAL. COMM'N ON CouNTY HoM RULE,
supra note 1, at 83. Sixteen of the State's 58 counties (28%) fall below that arbitrary stan-
dard. See CALIFORNIA CrrEs, TowNs & CouNTrs, supra note 3, at 477 (Alameda), 478
(Alpine), 479 (Amador), 483 (Contra Costa), 497 (Marin), 504 (Napa), 505 (Nevada), 506
(Orange), 510 (Sacramento), 514 (San Francisco), 517 (San Mateo), 520 (Santa Cruz), 522
(Sierra), 524 (Solano), 527 (Sutter), 534 (Yuba).
543. See Stanley Scott, Major Metropolitan Studies and Action Programs in California,
in GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, METROPOLITAN CALI-
FORNIA, supra note 1, at 24, citing Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 1797; Wayne A. Brooks, The Me-
tropolis, Home Rule, and the Special District: Part I, 11 HASTINGS L. J. 110, 115 (1959-
1960).
544. See PETER HALL, GREAT PLANNING DISASTERS, at xvi-xvii, 109-137 (1982); Melvin
Webber, The BART Experience-What Have We Learned?, PUB. INT. 79-108 (FALL, 1976).
At the beginning of the 1960s, San Francisco Mayor George Christopher lamented that the
State Legislature itself sabotaged BART by planning $1.5 billion in freeways years before
BART began construction. See Hon. George Christopher, Statement, in GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS, lETROPOLITAN CALIFORNIA, supra
note 1, at 49.
545. See supra part II.C.iii.b.
546. See Scorr & BOLLENs, GOVERNING A METROPOLITAN REGION: THE SAN FRAN-
CISCO BAY AREA, supra note 10, at 102.
547. C.f JOHN M. WINTERS, STATE CONSTITrTIONAL LImrrAIONs ON SOLUTIONS OF
METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS 50,52 (1961) (noting California counties' peculiar suita-
bility for regional planning).
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oversight over land use decisions made within their boundaries would
be a constructive step toward meeting California's regional problems.
Certainly, California's long history of piecemeal, ad hoc solutions
has not produced a better answer for the State's regional problems
than county-level government. County-based regional planning may
be unglamorous and imperfect, but, as this article hopes to persuade
its readers, California need not address its regional problems through
perfect solutions. Indeed, as land use problems accelerate, Californi-
ans cannot afford to chase perfect planning models.
A county-based strategy suggests at least two possible tactics to
achieve it. First, the Legislature might delegate the State's authority
to its county boards of supervisors over "countywide affairs." The
definition of countywide affairs could be left to the counties to define
in their discretion. Alternatively, the Legislature could amend the
Planning and Zoning Law specifically to authorize each of California's
58 counties to exercise the State's power over planning and land use
controls.
The first approach appeals because counties are mandatory geo-
graphical subdivisions of the State,54 so it makes sense that county
boards of supervisors should be able to act as mini-Legislatures in re-
gard to all land within their boundaries. According to the California
Supreme Court, legislative matters can be classified into two, mutually
exclusive types: "statewide concerns" and "municipal affairs." '54 9
Therefore, it would be of no moment to the State Constitution, or the
courts, if the Legislature carved out "countywide concerns" from its
"statewide concerns." Moreover, since statewide concerns include
planning and zoning, the Legislature would be able to delegate those
subjects to counties.550
548. See supra note 260.
549. Professor Peppin criticized the California Supreme Court for assuming in Golden
Gate Bridge & Highway Dist., 214 Cal. 308, and Hinman, 220 Cal. 578, that anything non-
local must be a statewide concern. See PEnqPm IV, supra note 96, at 666-67. Peppin pre-
ferred the reasoning in Henshaw, supra note 266, 176 Cal. 507, in which the court held that
a special district that subsumes several utilities each with the taxing power did not violate
former Section 12 to Article XI, barring state imposed taxes for local purposes, because the
new special district was dealing with "non-local" things. See id. Other scholars, namely
Professors Sato and McEwen, disagreed with Peppin. See Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in
California, supra note 132, at 1072-73; McEwen, supra note 1, at 438-39 n.43. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court takes Sato and McEwen's side, and the Henshaw approach is no longer
the law. See Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 399-400.
550. C.f Ferran, 50 Cal. App. 2d at 379 (city's ordinances have no extraterritorial effect
without express permission of the sovereign power).
In 1967, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne suggested in his report to
the Constitution Revision Commission that chartered counties should
gain control over "county affairs," an analogue to chartered cities' su-
perseding authority over their municipal affairs."' "Countywide af-
fairs" differ from Van Alstyne's proposal because they are not limited
to unincorporated areas, but cover cities as well. Also, unlike munici-
pal affairs whose definition is subject to unpredictable court deci-
sions ,552 "countywide affairs" would be defined solely by the
Legislature, whose intent would be dispositive.
This tactic could be hard to sell to voters that live in cities. Many
Californians may not even realize that the Legislature sitting in Sacra-
mento can preempt ordinances passed in their city halls. Creating
"countywide affairs" would not impinge on cities' police powers any
more than is already possible through State law. Nevertheless, voters
may not trust county boards of supervisors with such preemptive
power over their cities' ordinances. Indeed, if county boards are able
to pass ordinances tailored to local needs and apply them to incorpo-
rated areas, one wonders what important policy issues would be left
for city councils to address.
Therefore, the second alternative may be better. Through an
amendment to the State Planning and Zoning Law, the Legislature
could simply delegate its statewide concern in land use planning to
each county, in 58 pieces corresponding to the counties' respective ter-
ritories. This approach is sometimes called the "urban county"
plan.553
Voters in Dade County, Florida, adopted such a plan in 1957.554
Cities within that county, including Miami, did not merge into a con-
solidated city and county, nor did they surrender their legislative pow-
ers. Instead, Dade County can only preempt cities' legislative powers
in the limited areas of transportation, health care, welfare relief, parks
and recreation, public housing, redevelopment, air quality, flood pro-
tection, drainage, and economic promotion.555
551. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 43, at 169.
552. See supra part III.A.ii.b.
553. See Sco-r & BOLLENS, GOVERNING A METOPOLIrAN REGION: THE SAN FRAN-
CisCO BAY AREA, supra note 10, at 65-70.
554. See Scorr & BOLLENS, GOVERNING A METROPOLrAN REGION: THE SAN FRAN-
CISCO BAY AREA, supra note 10, at 67-68; see generally Feldman & Jassy, supra note 178, at
529-45.
555. See Scoi-r & BOLLENS, GOVERNING A MErROPOLrAN REGION: THE SAN FRAN-
CISCO BAY AREA, supra note 10, at 67.
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Florida, like California, is both high-growth and a Home-Rule
state,556 so there is no reason to think that the Dade County model is
not transferable. 55 7 Still, if the Dade-County model seems too heavy-
handed, California legislation need not assign planning duties com-
pletely to counties. Instead, the Legislature could require California
counties to impose a consistency requirement on cities' land use plans
and implementation measures. 558 The Cortese-Knox Act uses a simi-
lar approach in its delegation of the State's authority over local
boundaries to LAFCOs. 5
59
To make this second tactic work, the Legislature probably would
have to allow counties to discipline cities by withholding planning-re-
lated funds and even imposing penalties for non-cooperation. 6 ° Cali-
fornia's independently minded cities may be more willing to accept
such discipline from their nearby county government than from a dis-
tant State body unfamiliar with local conditions, 56' including local
political pressures. Naturally, no matter how the Legislature defines
"countywide affairs," the State Constitution forbids even the State to
legislate in the area of chartered cities' municipal affairs. Conse-
quently, a county could not do so either without offending Home
Rule. According to some, charter-based Home Rule makes the
county "completely ineffective" in solving regional problems.5 62 I dis-
agree. By definition, regional problems cannot be municipal affairs in
California.563
556. See John M. DeGrove, Critical Area Programs in Florida: Creative Balancing of
Growth and the Environment, 34 J. URnB. & Com4rM?. LAW 51, 52-53 (1988); Feldman &
Jassy, supra note 177, at 560.
557. Non-transferability to California is the problem with several regional-governance
models, like the Toronto, Ontario, and Portland, Oregon, models.
558. Professor Scott Bollens calls these "conjoint planning programs." See Scott A.
Bollens, State Growth Management: Intergovernmental Frameworks and Policy Objectives,
58 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 454, 458 (1992).
559. See supra part I.C.ii.
560. This is how the Florida's Growth Management Act works. See id. at 458; see also
John M. DeGrove, Florida's Growth Management System: A Blueprint for the Future, 14
FLA. ENVTh. & URB. ISSUES 1 (1986).
561. Here, I have in mind bodies like the State's Office of Housing and Community
Development ("H.C.D."). The State Planning and Zoning Law provides that every city
must submit its draft housing element to H.C.D. See Cal. Gov't Code § 65585(b) (West
1997). H.C.D. then reviews the draft element to determine if it "substantially complies"
with the Housing Elements article. See Cal. Gov't Code § 65585(b), (d) (West 1997). If
H.C.D. finds that the draft element does not substantially comply, then the legislative body
that submitted it must either redraft the element to make it substantially comply, or in-
clude an explanation in its written findings explaining its reasons for believing that its draft
element does substantially comply. See Cal. Gov't Code § 65585(f) (West 1997).
562. See, e.g., Brunetti, supra note 1, at 1125.
563. See supra note 291.
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Even if it were politically possible to amend the California Con-
stitution to undo Home Rule, and it probably is not, the history of
California's pre-Home Rule constitutional regime is not happy. The
intent of county-based regional government is not to glorify counties
but to solve regional problems. It does not require throwing out
Home Rule with the dirty bath water of dysfunctional regional plan-
ning. Individual citizens can expect local government to be more so-
licitous of their concerns, because of both its proximity5 6 4 and greater
risk of legal liability.565 It seems unwise to take that away.5 66
Moreover, imbuing counties with regional power is less likely to
give credence to strong opposition from Home Rule proponents, or
even to inspire it. This is especially so because California counties
rarely comprise an entire metropolitan area.567 In this context, newly
energized county governments pose less of a threat to vested political
interests. What is an apparent flaw for regional planning should be
exploited to political advantage.
The details for implementing my two suggested tactics, including
timing, are well beyond the scope of this article. I leave to the ex-
perts-lawyers, planning scholars and practitioners, regional econo-
mists, elected officials, political consultants, whomever-to determine
the proper way to design and carry out a workable program to im-
prove California regional planning. This article only seeks to suggest
a strategy, not stipulate particulars.
564. "[T]he city is where the action is. It is the first line of government for most people.
They feel their problems and frustrations where they live and work, and it is in their com-
munities where people state their expectations and lodge their complaints." ALLAN B.
JACOBS, MAKING CrrY PLANNING WORK 316 (reprinted ed.,1995).
565. See LEAGUE OF CAL. Crrms, supra note 208, Keynote Panel, remarks of Prof.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Stanford Univ., and City Att'y Manuela Albuquerque, City of
Berkeley; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1068-70
(1980).
566. See Lynch, 51 Cal. at 30 ("The advantage of having the home work done at home
commends itself to every mind.").
567. The federal Census Bureau uses some California counties as Primary Metropolitan
Statistical Areas ("P.M.S.A.s"): Shasta ("Redding"), Butte ("Chico-Paradise"), San Diego
("San Diego"), Kern ("Bakersfield"), San Luis Obispo ("San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-
Paso Robles"), Santa Barbara ("Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc"), Monterey ("Sali-
nas"), Tulare ("Visalia-Thlare-Porterville"), Merced ("Merced"), Stanislaus ("Modesto"),
and Stockton ("Stockton-Lodi"). See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bur. of Census, Califor-
nia-Metropolitan Areas, Counties, and, Selected Areas, COUNTY & CrrY DATA BOOK,
1994, at C-5, C-7 (12th ed., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Print. Ofc., 1994). Obviously, the
Census has had to simplify for statistical purposes.
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